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INTRODUCTION 
In 1543, the Polish astronomer, Nicolas Copernicus, determined 
the heliocentric design of the solar system. 1 Copernicus was motivated 
in large part by the conviction that Claudius Ptolemy's geocentric 
astronomical model, which dominated scientific thought at that time, 
was too incoherent , complex, and convoluted to be true. 2 Hence, 
Copernicus made a point of making his model coherent. simple, and 
elegant. Nearly three and a half centuries later, at the height of the 
impressionist movement , the French painter Claude Monet set out to 
depict the Ruen Cathedral in a series of twenty paintings,' each pre-
senting lhe cathedral in a different light. Mone t's goal was to 
demonstrate how his object of study may be perceived by observers 
differently depending on the circumstances of the observation. In the 
spirit of these two projects, in 1972, Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed resolved to craft a comprehensive , yet e legant,~ model for 
l. See JACOB BRONOWSKI & BRUCE MAZLISH. Til [ WEST ERN INTELLECTUAL 
TRADITION 113 (1960). For the purpose of historic accuracy. it is important to note that 1543 
was the ye ar in which Copernicus published his REVOLUTIONS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 
It is highly likely that Copernicus completed his account we ll before 1543, but was afraid that 
his views would offend the religious establishment of his time . Thus. Copernicus delayed the 
publication of his book until 1543, the year of his death. and rumor has it that he died hold-
ing the first printed copy of the book in his hands. I d. 
2. Jd. at 112-15. 
3. See KARIN SAGNER-DUCHTING. CLAUDE MONET, 1840-1926. at 172-73 (1998). 
4. See Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Vinues of rhe Carhedral , 106 YALE L.J. 
2201. 2202 (1997) [he reinafter Calabresi. Remarks] (stating that the Calabresi-Melamedian 
lra mc work was inte nded to be simple and elegant): Saul Levmore . UniJ:ving Re111edies: 
Properly Rules, Liabilitv Rules, and Starrling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 21 49. 2155 (1997) (com-
me nding Calabresi and M elame d for the elegance of their model). 
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o rga ni zing th e uni verse of lega l entitleme nts. ' The a rticl e's impact has 
bee n profound a nd enduring.6 
In their path-breaking article, Property Rules. Liubiliry Rules. and 
Jnolienobiliry: One View of th e Cothedml/ Ca labres i a nd Melamed es -
tablished a new way of conceptualizing legal ri ghts and duties. De-
parting from traditional jurisprudential notion s. Calabresi a nd 
Me lamed introduced the concepts of "property rul es" and '·li abi lity 
rules" as the ordering principles of the legal system . a nd then an zdyzecl 
their virtues and vices as m eans of protecting legal entit le ments. Prop-
erty rule protect io n forces po tential takers to secure the conse nt of the 
entitl em ent own e r, and thus a llows the ow ner to dete rmine the pr ice 
of her entitlem e nt . Liability rule protection, by con trast. a llows po ten-
tial takers w ava il th e mselves of o ther people's entitl ements as long as 
they are willing to pay a collectively de termined price that is usua lly 
se t by a co urt , a legislator, or an administra tive agen cy . ~ 
H avi ng introd uced the distinction between prupe rty rules and li-
ability rules, Calabresi and M elamed ventured to ex plain how these 
rules should be employed to promote economic efficie ncy. Thei r nor-
mative insight was that property rules should be fa vored over liability 
5. G uido Calabres i & A. Douglas Me lamed, Property Rules, l.iubilitv Rules, un d !nal-
ienubilily: One View of rile C111hedral, 85 HARV. L. R EV . 1089 (1'c!72). Fo ll o wing con ven ti o n. 
we will ca ll the a rticle Tile Cmiledral. 
6 . Virtua lly a ll c itat io n s tudies list Calabresi a nd Melamed's a rticle as o ne o f the top 
thi rty most-cited articl es. See. e.g. , Fred R. Shapiro, The M os1- Ci1ed L.mv Review Ar1icles . 73 
C\L. L. R EV . 1540 ( 1985) : Fred R. Shapiro , The J'v!os1- Ci1ed L(l\v R evie1v Arric/es Revis i1ed. 
71 C H!. -KENT L. RE V. 751 (1 996). Accord ing to Shapiro' s citation st udies, The Carh edml 
rank ed twe nty-second in l'c!85 . and climbed up to numbe r e leven in 1996. A different study 
b y Kr ie r a nd Schwab ra nks The Carhedra! as the fourtee nth mos t cited ar ticle . See Jame s E. 
Kri e r & Stewart J . Schwab. Tile Cachedral ar T wenry Five: Cirmions and l111pressiom. 106 
YALE L.J. 2121. 2140 (1997) [he re inafte r Krier & Schwab, Ciw rions and !111 p ressions ]. 
It bea rs empha sis. however. tha t no citation study ca n ca pture th e full impact of The 
Carli edro l. In our experie nce. very few scholarly works have affecte d le ga l thought as did 
Til e C(l{hedra/. Our impress io n is consiste nt with the findings of Krie r and Sc hwab. who re-
po rt th a t "Calabresi a nd Me lame d 's contri b ution to the lite rature has had a significa nt a nd 
o ngo ing. eve n increasing. influe nce.·· !d. a t 2130. They . too, note that "evide nce o f the im -
porta nce of the ir work is fo und in the m a ny anthologies, case books. a nd textbooks tha t re-
produce [th e workJ in whole or in part o r o therwise discuss or refe r to ir.· · !d. Furthermo re . 
the fr amework devi se d by Calabresi a nd Me lamed is taug ht and di sc usse d in prope rty and 
tort law classes . and is o ft e n extended to o ther lega l fie lds. See Levmore. supra note 4. a t 
2 151 (no ting that ··some o f th e value of the Calabresi-Me lamed fram e work lies in its abil ity 
to illumina te fi e lds o utside of traditiona l property a nd to rt law"): accord Krier & Schwa b. 
Cillllions and Impressions. supra a t 2130 (noting tha t "Calab resi and Me la me d 's articl e fi g-
ur-es reg ula rly in books o n subjects lik e Pro perty, Torts, a nd Contracts.'). 
7. 85 HARV. L. R EV.l089 (1972). 
ll. In pr inciple. the price of the use may be dete rmined by a nv third party . For exa m ple . 
two pa rties may contractua lly agree to accept a ny price X would se t fo r the e ntitleme nt. Th e 
de te rmina tio n may occur e ither ex a nte. be fo re the taking occurs. o r e x post. foll owing the 
takin g. 
As the title of their a rticle suggests . Ca labrcsi and Me lamed also di sc ussed a third type 
of p ro tec ti o n: inali enability rules. An entitl ement protected by an in a li e na bility ru le ca nn o t 
be transfe rre d at an y pr ice. 
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rul es wh e n transaction costs are low, a nd part ies can cos t-effec tively 
bargain with on e another. W he n. o n the o ther hand , transacti o n costs 
are high, and vo luntary barga ining cannot b e expecte d , li ability r ules 
sho uld be e mployed . 
In the vas t lite rature that fo ll owed,~ commentators have atte mpted 
to refine. revamp, and . at t imes. cha ll e nge the Cal ab resi-Melame clian 
an a lys is. In particu la r. att e mpts have been made to dis tinguish be-
twee n vari o us types of transaction costs. and then examin e which typ e 
of rules is bette r sui ted to combat each particular cost. Ye t. the a n <l -
lyti ca i structure dev ised by Calabres i an d M e lamed , and in particulcH. 
the found a tional di stinction be twee n pro perty and liability rules, has 
bee n accepted by virtua lly a ll the commentato rs - supporters and 
criti cs alike . The Calabresi -Me lam ccl ian typology has been wide ly un -
derstood to exha ust al l possible ways of protectin g legal en titlement ~ . 
and the binary sys tem the y devise d has dominated legal thought and 
scho larship . A lmost thirty ye a rs afte r its publication, Th e Cathedral is 
experiencing a rena issance as increasing numbers of preeminent 
scho lars flock to reeva luate and in1 prove upo n Calabres i a nd 
M elamed 's class ic. 10 T his Article share s the same ambition. 
We contend that , while the Ca labresi-Melamecli an fr am ework pre -
sents a solid bas is fo r understanding legal entitlements, 11 a more com -
9. Sa. e.g .. Ian Ay res & Paul iv!. Goldba n. Op1imul D elegmion and D eco up ling in !lze 
D esign of Liahilirv l<ules. [()()MICH. L. R EV. 1 (2001): Rich a rd Craswe ll, Property Rules an d 
L iohi!it\' Rult's in Unconscionabi!irv and Rela!t'd Dourines, 60 U. CHI. L. RE V. l ( 199:>): 
Robe rt C. El li ckson. ;\ilemuli,·es 1o Zoning: Co venun1s. Nuisance Rules, and Fin es us Land 
Us !:' Controls. 4(1 U. CHI. L. REV. 68 1 (1973 ): W ard Farnsworth . Do Par1ies w Nuisnncc 
Cases /Jurgain i \ jier .ludgntenf? ; \ Glimpse Inside 1he Ccah edral, 66 U . CI !I. L. R EV . 373 
( 1999) : Z o har Gosh en . Co111rolling Snmcgic Vu1ing: Properly Rule or Liubili1y R ule ?. 70 S. 
C AL. L. R EV . 74 1 (1997) : Lo u is Kapl o w & Steven ShavelL Propeny Rules Versu s l.iahilit\' 
Ru les: An Econ omic 1\ nalvsis . l09 I-I ARV. L. RE V. 7 13 ( 1996) : Daphna Lewinso hn- Za mir. 
Tlt e Ch oice Bel\l·eett Prop en v Rules and LiaiJilily Rules Revisi1ed: Crilica l Observmions fi-mn 
B ei111viorul Sw dies , ~() TEXAS L. R EV. 21 ') (20Cll ): Robert P. Merges. Col/[raCiing inru Li-
abilit\' l?ules: lnrel/ec[/{a/ Propertv Rig/us und ColleCiive Rig/us Organizmions. 84 CA L. L. 
R EV . 1293 (1996): Thoma s W. Me rrill & H e nry E. Smith. What H appened w Propcrl\' in 
Lcnv an d Econ omics ?. 111 YA LE L..f. 357 (20lH) : D a le A. Na nce , G uidan ce Rules Ufl{ / En -
j(Jrccntenl /(u /cs: A Be11er Vie1v of 1/te C{l[/t edral . S3 VA. L. REV . 837 (1997): A. Mitchell 
Po linsky. Resolving Nu isance Dispu1es: Th e Si111ple Econ omics of fnjunCiive and Damage 
Remedies . 32 STAN. L. R EV . 1075 ( 1980): Susan Rose-Ackerm an, lnalienabili1y i/1/{1 1/t e 
Th eory of Propeny Rig/us. SS COL UM. L. R EV . 931 (1985): Symposium. Propertv Rules, f.i . 
ahilil_\' Rules and lna!icnahi!itv: A T 1venty-Five Year Re1rospee1ive. 106 Y ALE L.J. 208 1 
( l 997). This li st is inte nd ed to be illustrati ve : it is fa r from being exhaust ive . W e disc uss 
man y other a rt icles in the te xt and in subse qu e nt footnotes. 
10. See so urces c ited supru note 9. 
ll. A br ie f cavea t is in o rde r he re. It is very possib le that Ca labres i and M e lam ed 
no ticed othe r ways to p ro tec t lega l e nt itleme nts. but decid ed. for the sake of simplic ity and 
elegance . to di scuss o nl y p rope rty. liab ility. and inali e nability ru les in their ce le b rated ar ticle . 
A s Ca labres i illumina ted in a recent sympos ium that marke d the twe nty-fifth a nnive rsary o f 
Th e Cmhedra/. c rucia l d is tinc tio ns a nd nuances "we re left o ut beca use I fwd to ma ke [the 
artic le ] simple so th at people would unde rs ta nd ir.·· Calabresi. R e111urk.1·. supra no te 4. a t 
2202 . It is safe to asse rt. howeve r. tha t Tlu: Ciuhedrul does n o t discuss. or eve n m e nti o n. p li-
a bility ru les a nd th e im portant func tio ns they se rve in the lega l sys te m. 
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plcte analysis must probe bcvond the ostensible dichotomy between 
property and liability rules. We seck to add another level to Cabbresi 
and Melamed·s analysis , to capture fully the protection of entitlernents 
in our legal system. 
By looking at their cathedral frozen in a moment in time- as in a 
single one or l'vionet"s paintings - Calabresi and Melamed have 
overlooked the importance ol examining the cathedral over the couc;c 
of time , as did l\tlonet's series. More concretely, by focusing the ir at-
tention on swric property and liability rules, Calabresi and MeLtnl ,~d 
have obscured the possibility ol protecting legal entitlements by mcctn~' 
of dynamic rules that we ca ll ··pliability rules. '.12 
Pliability. or pliable. rules arc contingent rules that provide an enti-
tlement owner with prupe rty rul e or liability rule protection as long as 
some specified condition obtains: however, once the re levant comli-
tion changes, a different rule rlrotects the entitlement- either liability 
or property. as the circumstances dictate. Pliability rules. in other 
words, are dynamic rules , while property and liability rules are static. 
This can be seen by revisiting the famous case of Boomer v. Ar!unric 
Cement Co. 1' In Boomer, homeowners near a manufacturing plant of 
Atlantic Cement complained that the plant's pollution gave rise to an 
actionable nuisance , and they sought an injunction that would close 
clown the plant. The court, however, decided to permit the plant to 
continue operations, subject to its payment of permanent damages to 
the homeowners. Calabresi and Melamed viewed the case as present-
ing a choice between enforcing property rule protection, as the home-
owners demanded, or liability rule protection, as the court eventually 
ruled. Calabresi and Melamed believed these to be the two basic up-
tions1.j because they -like the theorists that followed them- focused 
on discrete moments of legal protection in isolation. In reality. though. 
the court cou ld have chosen a pliability rule. For example, the court 
might have allowed Atlantic Cement to pay damages and continue 
operating for five years to avoid immediate and massive layoffs at the 
plant, but also decree that at the end of the five years, the injunction 
would become absolute to enable homeowners' quiet and clean use or 
their realty. 1:i This pliable rule- a five-year liability rule, followed by 
12. The term ··pli:1bility rule·· owes its origin to Peter Siegelman, who suggested it in :1 
conversation with one of the authors. 
13. 257N.E.2d870(N.Y.1971J) . 
14. Calabresi and Melamed allowed for four options: property rule protection in the 
hands of either the homeowner or plant. and liability rule protection for either the home-
owner or plant. 
15. As we discuss latcr, pliability rules can come in many forms. and mav involve anv 
number of ditlerent combinations of property and liability rul es. See infi-a Part II. 
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indefinite property rule pro tecti on -would pe rmit the co urt to com-
bine the features of liability and property rul es over the course o[ 
time . 
While the te rm "p li ab ility rul e'' is o ri gin a l. thi s mode o f lega l en t i-
tle ment has long existed in our legal sys tem. The lega l p ro tectio n of 
share owne rship in mergers is a class ic ex am ple ul a positive pliability 
rul e . Consider the case of a co rporate takeove r succeeded by a free ze-
out. The mino rity shareholders can either acce pt the price offere d by 
the acquirer or exercise the ir appra isa l ri ght. in whi ch case a court will 
dete rmin e the appropriate com pe nsatio n. [n '.:: ith er case. the minority 
share ho lde rs lose the ability to refuse to pa rt wi th the ir shares. In 
other words . the ir initial property rule protec tion ch <tnges in to a 
liability rule. f\ s in o ther li ab ili ty rule s. the pr ice they w ill receive is 
no t determined by th e m: it is set by a third pa rty. 
Likewise. a real property own e r may lose her property right if sh e 
a llows adve rse possessors to take hold o f he r land ancl usc it ope nly for 
a statutoriiy specified per iod. The property rul e protection of the 
landowne r is conditi onal since it depe nds on he r vigil ance in safe-
guardin g her land against potenti a l takers. Fa ilure to perform this duty 
erases the original protection o f the land and transfers it to the 
adverse possessor. Adverse possession thus creates a " title shifting pli-
ability rule," that is , a combinatio n of property rul es in which th e trig-
gering of a condition transfers property rule protection from the origi -
nal e ntitlement holder to ano ther. 
A nother pervasive kind o f pliability rule in the lmv is " the zero or-
der pliability rul e .'' In fact, ze ro order pliability rul es are the organiz-
in g principle of much of our inte ll ectual property law. In zero order 
pliability rules, p ro perty rule protec tio n is succeeded by a no li ability 
rule. Specifically, upon a tri ggering event, the initial entitlement 
ho lder loses the ability to exercise property rul e protection, such as 
the right to exclude , over he r prope rty. Instead the e ntitl ement holder 
must allow all comers to use the prope rty fr ee o f charge - that is, with 
ze ro order liability. Importa ntly. the subje ct item has not bee n aban-
do ned . No twithstanding the zero order liability , no third party m ay 
gai n a superior right to that o f the o rig in al ent itleme nt ho lder. Rather, 
zero order pli ability rules creat e anti- exclu sion, or ope n access re -
gi mes. Consider, for example , a pate nt. A patent confers upon the 
patentee property rule protection for twe nty years , but, upon the expi-
rat ion of that te rm, the nature of protection changes from a property 
ru le to a ze ro order liability rul e since she ca n no longer re fuse o thers 
the right to use her patent. 1° Copyright law provides a similar example. 
16. T o be sure . it is poss ible to think of o ther ways of characterizing patent protecti on. 
Fo r in sta nce. it is possible to view it as a p ro pert y ru k limite d in time . A lte rn a ti ve ly. it is 
poss ible to class ify pa te nt p ro tecti o n as a p roperty rule protec tion to the pate ntee fo llowe d 
hv a prope rty ru le protection to th e user. We do no t di spute that both of these alte rn at ive 
charac teri za tio ns are plausible. Both . however. ob fu sca te the possib ili ty o f viewin g pate nt 
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These examples, and others. show the attracti veness of pliability 
rules. Pliability rules combine two separa te rul es; with the passage be-
tween the two stages of rule protection triggered by a preset condition. 
Owing to their amal gamated nature. pliability rules are capable of 
combining the respective st rengths of pro perty and li abi lity rules while 
avoiding their respective \vea kn esses . P liability rules allow decision-
makers to avoid the all -or-nothing deci sion of crea tin g property rule 
o r liability rul e protection. instead. dec isionm<lke rs may b uild tlexibil-
ity into the rule , setting conditions tha t switch from a stronger to a 
weaker prot ection of e ntitleme nt s (or vi ce versa) when economi c effi-
c iency or fairn ess cons ide ration s so require . A s a result, pliability rules 
present decision makers with a wick array of options tha t arc u nava il-
ab le to them in the Calabresi- iVkLtnll..::dian bipolar world of property 
a nd li ability rule s. 
This Article has three goa ls: the first conce ptual, the second de-
scriptive, and the las t normative. Conce ptually, we demonstrate tha t 
pl iabilit y rules fa ll in a distinct category of rule protection, and that 
they must be recognized a longs ide their more fa miliar co unterparts-
property and liability rules. D escriptive ly, we show that, a lthough this 
fact m ay have eluded Calabres i and Melamed ,17 pliability rules are 
widely used in o ur legal sys tem. Furthermore, we devise a typology of 
pliability rules to illuminate th e myriad options the use of such rules 
presents to policy makers . Normat ively, we argue that in man y cases 
p liability rules can promote economic effic iency, and fairness, better 
than ei ther property rules or li ab ility rules. The two main legal fie lds 
we use to substantiate these claims are property and inte llectua l prop-
erty, but we also show that pliability rules are p resent in other legal 
areas, such as antitrust and corporate law. 
protection as a continuum starting with prope rty rule protecti o n. which e ndures for twenty 
vea rs. and then shifts into a ze ro o rder liability rule . Th inking of patent protection as a "zero 
order p li a bi lity rule" is helpfu l as it sensitizes o ne to the possibility of '·positive p li abili ty 
rules," i.e .. pliability rules whi ch set th e liabil ity am ount above ze ro. Furthermore, it is im -
portant to recall that patent and copyri gh t differ fm m traditional property rights beca use 
the y are lim ited in time: sta ndard prope rty right s. Lln the othe r hand, ma y e xist in pe rpe tuity. 
Th us, it is use ful to distingu ish the theore tical cha rac te rization o f the protec tion accorded by 
the Patent and Copy right Acts from that accorded to regul ar property entitl ements. For 
these reaso ns, we propose that patent and copyright p rotection should be thought of as zero 
order pliability rules. 
Th e ide a of e qua ting no-liability with ze ro-liability prote ction draws o n a famou s insight 
of Ian Ayres and Robert G e rtner. wh o , in characteriz ing U. C. C. § 2-20 l. provided that a 
contract fa iling to specify quantity is e nforceable a s a ' ·zero -qua ntity d e fault.'' They justify 
the "ze ro-quant ity d e fault" by noting '· it is cheape r for th e parti e s to e s tabli sh the qua ntity 
te rm be fore hand tha n for th e co urts to dete rm ine afte r the fact what the pa rties wou ld ha ve 
wanted. " Ian Ayres & Robert G e rtne r. Filling Gaps in !ncomplele Con/racts: An Economic 
Theorv of Defaull Rules , 99 YALE L..f. 87 , 96 (1989). 
17. See Levmo re . supra note 4. a t 2 157 (n o t ing that beca use Ca labresi and M e lamed 
sough t e lega nce as opposed to compre he nsiven ess . it wou ld be wrong to describe them as 
hav in g '·missed " re medies not explicit ly di scussed in thei r artic le ) . 
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Structurally , the A rticle consists of three parts. In Part L we re view 
Ca labresi and Melamed's seminal article, as we ll as its predecessors 
and progeny. In Part IL we present the concept of pliabil ity rules. We 
identify the many areas of law in which p liability rul es are already in 
use, a nd discuss how the use of pliability rules serves to prom o te effi-
cie ncy and fairness . A mong the insta nces of pl ia bi li ty ru le protection 
we discuss are those used in eminen t domain . copyrigh t. a n titrust. and 
corporat e law, as well as the doctrine of adve rse possession. finally, in 
Part III , we draw on the ana lys is in Part II to suggest how pol icymak -
ers may usc pliability rules in the future to enhance suciai ut ility. H ere, 
we show how a pl iab ility a na lysis can reshape key doc trin e:; of p rop-
erty and inte ll ectua l property law. We then venture t:: ven furthe r and 
demonst rate how the use of pl iabili ty rul es can be usec.l lO overcome 
ant ieommons problems that plague the integr ity ot suc h vu lnerab le so-
ci a l units as Nat ive A merican tribes and rural A friccm-Am crican 
communities. We conclude by discuss ing the potent ia l of a p li ab ilit y 
analysis to revolutioni ze the doctrine of emine nt domain. 
I. TH E E VOLUTION OF ENTITLEM ENT THEORY 
A. Coase and the Problem of Socio! Cost 
To full y appreciate th e contribution of Calabres i and Melamed, it 
is necessa ry to begin with Ronald Coase 's seminal article The Problem 
of Social Cost. 1 ~ Importantly, Coase was not interested in the assign-
me nt of lega l entitlements pe r se , but ra ther in the proble m of exter-
nali ties - the cos ts and benefits of one's activity on third parties that 
are not cap tured by the price system. T he paradigma tic manifesta tion 
of the externalities problem that concerned Coase a nd hi s contempo-
raries was industrial pollution. 19 Coase 's primary aim was to challenge 
the Pigouvian theory that government interve ntion in the form of 
taxation was necessary to remedy the problem of social cost. Specifi-
cally, Pigou had proposed that the governm e nt levy a tax on po lluters 
in the amount of the social harm they cause in order to force them to 
consider this cos t in the ir production decisions.20 By contras t to P igou, 
and the other theori sts of his time, who fo cused exclusive ly o n the 
18. Rona ld H. Coase. Th e Prahl em of Social Cost . 3 J. L. & ECON. l ( l%0). 
l9. See He nry E. Smith . Ambiguous Quality Changes .fi·0111 Taxes and Legal Rules. 67 U. 
CHI. L. R EV. 647 , 684 n. 87 (2000) (no ting that '"[i]n hi s critiqu e of Pigouvian taxes. Coase 
proposed th at prope rty rights could in ternalize pollution ex ternaliti es '"): cf Ca rol M. Rose. 
The Slwdmv of rhe Cathedral. l 06 Y 1\ LE L.J . 2175. 2189 ( l 997) [here inafter Rose . ShodoH: of 
the Co rlzedml] (noting that Ca labrcsi and Melamed cited ··a ir po ll ution and noise (including 
the ubiquitous Boomer) as examples o f negative ·ex te rnali ties · ··). Fo r a more re ce nt treat-
men t of industrial pollu tion using th e Ca labresi-Melamecl ia n framework. sec Kaplow & 
Sh ave !!. supm note 9. a t 748-52. 
20. See ARTH UR C. PI GOU . THE ECONO tvi iCS OF WELI7 ARE l59 (2 cl eel. I 925); ARTHUR 
C. P! GOU. WEALTH AN D WELFAR E (l9l2 }. 
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polluter, Coase observed that pollution - as well as all other exter-
nalities- are reciproca l in nature. Coase was the first to notice that , 
in principle. not only the wrongd oer but also the victim can e liminate 
the harm. If pollution from a nearby factory prevents residents from 
ha nging their laundry o utdoors , the harm can be e limin a ted in one of 
two \vays: the factory can inst a ll smokescreens o n its chimneys or the 
reside nts can purchase el ectric d ryers. 21 
Real izing th e reciproca l nature or the ex te rn alities problem e n-
ab led Coase i.o notice an im portant connection be tween contracts and 
torts. More :-;pccilical ly. it enabled Coase to sec that priva te bargainin g 
may substitute tor regulatory intervention as a me~m s of controlling 
social ha rm:; . Frum there, the Coase theorem was very much in si ght, 
but it took another ingenious step to get there . 
To demonstrak t he flaw in Pigo u's analysis, Coasc conjured up a 
fr ic tio nless \Vorld in vv hi ch transact ing is cost less 22 H e then showed 
that, in such a world . p ri vate bargaining wo uld a lways yield the eco-
nomically eflicient o utcome regard less of the initi a l a llocation of lega l 
e ntitle ments or li abilitiesY Coase recognized the need for clear de -
lineation and assignment of legal entitlements as a prerequisite for 
bargaining even in his 7.e ro tra nsaction cost world. 24 But once this task 
is accomplished, no other legal rules are necessary since private bar-
gaining would override a ny legal norm and result in efficient resource 
2 1. See A . i'vi iTC' HEL. L POLI NS KY. AN Il\TRODUCTION TO LAW AN D ECONOM ICS l l -1.:\ 
(2cl e el. 1909). 
22. C( R.H . COASE. Tfi E FIR,\1. THE MARKET. ,\ ND TH E L\W 174 (198S) ("The " ·or iel 
of ze ro tra nsac ti on cos ts h;ls o fte n bee n described a s a Coasian wo rld. No thin g co ul d be fu r-
the r fro m the tru th. It is the wo ricl o f mode rn eco nomi c the o ry, o ne which I was hopin g to 
pe rsuade economis ts to leave."). 
23. Th is formulation ha s come to be known as the "strong ve rsio n," or the "invariance 
ve rsio n·· of the Coast: Thc o rc: rn. See Tho mas S. Ult:n. Flogging a Dead Pig: Professo r Posin 
on rh e Couse Th eo re111. 38 W;\ YNE L. REV. 9J ( 1991 ). A "weaker'' ve rsion of the Coase 
Theore m maintains th at in a world without transacti on costs th e a ll ocation of entitle me nts 
would not influenc <e th e tu ta l val ue of output. but it might affect th e use of resources and the 
pattern o f o utp ut. Sec Robe n D. Coote r. The Coase Til eore111. in T HE NEW PALGRAVE: A 
D ICTI Ot'A RY OF EC:Oi\O~· I I CS ( 1987 ). It is de batable whethe r e ithe r vers ion of the Coase 
theore m ac tuall y ho lds. Fa mously. R obe rt Cooter has pointe d o ut that even in a world with 
ze ro transac ti o n cos ts. s trat egic ba rga ining may th wa rt effi c ie nt a lloca ti o n of reso urces . See 
Robe rt Coote r. Tile Cosr u( Couse . II J. LEG AL ST UD. 1. 23 (1 982). A diffe re nt concern has 
bee n ra ised by Clifford Ho lde rness. who p roposes that the strong ve rs ion only holds tru e 
wh en e ntitlemt:nts arc g r:1n tcd to close d groups. but not whe n they a re g iven to open groups 
that allow en try. See Clifford G. H olde rness. Tile Assignm enr of Rights, Emry Eff'ecrs. and 
ril e A llocation ol Resuurces. IS J. LEGA L STUD. lSl (1989) . Rur see H e nry E. Smith. Two 
Dimensions of Prope rty Rights (Mar. 31. 21101) (unpubli shed ma nuscript. ci1cd in Merrill & 
Smith . . l'llpro note lJ. at 368 n.4:i) (s ugges ting that ''[i]f transact ion costs were truly zero. 
barga ining could cost lessly c!o:;e <t il classes" ). It shou ld be e m phas ize d that the Coase th eo-
re m does no t guarantee efficie ncy in positive transaction cost se ttings. Sec Dic rcl re 
McCioskev . Other Filing.' Equal.- Th e So -Called Coase Th eorem. 24 E . ECON. J. 367 ( 1998) . 
2-L Coasc. supm no te I 8 . at 8 . Rur see Steven N .S. C heu ng. The Transouion Cosrs Pam-
digm. 37 ECON. Ic-JQ. 5 14. 5 1 S-20 ( 1998) (quest ioning lhe nee d for a we ll -d e fin e d sys te m o r 
e n.tit le me nt in a wor ld \\' ith ze ro transac ti o n cos ts) . 
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all ocation . If clean air were more va lu ab le th an th e ac tivit y causing th e 
po llution , res idents wo uld pay pl a nt s to shut clown: if th e opposite 
we re true, industrial compa nies wo uld pay res idents to re lo cateY Pri-
va te orde ring wo uld rul e : lmv cou ld be shunted aside. 
T he transitio n to the rea l wor ld . in th e seco nd part of the a rticl e . 
th rus t law back to th e for e . Th e introd ucti o n o f pos itive transa ction 
costs forced Coase to address th e signi fica nce o f lega l rul es , as we ll as 
of the co urts administe ring th e m . O nce the ass umption o f zero trans-
act io n cos ts is a ba ndo ned. Coasc·s ~1 n a l ys i s . ~1 lt hough s till illuminating. 
loses some of it s anal ytical ri gor. Coasc's gen e ra l prescripti o n is that in 
a \Vor lcl with positi ve transac tion cos ts. courts sho ul d ass ign pro pe rty' 
ri ghts in a m a nner tha t m ax im it.cs the va lu e o r p rodu c ti o n. ~(, ln as-
sessi ng the abilit y of the co urt\ to reac h e tli cie nt o ut com es in pa rticu-
la r cases , Coase re viewed a host or nuisa nce dec isio ns. A ltho ugh he 
failed to trace any eco nomic th eo rizing in th e decisio ns, anc.l worse, he 
fo und the re asonin g e mploye d hy the co urt s odd and irre leva nLn 
C oase concluded , somewha t surpri singly , th a t courts are consci o us o f 
th e economic conseque nces o f the ir decisions. Thus, a t the end of the 
day, Coase was willing to entrust the co urts with the cha lle nging task 
of alloca ting legal entitlements efficientl y. 
C oase, however, did no t provide th e courts with any meaningful 
guidance as to how to perfo rm this task. All he h ad to say was that , 
insofa r as this is at all possible . co urts sho uld consult econo mic consid-
era tions in making their decisions witho ut cre ating too much uncer-
ta inty about th e lega l position itse lf . .. . "2~ This proposa l exposes an 
25 . A n obvio us p ro ble m with thi s co nclus io n. as \\e ll as with the Coase theore m in ge n-
e ra l. is that it ignores wea lth effec ts. See Ric ha rd Craswel l. Passing on rhe Cosrs of Legul 
Rules: Efficiency and Disrrihurion in /Jur a -Sel ler Rl'iurionships. 43 STAN. L. REV. 361. 385-
I.J l (li.JI.J l ) (no ting that Coase 's mo de l ove rl ooks cogniti ve biases. such as wea lth an d fra ming 
e ffec ts): se<: also Ian Ayres & Jack Ga lkin. Legal Enrirle111enrs as Aucrions: Propeny Rules, 
Liahilirv Rules. and Beyond, 106 Yi\LE L.J. 7U3 . 71 1' n.52 (1 908) (ex pla ining that '· wea lth e f-
fects a re p roduced by b udge t constra in ts o n o ur a bility to pay"). A lth o ugh res ide n ts affe cted 
bv th e polluti on may value the ri ght to li ve polluti on -free mo re hig hl y tha n th e acti vity ge n-
erat ing the po llutio n , they ma y no t have su fficient n:: sources to pay the pl a nts, ca using the 
p roble m to shut down. If tra nsactors do not possess su ffici e nt funds. assuming a way tra nsa c-
tio n cos ts would no t help b ring abo ut e ffi c ie n t all oca tio n of resources. See H e rbe rt 
H ove nkamp. Marginal Uriliry and rlu: Couse Th eo rem, 75 CO RN ELL L. R EV. 783 . 797-808 
(1990) (no t ing that wealth e ffec ts arc mo re com mon tha n is sometimes th o ught) ; Willi a m M . 
La ndes. Copyrigh r, Borrmved Images. and Appropriarion Arr: A n Economic A pproach , 9 
G EO. MASON L. R EV . 1, 21 (2000) ( listing the abse nce of transactio n costs a nd we a lth e ffe cts 
a s two preconditio ns for effecti ve upe ra tion o f the Coase theorem ). B ut see Russell 
Ko ro bkin. Note. Policym aking and rhe Offerl!\ sking Price Cap: To1vard a Theory of Effi -
cienr Enritlement A llocu tion, 46 STAN . L. R EV . 663, 679-82 (1994) (disputing Ho ve nk amp's 
wea lth e ffec t claims) ; cf Chri stine .l o lls. Cass R. Sun stein & Richard Thaler, 1\ Behavio ral 
A pproach ro Law and Economics. 50 STJ\N. L. R EV. 147 1. 1483 (1998) (obse rving tha t "even 
wh e n transaction cos ts and wealth effects arc known to be zero . ini tia l e nt itle me nts a lte r the 
fin a l allocat ion of resources") . 
26. See Coase . supra note 18, a t 15-16. 
27 See id. at 15. 
28. !d. a t 19. 
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inherent tension in Coase's analysis. On the one hand. Coase·s article 
calls for a clear delimitation of legal rights in order to encourage pri-
vate bargaining. On the other hand , its reliance on the courts injects a 
considerable degree of uncertainty into the legal system as it necessi-
tates extensive use of judicial discretion to promote efficiency in par-
ticular C<Jses. More importantly, perhaps, the two perspectives devel-
oped in Coase\ article-- the contractarian and the judicial~ arc in 
potcnti<ll conflict when transaction costs are positive. The more courts 
exercise judici<ll restraint by deferring to private bargaining. the 
strong,~r the incentive to bargain privately. Conversely, when cuurts 
take an interventionist approach to private ordering. the incentive to 
bmgain f·,rivatcly uver efficient allocation ol resources is significantly 
undcrrnincd. Yet, Coasc did not suggest how this tension can be re-
solved. m which perspective, the contractarian or the judicial. should 
take precedence in cases of conflict. Ultimately, Coase advanced nei-
ther a theury. nor a list of factors. to help the courts in performing 
their charge; he trusted them, based on past performance, albeit a very 
mediocre one. to succeed in the future. 
Despite these drawbacks, Coase's analysis is illuminating and it has 
been extremely influential. It would not be an exaggeration to state 
that Coasc's discussion of transaction costs blazed the trail for all sub-
sequent law and economics scholars. In particular, Coase's focus on 
contractual arrangements has elevated private bargaining to unprece-
dented heights, turning it into the primary focus of law and economics 
scholarship. Yet, Coase ·s analysis by itself did not aptly explain the 
role of legal norms in promoting efficiency; nor did it provide a posi-
tive account of how exactly, if at all, the law protects entitlements in 
the real world. Moreover, Coase did not discuss how entitlements 
should be protected after the initial allocation. These tasks were re-
served for Calabresi and Melamed. 
B. The Calabresinrz-Melamedian Framework 
Unlike Coase, whose primary goal was to determine the role of 
government intervention in the regulation of harmful activities, 
Calabresi and Melamed's goal was to analyze the role of law in the as-
signment and protection of entitlements. Specifically, Calabresi and 
Melamed sought to shed light on the ways in which the legal system 
does, and ought to, protect rights. Yet, Coase's insights had a palpable 
influence on Calabresi and Melamed. His contractarian perspective 
and the careful attention to transaction costs informed much of 
Calabresi and Melamed 's normative analysis. Due to their different 
focus and superior mastery of law, however, Calabresi and lVIelamecl 
ventured far beyond Coasc's legal insights and developed a new con-
ceptualization of the law. 
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In The Curhedm!, Calabresi and Melamed made three important 
contributions to legal theury. The first was conceptual. Calabresi and 
Melamed were the first to realize that a thc:orv of entitlement alloca-
tion must address two questions. not one. One question is how to as-
sign the entitlement initially between the contending parties. T he 
other is how to protect the initial assignment?' In addressing the for-
mer question . Calabresi and Melamed did not advance a si rnple an-
svver, or even a single principle according to which entitlements should 
be assigned. Instead, they pruposcd th~1t in assigning entitlements. so-
ciety should consider Lhrc<.' bruitd types of considerations: economic 
efficiency, distributional pn:tcrences. ~mel other justice reasons. '" 
Calabresi and Melamed di sc ussed and explored all three concerns , 
and, in contrast to Coasc . they did not single o ut one value the courts 
should maximize. Rather. they· advocated a careful weighing of the 
various criteria they listed <ts a basis for entitlement allocaLion in par-
ticular cases. 31 
Calabresi and Melamed's second important contribution was de-
scriptive. In analyzing how the law protects entitleme n ts, C alabresi 
and Melamed divided the universe of legal remedies into three mo-
dalities of protection: property rules, liability rules, and inalienability 
rules:'2 They defined the three modalities as follows. Property rule 
protection confers upon the entitlement holder the exclusive power to 
determine the price nonholders would have to pay for using the pro-
tected asset or right.'' Thus, all transfers of entitlements prot•.::cted by a 
property rule must be consensual: all attempts to transfer the entitle-
ment nonconsensually would be met with an injunction. Liability rule 
protection, by contrast, gives the nonholder the power to take the enti-
tlement without the consent of the entitlement holder and pay a price 
to be determined by a third party, typically a court or the legislature. 
The entitlement holder would not be able to enjoin third parties from-
taking her entitlement; instead, she would have to settle for damages. 34 
29. Calabresi & Melamed. supro note 5. at 108lJ-93. 
30. /d. at 10lJ3-95. Calabresi and Melamed recognized that it is hard to pour content into 
the term ·'justice reasons." /d. at 1102. Furthermore. they admitted that. broadly defined. 
distributional considerations can subsume all other justice reasons. /d. at 1104. Yet. they 
suggested that it is preferable to think of considerations such as equality. caste preferences. 
and other idiosyncratic preferences. separately from traditional distributional considerations. 
/d. at 1098. 
31. !d. at 1093-1105. See generai/v GUIDO C".LABRESI. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-33 
(1970) (discussing economic efficiency. distributional preferences. and other justice consid-
erations as bases for entitlement allocation). 
32. Calabresi & Melamed. supra note 5. at 1092. 1105-06. 
33. /d. at 1092. 1105. 
34. /d. at 1092. 1106-10. Coleman and Kraus have criticized the idea of liability rule pro-
tection for being at odds with the classic view of rights as domains of freedom and personal 
autonomv. See Jules Coleman & Jodv Kraus. Rerhinking r!Je Theorv of Legal Rigf11s. 
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F inally, inali e nabilit y rules bar a ll transfers of the c mitl e ment , whe th e r 
consensua l o r noncon se nsual. ' 5 
M oreover. Ca labrcs i and Me lamed no ticed the existence o f whJt 
Carol Rose late r call ed " bilateml symme try:· ·;(, na me ly, that prope rty 
and li a bility rule protec tion may be acco rd ed to e ither o f the parties to 
the co nflict. " T his insight ena bled Ca labresi and Me la med to craft 
their fa mous fo ur-rul e menu . which captures the rem edial choices 
ava il ab le to cour ts. To illustra te th e o pe ra tion o f th e four diffe rent 
rules. it would be: hclp i" ui to re turn to the pol luti o n di spute example. 
A ssume. firs t. t h ~l t soc ie ty dec ides to fa vo r the resid e nts ' inte res t in 
clean air. In th is case. a co urt ca n vindica te the res ide nts ' right to li ve 
pollutio n-free e ithe r by e njoining th e po llutin ~ ~lc tivity (rule L), o r by 
conditio ning the con ti n u<! ncc ol" the po llu t ion un th e pay ment of dam-
o.ges to the vict ims (ru le 2). Converse ly, if society ass igns the initi a l en-
titleme nt to the t·actory owner, the co ur t can vindica te her ri ght to 
pollute by permitting he r to po ll u te with impunity (rule 3), or by con-
ditioning the aba teme nt of th e po llutio n on th e paym ent of damages 
to the factory ovvner (rule 4 ). T he four-rule fr amework and the taxon-
omy developed by Calabresi and Melamed to describe the different 
rules have become staples in legal scholarship and teaching. 38 
Calabresi a nd Me lamed 's third impo rtant contribution was norma-
tive. In analyzing how the legal system should protect entitle ments , 
Calabresi and Melamed successfull y synthesized the contractaria n and 
95 YA LE L.J. 1.335. l33l) ( l l)l)5). Furthermo re . Co lema n and Kra us have no ted th a t the pro-
tection accorded cha nges th e nat ure o f the e ntitleme nt. It!. a t 1346. 
35. Ca labresi & tvklamec!, supra note 5, at 1092. Later in the artic le . Calabres i and 
Me lamed broadened the defi nitio n of in a lie nability rul es to include not onl y outright prohi-
bition on tra nsfe rs. but a lso we ake r fo rms of regula to ry ove rsigh t. Jd a t llll. According to 
Ca labresi and Me lamed. inalie nability rule protection may be appropri a te when changes in 
the initia l assignment have untoward e ffec ts on third parties. o r for pate rna listic or distribu-
tional reasons. Jd. at 11 11-1 5. 
36. Rose, Slwtl01v ofilu: Cathedral. supra no te l9. a t 2177. 
37. Ca labresi & Melamed , supra note 5, at 111 5-17: see alsu James E. Krier & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Property Rules and Liab ility R ules: The Ca tltedrul in A nother Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
R EV. 440. 444 (1995) (he re inafte r Krier & Schwab, The Cathedral in A nother Light] (map-
ping the symme trica l re lati on in a two-by-two matri x) . 
38. It is noteworthy that a t the time Til e Cathedral was authored, rules 1 through 3 were 
well known, but rule 4 wa s not . Indeed, a t the time, the re were no cases in which rul e 4 was 
employed. Fortuna te ly for Ca labresi and Melamed, the yea r The Cathedral was published , 
the Arizona Supreme Court , in Spur Industries In c. v. Dell£. Webb Development Co., 494 
P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). enj o in ed the ope rator of a feedlo t fro m continuing its operation, 
but ordered that a deve lope r representin g residents indemnify the tortfeasor for the cost of 
moving o r shutting down. A lth o ugh it was be lieved that Ca labres i and Me lamed we re th e 
first to unveil rule 4, it was, in fac t. sugges ted seve ra l yea rs ea rlie r by James Atwood in a 
student no te in the Stanford Lmv Revie1v. See James R. Atwood , Note , A n Economic Analy-
sis of Land Use Con flicts , 21 STAN. L. REv. 293. 315 (1969 ); see also Calabresi , R emarks , 
supra note 4, at 2204 (a ttributing the ·'discove ry" of rule 4 to Atwood). Ye t, it is indisputable 
tha t rule 4 has become fa mo us thanks to its inclu sion in the Calabresian-Melamedian 
framework. 
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judicia l pe rspecti ve ra ised by Coasc . -~" They proposed th at prope rt y 
ru les be em ployed when transact io n costs ;:re low, whe n the re a re only 
a few parties to the di spute , and when th e parti es to the d ispute arc 
read ily icle n tifia b le.·10 W he n these cond iti o ns ob ta in . there is no need 
!'or lega l in te rven tion since the pr ivate tra nsacting wo ul d lead to an er-
licie nt allocation of reso urces. L ittb iiity ru les, on the othe r h<mcl. 
shou ld be used in the presence of hi g h transac tion cos ts . whic h preven t 
th e part ies fro m easily ident iry ing and bctrga in ing with one anothc r:11 
C ala bresi and M elamed 's no rma ti vr.: <ma lysis h~1s so licl ificcl the 
domi nance of pri va te o rderi ng over p ubli c o rder ing. P ri vate o rder ing. 
thro ugh transacting, sho uld take preceden ce ove r lega l inte rve ntion . ft 
is o n ly wh e n we s uspect th a t pr ivz1te bmga in ing m ight be ine ffective 
tiwt we sho uld resort to lega l in terve nti on. Ot herwise . the law should 
me re ly provide th e backdrop again st which p riva te barga ining takes 
rl:tce . T he ce ntrality of priva te barga ini ng to Calab rcs i a nd Me lan1c cl 
is most ev ide nt in thei r d iscuss io n o f the cri mina l la w. The role 
Ca la brcsi a nd Mela med ass ign to the cr imin a l law is no t to p ro tec t in -
d ividual r ights and persona l security . b ut rather , to de te r ' 'a tte mpts to 
co nvert property rules into liability r ul es."42 
Howeve r , the strong e mphasis o n ba rgaining , th e po ten t ia l weak-
ness of Ca labresian-M elam edian fram e work, was a lso th e so urce of its 
appeal and success. This foc us e na bl ed Calabresi a nd Melame d to 
propose a revolu t ionary way o f think ing abo ut the law. Moreo ver. it 
e nab led th e m to keep their a na lysis cohere nt and e legant. Yet, 
Ca la bresi an d M ela med 's a na lysis was not at a ll o ne-dime nsio nal ; no r 
did it o nly see k to maximize econo mic efficiency. A n o ther laudab le 
aspec t of Calabres i and Me la med 's ana lysis was the call fo r the inco r-
p ora tion of fa irness-based considerations into enti t lement t heory. Un-
fortu nate ly, this aspect of the article has not a tt racted nearly as much 
attention as the efficiency analysis. In fact , it was large ly ignored by 
subsequent comme ntators.43 
39. Ca labresi & Melamed. supra note 5. at 1108-1 0. 
40. /d. at 1125-27. 
4 1. See id.; .1ee also R ICI-!ARD A. POSNER. ECON OM IC AN AL YSIS OF LAW 56-57. 70 (4t h 
ed. 1992) (discussing the "conventional wi sdom" favorin g property ru les whe re transa ction 
cos ts are low. and li ab il ity rules whe re transac ti on costs a re high): Krie r & Schwab. The 
Corhet!ral in Another Lig/11. supra no te 37. at 447-53 (prese nting the "conventiona l wisdom " 
for late r critique) : c( Kaplow & Shave!!. supm no te 9. at 718 (no tin g that th e ir fi ndin gs co n-
tradi ct the ·'conventi onal wisdom"). 
42. Ca labresi & Mela med, supm no te 5. a t 11 2o. q: l-I AN OCH DAGr\N. UNJUST 
ENR I CH~ JENT 15 (1997). Dagan argues that th e choice bt:tween property rule s and li a bi lity 
rules embod ies a choice be tween we ll-being and control. with li abi lity ru les protec ting th e 
former and prope rty rules pro tecting the latte r. Thus. "the choice between lhc two rules re-
quires a choice of the substan tive conten t of the entitlt:mcnt itse lf. .. /d . (foot no te om itted). 
43 . We seek to redress thi s omission in Pan IlL m/i'u. 
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C. Su bseq uen t Con rri hu tions 
As one could expe c t. The Curlz edrnl has no t met wi th un ive rsa l ac-
cep tance . Subseq ue nt scholars have cha ll e nged bo th th e descr ip ti ve 
a nd th e norma tive cla ims o f the a rti c l e . ~~ The no rm ati ve cha ll e nges 
have targeted Ca labresi a nd M e lame d 's prescri pt io ns as to how prop-
e rt y and liability rul es sho uld be appli ed to enha nce eco no mic effi-
c ie ncy. T he descr ipti ve cha ll e nges have focused o n th e acc u racy and 
co mpre he ns iveness of Ca labres i a nd ;'vlcl<~mecl" s po rtray <li o f the lega l 
s ys t em . ~5 \Ve co mm e nce by rev iewin g the norm at ive clw ll c ngcs a nd 
th e n turn to th e descri pt ive o nes. 
l. N um wrive Clzul!enges 
o. A yres w zd To /lev's S o lom onic Enrir!em enr.1. Fo ll o wing Ca la bresi 
a nd Me la med, the accepted lore was th a t prope rty rul es outpe rlo rm 
li a bility rul es whe n disp utes in vo lve a sma ll nu mbe r of pa rties and the 
cos ts of ide nti fy ing th e re leva nt pa rti es arc low. fn such se ttin gs, the 
e mploym ent o f property rules was pres umed to induce s uccess ful pri-
va te bargaining and conse quently effi cie nt all oca tion of rcso u rces . ~6 
Ayres and T a lley ca lled this view into question . They conte nde d tha t 
li a bility rules might be supe rior to prope rty rul es in set t in gs in which 
prope rty rules were be li eve d to wo rk bes t: thi n ma rke ts . ~ 7 T o reach 
this somewha t co unte rintuiti ve c la im. Ay res a nd T a ll ey recha rac te r-
izc cl two important compo nen ts in th e Ca labresi-Mclam ed ian fr a me-
work: li abi lity rul es and transac ti on costs. 
Ayres a nd Ta lley bega n the ir accoun t by po inting o ut that t he use 
of liability rules divides e ntitlem e nts into a n optio n to buy th e sub ject 
--+4. A compre he nsive rev ie w o l all the ch allenges is be yund th e scupe o f thi s An icle. 
N a tura ll v. we focus on th e cha ll e nges that ~1 re m ost re le va nt to o ur cl isc uss iun. W e do not 
sugges t tha t the cha lle nges we disc uss a re necessa ril y the most impo rta n t o r pl)we rful o nes. 
45 . A dmittedl y. this disti ncti o n invol ves a deg ree n f imprec isio n. Some u l th e cha lle nges 
we label no rmative a lso conta in descripti ve insigh t:;. a nd vice versa. Ye t. this di s tin ction 
he lps o rga ni ze the subseq ue n t li te ra tu re in a se nsible fas h io n. 
46. See supra te xt acco mpa nying no te 4 l. 
47. See [an A yres & Eri c T a lley . Solonzonic Borguin ing: Di viding 11 Lt!gul Enrir/entf//1 ro 
Fuciliwre Cousean Trade. 104 Y1-\LE L.J. 1027 . 1030-33 (1905). In para lle l with A yres and 
Ta ll ey . .J ohnsto n reache d a simil<n finding. See Jaso n S. Jo hns to n. Bargain ing Un der Rules 
Versus Srondords . II J .L. ECON. & ORG. 256 ( I'J'J5) . Jo hns ton de monstra te d th a t whe n ce r-
ta in con d iti ons obta in. co ntinge n t e x pos t e n title ment s may p rod uce m o re e fficie n t ba rga in-
ing than cle ar ex ante e ntitle me nts. A n impo rtant impl icati on o f this obse rvatio n is that 
blur ry ba la nc ing tes ts a nd eve n JUd ic ia l e rror are more socia llv d esirable th a n p rev io usly 
tho ugh t. ln a subseq ue nt article, Jo hns to n a nd C roso n adclucc cl e xpe rime nta l res ul ts that 
o ffe r suppo t·t o f the theo re tic pre d ictions o f J ohnston· s model. See Rache l C roso n & Jason S. 
Jo hns to n. E.rperimmwl R.esulrs on Bargaining Under !1 /r enw tive Prop errv Rig/us Regi111 es. 16 
J .L. E CON. & ORG. 50 (2000). In the text. we focus o n Ay re s and Tal ley simpl y beclll se th ey 
fra med the ir a na lys is in prope rt y ve rsus li a b ili ty ru le te rm s. whe reas .J o h ns to n ·s ma in prism 
is that ot ru lc: s versus sta nda rds. 
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of the ent itlemen t~' and a right subject to the option. ~" Moreove r, they 
insightfully observed that thi s d ivision creates a unique opportunity 
for ·· So lomonic Lxuga ining·· between the holders of the divided ent i-
tlement. Because the partition o f the e ntitl e ment permits two-way 
trading, rather than o ne. li ability rules co uld ge ne ra te more pri va te 
bargai ning than prope rt y ru les. H the option-holder values the subj ect 
of the entitleme nt more highly th an th e right holder. she would exer-
cise her option and buy the right. C onverse ly , if the ri ght holder values 
th e und er lying dSSd mo re highly. she wou ld ·'bribe '' th e opt io n holde r 
not to exe rc ise th t; option.'11 Each party to a liability rule dispute is si-
mul taneous ly a poten tial buyer a nd a pote ntial seller . By contrast. 
proper ty rules crcctte only one se ller and one buyer: no a lternatin g i::; 
possibl e. 
B ut what about transaction costs? Eve n if liability rules ha ve th e 
pote ntial to gencr:tte more trades, this advantage may be lost in th e 
presence of transact io n costs. To overcome this ch a ll e nge , Ayres a nd 
Talley modified traditional transaction cost analysis. They noted that 
in thin markets the main obstac le to private barga ining is not the cost 
of locat ing and assembling the affected parties, which preoccupied 
Calabresi and Me la med , but rather , s trategic bargaining.51 In such an 
environment, whe re price is not readily de terminable, each negotiator 
has an incentive to pos ture in order to secure a larger share of the bar-
gaining surplus. Consequently, the challenge for legal rules is to facili-
tate exchange by countering the predisposit ion to bargain strateg ica ll y. 
Liability rules acco mplish just that. By dividing entit lem e nts, liability 
rules put the barga iners in an '·identity crisis," with neither of them 
knowing whether she would wind up buying or selling. Asking too 
much , or offering too little , runs the risk of the other party se lecting to 
sell for the quoted price instead of buying, or buy for the quoted price 
instead of selling. 52 Moreove r, dividing the entitlem ent lowers the 
stakes for each bargainer, thus further reducing the incentive to bar-
gain dishonestly. 5 ~ 
48 . That is. a .. call op ti o n." 
49. See Ayres & T a lley . supra no te 47, a t 1031. 
50. See id. at 1U38. 
5l. See id. at 1030: see also Robe rt Coote r. Tlz e Cos! of Coase. 11 J. LEGAL STUD. l, 23 
(1982) (pointing out th at disag reements as to how to divide the contractual surplus may pre-
vent successful Coasean bargaining): Joh n Kennan & Robert Wilson . Bargaining 1vi!l1 Pri-
mre !nfo rmmion. 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 46 (1993) (hypothesizi ng that di ffere nces in 
pri vate info rm ation a rc a primary cause of barga in ing de lays). 
52. See Ay res & Talley. supra note 47. a t 1030. This " iden tity cri sis" is stro ngest when 
entitlements arc divide d eve nly. See. e.g., Pete r Cramton e t al., Dissolving a Porrnership Effi-
cienrly, 55 ECONOM ETRIC\ 615 (1987). 
53. See Rose. Sluuhnv of rlze Cmh edrai . supra note 19, at 2184. 
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f inally, Ayres and Tall ey ha ve illumin ated the informa tion-
rcvea iing aspec t of li ab ility rules. They proposed that the values the 
parti es place on the whole entitlement may be discerned fro m their 
bargaining tact ics . Assume, for example , that the op tion hold er seeks 
to exercise her op tion . A high-va lue right ho lde r v.'o ulc.l o ffer to pay 
the option holder not to exercise. Conve rse ly . a l O\\ -valu e r ight ho lder 
wo uld not a ttem pt to stave off the exerc ise or ih•: o ption. and may 
even ap proach the o ption-holde r with an offer to se ll. Th us. the 
Solomonic barga ining ge nerated by li ab ility ru les pcnlitions Lh c hold-
e rs of the clivicl ccl entit leme nt into higher- a nd luvv:_:r- \ a lue bidders. 
thereby divulging pri vate informa ti o n and facilitatin~ t rade.'-' 
b. Kap!mv ond Sho vel!. A different rdincmc n~ !.U :he Cal abresi -
Ivlclamedian framework has bee n proposed by Ka ptcl\V and Sbavel l>' 
L ike Ayres and Ta lley, Ka plow and Shavc li have called tor a more ex-
pa nsive usc of li ability rules, albeit for diilerent reasons. Furthe rmore. 
unlik e Ayres and Ta ll ey who disregarded property ru les. Kaplow and 
Shave ll redefined the proper ro le of property rules in protecting e nti-
tlements. 
At the core of Kaplow and Shave ll 's analysis lie two analytical dis-
tinctions which enabled them to compartmentalize the universe of en-
titlement disputes into a two-by-two m a trix. The fi rst dist inction is be-
tween "externalities disputes" and "possessory disputes ." A 
paradigmatic example of the forme r is industrial pollutio n, or noise. A 
typical example of the latter is a disp ute over an item of personal 
property, such as a laptop computer. T he second . and more fa miliar , 
distinction is between high transac tion cos t and low transactio n cost 
settings . 
Kap low and Shavell proposed that property rules are superior to 
liability rules in the context of possessory disputes irrespective of 
whether transaction costs are high or low. This is beca use liability rule 
protection of possessory interests raises two problems: reciprocal tak-
ings and sequential taking. 56 If A's possession of her laptop computer 
is protected by a liability rule , a nd the damage amo unt is se t too low,57 
B would take A's laptop and pay the damage award. I'his, in turn, 
would prompt A to take back the laptop and pay B, and so a vicious 
54. See id. at 2184-85: see also Ayres & Talley , supm note -f7 . a t 1039-47. Ayres and 
T a lley acknowledged tha t nego tiato rs would conti nue to mis represe nt the ir true va luations 
in the hope of ex tracting a large r share of the bargai ning surp lus. They pointed out. howeve r. 
that the li abi lity amount restricts the ability of the parties to exaggerate . O r, as they put it. 
the expecte d damage award '·serves as both a ceiling to overstatements a nd a floor to under-
state me nts." Jd. at l046. 
55. See Kaplow & Shavell , sup ra note 9. 
56. /d. a t 722. 765-67 . 
57 . If the dam age award is too high, the d istincti o n bet1we n li ab ilit y ru k protect ion and 
property rul e protec ti o n loses its significa nce . See id. a t 724 (obse rving that .. a liability ru le 
with very high dam ages is equivalent to a property rul e protecti on o f victims"). 
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cycle ol reciprocal takings would ensue . Even wo rse , other partie::;. 
such as. C and D. may choose to take th e lap top a nd pay, spe a rh ead -
ing an in [inite se ries of sequential takings. In stead of negotiatin g in the 
shadow uf li ab ility rules, as Ayres and Talley wo uld ha ve th em . th e 
contendin g part ies would repeated ly ta ke from on e anothe r. 's 
In e.\tcrnalit ies cases , the choice o r lega l rules depe nds o n the 
m ag nitude oi transact ion costs. R e ite rat ing Coase 's main in sight. 
Kap lo w ~ tnd Shave !! co nclu de th a t wh e n transaction costs are low, th e 
cho ice u!· legal rul e does no t ma tte r. In thi s instance, pro perty rules 
<m el liClhility rule s wou ld perform equally well s ince parties can ba rgain 
to achie ve th t::: optim al a ll ocat ion o f resources . \V he n transact io n cos ts 
arc hi gh. li~tbility ru les ha ve the e dge . When pri vat e barga ining is im-
poss ih k. the ctl urt must a ll ocate the ri ght to the higher va lue user. H 
th e court chooses to e mploy property rule protect ion , it must know 
b oth th e cLtm age to the victim and th e prevention cos t to the pollute r. 
By contr<tsL the use o f li ab ility rul es requires th e court to know onl y 
one variable: th e dam age to the victim. Once the court se ts the li ability 
amount co rrec tl y, th e polluter, who knows the cost o f p revention, has 
a choice to make. lf th e cost o f prevention exceeds the da mage 
amount. she would continue with the polluting activity a nd pay dam-
ages. If th e cost of prevention is lower than the expected li a b ility, she 
would in vest in preventive measures and aba te the pollution. Thus. 
li ability rules minimize info rma tion costs. According to Kaplow and 
Sh <.we ll. it is for thi s reason that liabilit y rul es should be fa vore d ove r 
property rul es whe n tra nsact ion costs are high, and not because of th e 
im poss ibility of bargaining, as Calabresi and Melamed suggested.'~ 
c. Krier and S chwab. Th e final chall enge to the C a labresi-
Me lam ec! ian fra mewo rk differs dramatically from the two prev io usly 
cliscussecl. In a marke d departure from the conventional view among 
Jaw and econ o mics scholars, Kri e r and Schwab questio ne d th e pre-
sumed superiority of liability rul es in high transaction costs se ttings. 
They no ted that th e conve ntional view that liability rul es outpe rform 
property rules when transact ing is prohibitively costly rests on a tacit 
assump tio n that courts can assess damages with reasonable accuracy in 
such situa tions. Yet, following Polinsky,6° Krier and Schwab pointed 
out that this key assumpti o n has never been substantiated .61 Kri e r and 
5S. !an Av res and Jack 13a lkin . however. have pointed out tha t this proble m could be 
avoided if eac h taking were accomranied by an incremental price incre;Jse . More ge nera lly. 
th ey note: that li abi li ty rule s are esse ntially trunc;Jtcd auctions. Thus. they propose tha t enti-
tl eme nts be auct ioned off be twee n the co ntending parties with the highest bidder ultima te ly 
rece iving the cn tit !t:ment. See Ayres & 13alkin. supra note 25 . at 707-716. 
5l). See Kaplow & Shave! !. supru note 9. at 71 9. 726-27: see olso Rose. Slzwlmv of rl1 e 
Curhedm l. supm note 19. at 2 19 l. 
GO. See Polinsky . supm note 9. at Ill!. 
61. See Krie r & Schwab. Th e Carli edral in Anorli er Liglir. supra note 37. a t 45 .3 -5-+. 
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Schwab attributed this omission to the failure of scholars to recognize 
the existence of assessment costs - the transaction costs of the judi-
cial process -and, more generally, to engage in comparative institu-
tional analvsis -"c 
In addressing these omissions , Krier and Schwab found that the 
presumed superiority of liability rules in high transaction costs settings 
is illusory, Krier and Schwab contended that although private bar-
gaining over damages is costly when transaction costs arc high, th e 
cost of judicial assessment of damages may be higher s till. lienee. it is 
impossible to determine in the abstract which mode is supe rior. (' ' 
Moreover , they suggested that there is a positive corre la ticm be tween 
factors th z1t give rise to high transaction costs ami those creating high 
assessment costs. "~ For exampl e , bargaining is likely tn be inctlective 
in disputes involving multiple parties and in bilateral monopoly cases. 
But so is judicial ~1ssessment of damages. Consi der. for c::xample , the 
case of Boomer v. Atlwuic Cemem Co6 ' fn Boo111 er, the presence of 
multiple victims, which gave rise to high transaction costs and poten-
tial holdout problems, thwarted the possibility of a voluntary agree-
ment between the cement plant and the residents. T he same fact, 
however, made judicial determination of damages extremely difficult. 66 
This example may be generalized: the involvement of multiple parties 
and the lack of readily ascertainable market prices make accurate as-
sessment of damage virtually impossible. 67 Thus. the very factors that 
undermine efficient bargaining also frustrate the ability of courts to 
determine damages with reasonable precision. 
Furthermore, because courts routinely grant objective damages 
and ignore subjective , or idiosyncratic, harms , damage awards tend to 
be unclercompensatory; victims ' losses are rarely fully redressed in liti-
gation.6:o At the end of the clay, therefore, Krier and Schwab posit that 
there is no inherent reason to assume that liability rules would better 
e nhance economic e fficiency when transaction costs are high.1' 9 
62. Seeid. at454.475-77. 
63. See id. at 454-55. 
64. See id. at 459-61. 
65. 257N.E.2d870 (N.Y.I970). 
66. For discussion. see NEIL K. KOMESAR, Ii'viPERFE CT ALT ERN ATIVES: CHOOSI'JG 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW. ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POL.ICY 14-28 (1994) (di scussing the as-
se ssme nt problem in the Boomer case ): Daniel A. Farber. R eassessing Boome r: .fusrice, Ej fi'· 
ciency, and Nuisance Lmv , in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF JOHN E. CRIBBET 7. ll-12 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eels .. 1989) (pointing out 
that Atlantic's total liability "ultimately came to S71Cl,OOO, som e four times the amount men-
tioned in the Court of Appeals decision denying injunctive r e lief''). 
67. See Krier & Schwab. The Cmhedm! in Anorher Lighr. supm note 37. at 460-62. 
68. See id. at 457-59. 
69. It hears emphas is. however. that Krier and Schwab have no t positive ly shown that 
property rules would outpe rfo rm liability rules in high-transaction-co sts se tt ings. Their 
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2. Descriprive Challenges 
u. Pw Protecrion. C ombining the Calabresi-Melamedian frame-
wor k '.Vith option the ory, se ve ra l scholars have noticed an inte res tin g 
exte nsion to Calabresi and Melamed's analysi s of li ability rules . Spe-
cifica lly. th ey obse rved that while Calabresi and M elamed trea ted li-
ability rule s strictly as call options, i.e .. options to " buy '· entitle m e nts 
from th e ir holders. e ntitl e me nts may a lso be protected with put op-
tions711 T he mirro r image of calls, put options bes tow upon th e enti-
tl e me nt ho lder the power to sell th e entitl eme nt to the othe r party to 
the dis p ut,2. t"o r examp le the poiluter, for a ce rtain exercise price. 
He nce. it •:<m be SE\id th a t put optio n pro tection grants to '· the initi a l 
en tit k rn ent ho lder every thin g that she would have und e r a p rope rty 
rule plus a put opti on. "71 
T he choice between '· call s' · and ·' pu ts" has importa nt distrib utio na l 
conse que nces . P ut s increase th e expec ted payoff of th e e ntitle me nt 
holde r rela ti ve to calls and s tandard property rule pro tection.7:c 
Moreove r, put option protection reduces the risk to which entitlem en t 
analysis only suggests th at Ca labresi and Melamed's concl usion that liability rul es be tte r en-
hance cfriciencv in the face o r high transaction costs may be incorrect due to Cala bresi and 
Ivlelamecl"s omi ss ion of comparative institutional analysis. 
70. See . e.g .. Ian Ay re s. Prorecring Pmperry l''ith Purs. 32 VAL. U. L. R EV. 793, 79S 
( 1998) (no ting th a t a put op tion. or ··ro rced purchase ·· rule . gives the entitlement ho lder the 
option to force the non c: ntitlement ho lde r to purchase): Madelin e Morri s. Th e Srm cwre of 
Enrirlelllenrs. 7S CORNE LL L. Rt= v . 822 . 854-56 ( 19LJ3) (describ ing put options as exa mples o r 
reve rse liab ilitv rule s in which th e entitlement holde r has th e right to a forced compensa te d 
transfer ): c( Ay res & Da lkin. supra note 25 (desc ri bi ng vari ous mechani sms for a ucti o ning 
put opti ons). /) ut see Richard A. E pste in. Prorecring Properly Rigl11s 1virh Legol Re!ll edies: A 
Coiiii!IOII Se nse Heply w !'rofi>sso r A v res. 32 VAL. U . L. R EV. 833 (1 998) (chall enging the 
e fforts of I<J n An es and others to apply finan cial economi cs to elaborate on Ca la bres i and 
Melamecl· s original twu-bv-two matri x) . 
7 1. See Avres. sup ro note 70. at 799. Correspo ndingly. the nonentitl ement ho lde r agJ inst 
whom the put option ma y be exe rcised has less than nothing. since she ma y be forc ed to buv 
an entitlement again st her will. !d. 
72. See id at ~04-13 . Ayres points out tha t in addition to changing the di vision o r th e 
barga ining surplus betwee n the pmtics. put pro tecti on al so affects th e bid/as k difference. He 
no te s that '" [f] o r bot h cognittve and wea lth effec ts reasons. it is often the case that a particu-
IJr pe rson will demand a highe r price when se lling a n entitl ement than she would be willing 
to pay if force d to buy.·· Jrl. at 609-10: see also Levm orc. supm not e 4. at 21 66 (describing th e 
o ffer- asking diffe rential. or ··endowment effect'" ). 
On th e ··endowmen t effect.'. sec gene rally Daniel Kahneman et al.. Experimenral Tcs1.1 
of r!ze Endo nmr:nr Ef(ecr i/1/(/ rhe Conse 1heorr:m. 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 ( 1990) (co ncluding 
tha t endowmen t effects a re not easily altered by experience): Daniel Kahnem an e t al.. Th e 
End01 vm e111 F/fecr. Lu.\S A t·ersiun, ltnd Sllt rus Quo Bias. 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 . 194 ( 19LJ I ) 
(de finin g the ·· end owmen t effec t"" as a behavio r in which "people often deman d mu ch more 
to give up an obj ec t th an th ey would be willing to pay to acquire it" '); Richard Tha le r. 
TOI I'Ord u Posiun· Theory of Consu111er Choice. J. ECON. B EHA V. & ORG. 1 ( 1980) (e x<J rn -
ining wavs in which consume rs deviate from ration al eco nomic models). On the impact of 
the e ndowment effect on lega l po licymaking. sec Elizabe th Hoffman & Matthew L. Spit ze r. 
Willingness w Put· ~"·' · Vvi/ling/l(:ss ro A ccepr: Legol und Economic !mplicurions , 71 WASI-l. U. 
L. Q. 59 ( 19LJ3 ): Russe ll Korob kin. Note . Policl"llwking und rhe Offei/Asking Price C up. To -
t\"ltrt! u Theon· of l:J/icienr Lnrirletn m r A llocurion. 4 6 ST;\ N. L. REV . 663 ( 19')4 ). 
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holders are exposed . Call opt ions ves t the power to exercise in. the 
nonentitlement holder. Put options, by contrast, grant the decision-
making power to the entitlement holder. Consequentl y, put option 
protection provides the grea test incentive to property owners to inves t 
in the ir asse ts. and the strongest dete rrent to potential takers .' ' 
A ltho ugh put option protect ion is an importan t theore ti cal possi -
bility. it is rare ly used in rea lity7 1 Richard Eps tein, for C';ampk. ~ug­
gestecl that puts "are never imposed as a matter of law on stran gers . 
but are the ou tgrowth or conse nsua l transactions over orga ni1cd mar-
kets ... i ' In response to th is cl<lim. fan A yres showed that the rc;Kh ~~ f 
put option protection extends to certain nonco nsensua l selli ng:;. :-; uc i\ 
<1S convei·sion . and trespass disputes . Even Ayres, howeve r, cunccdcu 
E pskin's basic point: that the common law does not emp loy puts in 
rcl!l. but rather. as li mited in personwn rights in certain bilatenli rno-
nopoiy situat ions?' 
h. ''Swrtle'' or "Stortling" Rules.77 Aside from the possib ilily cf put 
option protection, seve ral schol ars have observed various other exten -
sions to the Calabres i-Melam eclian four rule fra mework. T he sch olarly 
interest in the possib ility of additional rules has been re kindled by 
K rier and Schwab 's ' ·discovery" of a new rule , which they entitled 
' ' rul e 5."7~ Krier and Schwab proposed that in certain instances th e 
transgressor should be permitted to choose to abate the tortious activ-
ity and co llect the vict im's ga ins occasioned by this dec ision. Under 
thi s ru le. A, who causes a nuisa nce to B , ge ts the discret ion to stop at 
73. Sc.: Ay res. supra no te 70. at SIJ7. 
74. See . e.g. . Ri cb;trel A. Epste in. A Clmr Vi('J v of !he Carhf'dml: T/11~ !Jmn;nunce nf 
Prop !'rrv Rules . l 06 YALE L.J. 20'1 l. 20':)3 ( 1997) (not ing tha t ce rta in fin il nc ia I <Hra nge me n ts . 
such as puts. a rc ·· comm o n e no ugh in fin ancia l markets. but a re ra re ly e nco un te red in th e 
wor ld of le ga lly c t-cated re me d ies " ). Even Morr is. who was the first to obse rve the possibilitv 
of put op ti o n protecti o n. found onl y two rea l world exam ples of this tvpe ol' pro tection: 
"[g]un buy-out ulfers by po li ce departme nt. Jnd soft drink containe r depos it redem ption 
laws ... See i'dorr is. supm note 70. a t S55. 
75. Eps te in. supm note 74. at 20'13. 
76. See Ay res. supm no te 70. a t 8 14 n.63. It shou ld be no te d tha t some of the put protec-
tion examples ide ntifi ed by Ayres clu not clea rly fall und e r hi s own definiti o n of th e tenn. 
For in stance. Ayres ch Jracte ri ;r.es the fam o us case of Pile v. Pedrick. 31 A. fi4(-i (Pa. lgl))). as 
granting the plaintiffs. the victims of th e e ncruachment. put op tion protecti o n. In fact. th e: 
cour t me rely perm itted the plain tiff to choose be tween injunct ion a nd damages. and the 
p laintiff ultimate ly prefe rred the former. i. e .. property rul e protection. Since true pu t opt ion 
p rotection woul d g ive the p la intiffs mo re th a n a sim ple prope rty rule. the plai nti ffs' e lwi cc 
seems quit e odd . It is possib le. then. that the co urt wa s not offe ring the plaintiff put opt ion 
protection. bu t ra th c: r. a cho ice betwee n prope rty rule pro tection and a ca ll o ption protec -
tion to the clcfcnclant-transg ressor. Thi s is not to say that Ay res · construc ti o n o f the c1sc is 
necessa rily in cor-rect. Howe ve r. wi th o ut knowing what exactly the dam age award was in thi s 
case. it is impossible to say with ce rta in ty tha t the cou rt e m ployed put opt ion prot ect ion. 
77 . The te rm ··s ta r tling rule" owes its o rigi n to Levm o re. 
78. See Krier & Schwab. Til e Carliedwl in 1\norh cr Lighr . supm no te 37 . at 47U- 7 1. it is 
widclv agree d that the or ig inal startling rule was Calab res i and Me lamed's rul e 4. S'ee 
Lcvmore . supu1 no te 4. at 2 150 . 
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he r choi ce, and collect da mages fr om B in th e amount of the be nefit B 
receives as a consequence o r to continu e th e nuisance and receive 
nothing.7Y Krie r a nd Schwab·s proposal re portedly ''infuriated [ce rtain 
scholars] who found it too unusua l to be of no tc ."' 0 But it captivated 
the minds o f most othe rs,81 despite the fa ct that Krie r a nd Sclnvab 
we re unable to fine! any judicial authority employing or foreshadowing 
the ir in sight. a nd the ob vio us ri sk of st rat eg ic abuse of this r emedy by 
tortfea s ors . '~ Importantly. Krie r and Schwab 's insight. debatable as it 
might be. cl e mo nstr <t tc cl th a t other rul es ma~' be hiding in the wings or 
Calabrcsi and Me lamed's four basic rules. 
lnclcecl. thre e years later, Saul Le vrn o re. in an analytical tour de 
forc:e, deri ved ~1s many as sixt ee n vari a nts lro m Calabresi a nd 
Melamecl's o riginal four. '' To accomplish this feat , Levmore divided 
the fo ur basic rul es according to various famili a r lega l di stinctions. For 
example . in the context o f lia bi lit y rules. Lcvmore proposed tha t a 
court might o rde r compensation on ly if th e injurer was neglige nt, but 
no t otherwise_s-+ Furthermore, d rawing on the di stinction b etween torts 
and unjust e nrichme nt, Levmore noted that in de te rmining the proper 
compensation aware!. a co urt cou ld choose betwe en the victim 's loss 
and the injurer's gain."5 Lcvmore also observed that instead of award-
ing compensation for both past and future injuries, a court may com-
pe nsate the victim for eith er past or fut ure injuries.s6 In the same vein , 
in the context of property rules. a court may award the victim an in-
junction, but deny her d amages for past injuries . Or, if the court 
wishes to increase th e victim 's compensation , it may enjoin the harm-
ful activity a nd aware\ the vic tim the injurer 's past ga in . 
Inspired by the unve iling of rule 5 , Levmorc also sought to uncover 
se veral '·startling rul es" of his own. U ltima te ly, Levmore found o ne 
such rul e, which he dubbed ·'Rule 5CE."87 Drawing on rule 5, 
Levmore proposed a rul e that wo uld permit th e injure r to continue 
79. Jan Ay res correc tl y no ted that rule 5 is esse ntiall y iln exa mple of put optio n protec-
ti o n. S<'e Ayrc:s. sup m no te 70. at 00 1. 
00. Levmore . supm note 4. at 2150. 
8 1. See id . 
82. See Levmore, supm note 4, at 2 16 1 (noting th a t ' ·[i] f A kne w that a j udge would re -
spo nd to a ny compla int by B with thi s ru le 5. the n A wou ld have a perverse ince nti ve to cre-
ate nuisances in order to collect from B'" ). 
83. A full review o f a ll o f Le vmore 's var iants is beyond the scope of thi s Artic le. F o r a 
ta ble summ a rizin g the sixteen differe nt rul es. see Levmorc, supm no te 4. a t 2173 . 
84. /d. a t 2156. In a diffe re nt va ri a n t. Levmo re proposed th at if the injurer was no t neg-
lige nt she wo uld sha re in the victim's loss if th ey both be long to the sa me comm unity. !d. at 
2159. 
85. !d. at 21.57. 
86. !d. at215lJ. 
87. !d . at 2162. 
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with the harmful activity, but would force her to pay all her gains from 
choosing to clo so to the victim.'' However. Levmore himself aclmittecl 
that "it may be hard to see \vhy Rule 5 or 5CE would ever be selected 
[l 1 
.. ,,, 
JY a cour t . · 
c. Sumnzory and Evn!umion. The Curlzedm! ancl its progeny have 
had a profound impact on entitlement theory as well as our under-
standing of the legal system ~~sa whole. The locus on transaction costs, 
the defining characteristic of this body o! literc1turc. has transformed 
traditional understandings of property. contract . and tort. Several 
changes cllT worth noting. 
Fir~t , the locus on transacting has reduced the status of property 
rights from ncar-absolute rights th~tl dcrwtc individual autonomy and 
security to fungible bargaining chips. From ct right that granted to its 
holder the power to exclude ot hers."1' propert y has become no more 
than a contractual lever. And. from ~~ right that could only in rare 
cases be taken for a public use. '' ' property has become an up-for-grabs 
right, open to all potential takers. The familiar ··no-trespassing" sign 
was replaced with an ·'all welcome'· one. 
Second, the entitlement literature has largely changed the internal 
hierarchy between property and contract. Traditionally, property was 
deemed a keynote right,92 and contract as a subservient right, designed 
to enable property owners to transfer their property. The right to 
transfer, represented by contract , was just one stick in the bundle of 
rights property confers upon its holcler. 9' The entitlement literature 
has turned this relationship around, placing contract at the core of our 
legal system, and property at the fringe~. Under the new conceptuali-
zation, property merely facilitates contracting by defining the initial 
bargaining positions of the parties. 
88. !d. 
89. !d. at 2loS. 
90. Sec. e.g.. Kaiser Aetna v. United States. 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (" '[T]he right to 
exclude others' is ·one of the most essential sticks in the: bundle of rights that are common1v 
characterized as property.· '"): Thomas \V. Merrill. Properly and rl;e Right to Exclude. 77 
NEB. L. REV. 730. 730 (2000) (positing that '·th e right to exclude others is more than just 
·one of the most essential" constituents of property- it is the sine qua non"). 
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ('·[Njur shall private property bt: taken for public use. 
without just compensation."). 
92. See Carol l'vl. Ruse. Propenv os the Keystone Righ(l. 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 
(1999) [hereinafter Rose. Keysrone Rig/ttl (reviewing and critically examining the various 
sources of the view of property as a keynote right). 
93. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER. A Tl!EORY OF PROPERTY 40-5() (1990) (suggesting that 
the right to transfer the "stick" distinguishes property rights from personal rights); J.E. Pen-
ncr. Tit!! "Bundle of Rig/us'" Pic!ure uf Propertv, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 747 (arguing that 
.. the right to transfer property is an inherent feature of property rights"): cf Merrill & Smith. 
supra note 9. at 365 (observing that for some writers inlluenccd by the legal realism of the 
1920s and l930s, ·'the bundle-of-rights concept simply meant that property could be reduced 
to recognizabk collections of functional attributes. such as the right. . to transfer .. ). 
24 /V{i chigun Lull' Rn·ic 11 ' 
T hird . the economic analysis of entitlemen ts has stri pped property 
of one of its defining characteristics. its in re111 nature.'' 1 By contrast to 
in personum contractual rights that arc binding only o n the parties to 
the co ntract. proper ty rights arc binding upon th e res t o l the worl cl. ~' 
Yet, owing to the te ndency to model disputes as two party conflicts. 
the econom ic literature on entitlements has oblite rated this importa nt 
dil'fcrencc . As Thomas Merr ill and Henry Smith ha ve obse rved ... most 
mode rn economic accounts e ndow property with no dist incti ve cha rac-
ter at all'' Property ri ghts are "simpl y ... little empty bo:;cs l'ill ed with 
Cl miscellany of use ri ghts that opera te in the background uf <t ··.vur ld 
consisting of nothing but in pc r:;onam obl igations ... . ,r, 
Fo urth. the virtually exclusive focus on l'ctcilitclting tr<ms<tctic1ns has 
pushed to the corner the traditiona l utilit clrian justifications of prop-
er ty, most notably the need to incentivize owners to invest in re -
so urces.'17 For thi s reaso n. property regimes overwhe lmingly employ 
proper ty rules as the defau lt reg ime.% As Carol Rose e:.:plainecL this 
property rule favoriti sm is not accidental. Strong. undivided , a nd 
sharply defined prope rty rights not only faci lit ate contracting but a lso 
··encourage individua l inves tment , planning and el'fort" by giving ac-
to rs ·'a clearer sense of what they are getting ... q" Moreover, the trans-
actional focus has marginalized another key role of property law -
0.J . Me rrill & Smith. supm no te 0. a t 360 (not ing that "[pjrope rty right' h is to r ica ll v ha ve 
bee n reg.arclecl as in rem"): Thom as \N. Me rrill & He nry F.. Smith. The l'ropcrn / Conrmcr 
lnrcrjinc. l()l COLU\'1. L. R EV . 773 . 777 (2110 1) (noting th at " [p]roperty rights arc in rem-
th ey hind the 'rest of the world' '' ). 
05. See 'We sley Newco mb H o hfcld. Fundwnenru/ Lcgul Conn'fJlions us i \pf!lied in .ludi-
ciul Reusoning. 26 YALE L..J. 7 10 (ll) l 7) (di sc uss ing th e diffe re nce betwee n in per.1·onun1 
ri ghts. which avail agains t one or a i'ew pe rsons. and in rem ri g hts . which ~1V~1il aga inst a la rge 
and indefinite class or peopl e) . 
lJ6. Me rrill & Smit h. supr11 no te Y. at 305. 
07. See J ERE~'I Y BENTH Mvl. TH EO RY Or LEGI SL.-\T ION l l l-1 3 (.:it h eel. 1882) (pos iting 
th ;H pro pe rty is the bas is o f an expecta tio n of adva n tages). Examples of modern law and 
econ o mics scholars of thi s view inc lude: R ICHARD POSNER . ECONOM IC A N1\LYSIS OF L AW 
(4 th eel. 1908) . J ESSE D UKEM INIER & ] ;-\iviES E. KRIER. PROPERTY )3 (4t h e el. 1008) (noting 
th a t "[u]t ilitarian th eory is . without doubt. the domina nt view of property today ... espe -
cially among those workin g in law and economics' '): Haro ld D e mse tz. I()\mrd 11 Tlu:orv of 
Properly Righ1.1. 57 A\-1. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (providing a utilit:Jrian account of th e emer-
gence of property ri gh ts): R obe rt C. E llickson, !'rop u1y in l.o/1{/. 102 YALE LJ. 131:1 ( l 0LJ3) 
(comparing private and g r· oup la nd owne rsh ip. and notin g th a t a change in la nd regim es is 
e ffi cien t when it red uces the sum o f tra nsaction costs and deadweight losses) : and Ruse. 
S/l(fr/ol\' oflhc Ca1hulml. supru note 19. a t 2 182 . 21 :-:\7 . 
08. See R ose. Shlllimv o(rhe Carhcdrul. supra note 10. a t 2 187: Epste in . SIIJJm note 7-1. at 
2(1S>fi-2 10) (d iscussing the d o minance o f property rul es in prope rt y law ). 
0<). Rose. Shadolt' o(lhc Cmhn/ml. supra note l Y. at 2 1 S7 . 
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str ikin g th e bal ance between exclu sivity and acccss .11111 and in some 
cases. between monopol y and compe tition. 1111 
Finally. Calabrcsi and lVfc lamed's cc1!1 to consider distributive and 
other justice cons id e rations in determining the allocat ion of entitl e-
ments has been all but ignored by subseq uent law and econ omi cs 
schola rs. A lth ough Ca labresi and Melame d put the va rious consider <1 -
tio ns on eq ual foo ti ng. economic ,_:tliciency somehow eclipsed th e two 
other va lues . 
1!. E NTTR P LI.,\H IUTY RU LES 
In this Part. we introd uce the concep t of pliability rul es .1112 ·1\!Ie t<t -
phorica ll y spea king. C1labres i :111d Mela med viewed th e law as a 
three-l eve l structure. with in alie ndb ility rules at the ground leveL 
prope rty rules at the first ri oor . anc.l li~1bility rules at the second . Whil e 
we adopt Calabresi and Mc~ldmed·s three bas ic ca tegories, we show 
th at their metaphor is in co mple te. It fail s to capture the dynamism o f 
the legal system, which allows fo r the changing of entitlements over 
time. In other words. it neglects to acco unt for connections within the 
structure and the ab ility to move around in it. We propose th at 
pliability rules should be viewed as the stairways between the floors, 
and the corridors and doorways connecting rooms on those flo ors . In 
o the r words, we contend that the se t of enti tlements described by the 
metaphor should in clude not on ly the rule in isola tion , but also thei r 
l Oll. Sct' . t'. g .. Lau ra l.illllc rkull"le r. On fJIIif !l' rl\ ': / \11 E.1sur. 1011 YALE L.J . 127 . 12<J. 1-1-l -
-15 ( l<J <Jl) (pos iting that prllperty e mbod ies ~rn inherent tcnsiun between the individual and 
th e co llec ti ve .): c{ Ne il Weinstock :'-Jc t ~1 n el. Cnprrighr 111/{1 u Denwcmric Civil Sociel\'. 1116 
YALE L.J. 283.36-1 (19<J6) (s ugges ting. in th e cuntexl of copy right. that the cha llenge facin g 
decisionmake rs is to struct ure th e t ~1 1V so that it strikes a .. ca re ful ba lance be twee n exclusivit1· 
a nd access .. ). 
10 !. See RICH A RD A. E l'STE \:--1 . T.AK I:--IGS: PRJ V!\T E PROPERTY AN D TH E POWE R OF 
EMIN ENT DOMAIN ( I<J:'N): cf J.H. Reichman. lnrellecruul Prop r.' rl\' in ln remarionul Fuu le: 
Oppnrruniries und Risks uf u C:A TT Cnn necrion. 22 Y AN D. J. TRANSNAT"L L. 747. 867 
( 1989) (s uggesting that pwgress in in tt: rn a ti o na l inte llec tu al property re la ti o ns has bee n 
based ·'on a process ol conse nsus that e nab led all participants to determine th e des ired bal -
ance be twee n mo nopo ly and co mpe ti tio n .. ): De borah ·russey . Fru111 f {tn Sites ro Files/wring: 
l'ersonul Us e in Cvbr:rspo cc. 35 Gi\. L. Rev. 11 29 . !17 1 n. l4 1 (20<Jl) (no ting. in the intell ec-
tual prope rty context. that "u tilit a rianism seeks to ba lance creators' incentives aga inst th e 
pub li c right of access, providing monopoly ince nti ves only to the ex tent necessary to induce 
creation"). 
102. As Ian Ayres ca uti oned. origin ality is tricky to claim . Indeed. it is poss ible th a t 
Cn labresi and Melamed saw the possibility of mixing p rope rty and liability rul e protection. It 
is li kely that Le vmo re saw this opt io n. hut never deve loped it. whe n he me nti o ned the possi-
bility of less than pe rfect property ru le protect ion . And clearly. Mnri ll not iced. and even 
di scussed, th e possibility of incor poratin g a sim ilar mode of protection in to th e doctrine s of 
adve rse possessio n an d prescri pli ve case me nt s. See Thomas W. iVI e rr iiL Property Rules. 
I .iahilily Rules, and ; \d1·crsc fJosscs.1ion . 7'J Nw. U. L. R ev. 11 22 (1984). Howeve r. !Yi e rrill" s 
d isc uss ion was limi ted to th a t co ntex t. and was prima ril y norma tive. !Yie rrill neve r went be -
yond adverse possess ion. He did not ex plore the descripti ve preva le nce of pli ab ili ty rules in 
o th er legal areas. nor d id he propose the use o f plia bi lit y rules in other se ttings. 
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interconnections. Calabresi and Melamed's model is static; ours is dy-
narmc. 
Our three-fold project in this P art is to demonstrate the conceptual 
distinctiveness of pliability rules, show the descriptive pervasiveness of 
such rules. and to expound the various goals pliability rule protection 
serves. Our conceptual discussion focuses on demonstrating the dis-
tinctiveness of the category of pliability rules. and the importance of 
pliability rules for extending Calabresi and Mclamecrs analysis. 
As should be clear by the large number of examples presented in 
this Part. we contend that lawmakers have preceded the academy to 
pliability rules: pliability rules arc already widely used. Our descriptive 
exposition covers various legal areas, with a m<~jor focus on property 
and intellectual property law. as well as antitrust law and corporate 
law. We show that in certain instances pliability rules enhance eco-
nomic efficiency, while in others they promote fairness and distribu-
tive concerns. 
Our normative aim here is to show that. due to their amalgamated 
nature, pliability rules provide a unique policy tool for a variety of cir-
cumstances, such as the need to accommodate competing societal in-
terests such as efficiency and equity, and monopoly power and compe-
tition. By combining property and liability rule protection, pliability 
rules merge the respective strengths of the two modalities. 'We gener-
alize our normative discussion in the next Part; here, our aim is to 
show the gains achieved by each of the examples of pliability rule we 
cite. 
A. Property+ Liability= Pliability 
1. Pliability and Grue 
Pliability rules are amalgamated rules. They combine their familiar 
cousins- property rules and liability rules- in numerous combina-
tions. Among the many legal fields employing pliability rules are cor-
porate law, intellectual property, eminent domain, and antitrust, as 
well as several areas of law not discussed in rhis Part, such as bank-
ruptcy. However, pliability rules are much more than a rearrangement 
of familiar materials. 
To illustrate the importance of pliability rules, we turn to an anal-
ogy provided by the philosopher Nelson Goodman. In his Fact, Fiction 
and Forecast, Goodman sought to illustrate a problem with inductive 
reasoning by hypothesizing an imaginary color called "grue." 103 An 
item that is colored "grue" looks green to anyone who observes it 
prior to a given time - for example, the year 2003. Thereafter, the 
grue item appears blue. Goodman notes that before the year 2003, 
103. NELSON GOODMAN. FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST 74 er seq. (2cl eel. 1965). 
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anyone cxammmg the grue-colored item would be unable to tell 
wh e ther she was looking at something that was green or something 
tha t was gruc. Anyone hearing an item described as ··green" before 
2003, or as "blue" aft e rwards, would not know whet he r the described 
ite m were actually green or blue, on the one hand. or grue , on the 
other. This. says Good man, demonstrates a characteristic failure of in -
duction. While green. blue and grue are all ontol og ica lly distinct -
each bas its own di stinct co lo r characteristic - the observe r can never 
induce whe ther she has seen grue or either gree n or blue. Induction, 
no tes Goodman. fai ls to distinguish betwee n items th at appear th e 
same, but are ontologically diffe rent. 
Pliability rules are distinct from property and li abi lit y ruks, as grue 
is fro m green and blue. While a pliability rul e may appear as a prop-
e rty or liability rul e at any given point in time, it is neve rtheless onto-
log ical ly distinct. Unlike a property or li ability ru le , a pliability rule 
co ntains within itself its own conditions for change. A perso n who ob-
serves property rule or liability rule protection a t a give n point in time , 
and assumes that the property rule or liability rule protection encap-
sul a tes the true legal protection of an object, may be making a critical 
error. If the entitlement holder actually enjoys pliability rule protec-
tion over the obj ect, describing the protection as property rule or li-
abi lity rule protection would constitute an ontological error. In this 
se nse, a pliability analysis is thus the opposite of what Louis Kaplow 
labe led a "transitional" analysis - the analysis of how entitleme nts 
sho uld be treated in th e face of " the existence of uncertainty con-
cern ing (a] future government policy (transition] prior to the govern-
ment action. " 1 ' 1~ Pliability rules provide entitlement ho lders with cer-
tainty concerning future changes in the rul es protecting th eir 
entitl ements, and , therefore, a truer appreciati on of the nature of pro-
tection they enjoy at present. 
Importantly, given that pliability rules have distinct properties and 
a unique identity and course, they create a diffe rent se t of incentives. 
Property rules are genera lly thought to encourage greater investment 
than liability rul es, since the entitlement holder may prevent involun-
tary loss of the object. P liability rules fall somewhere in the middle, 
depending on the particul ar combination of prope rty rules and liability 
rules. Also, certain pliability rules offer the additional advantage of 
self-regulation as they allow the entitlement hold er to affect the na-
ture of the protection she enjoys. We illustrate these important fea-
tures of pliability rules in the discussion and examples later in this 
Part. 
Ne lson Goodman's discussion of grue provides a me taphor for an-
other key feature of our analysis of pliability rules. Goodman does not 
I 04. Louis Kaplow. An Econo111ic Analysis of Legal Tm mi1ions. 99 H A RV. L. RE v . 509. 
512 ( 1%6). 
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suffice with grue's ontological distinctiveness; ultimately, Goodman 
rejects the importance of grue on pragmatic grounds, noting that grue 
is not a significant category in the real world. Thus , for the existence of 
pliability rules to be noteworthy, such rules must have some practical 
significance, as well as ontological identity. Our d iscussion in this Part 
shows the pervasiveness of pliability rules in the legal world, rendering 
pliability rules a more valuable category of analy~is than grue. 
Indeed, as our discussion shows, pliability rules are so ubiquitous 
in our legal regime that every entitlement can be viewed, in one sense 
or another. as falling under the protection or pliability rules, rather 
than property or liability rules. This, too. requires a practical ap-
proach. Property rules, liability rules, and pliabi lity rules are not di-
vorced [rom the legal context in which they arise. In some cases, the 
legal contingency that gives rise to a change in legal protection may be 
so remote that it may be safely ignored for most purposes. Pure prop-
erty or liability rules are the more useful framework for examining the 
entitlement in such instances. 
2. Pliability and Calabresi and Melamed 
The role of pliability rules can also be illustrated in reference to 
Calabresi and Melamed's famous table of the four basic types of prop-
erty and liability rules. Their table omitted inalienability rules. The ta-
ble is meant to illustrate four possible responses to claims of nuisance. 
The typical case underlying each cell in the table involves a home-
owner suing a nearby polluter. In cell one, the plaintiff homeowner 
enjoys property rule protection and is entitled to a court order en-
joining the polluting activity. In cell two, the plaintiff homeowner re-
ceives liability rule protection. The polluter may continue her activi-
ties but must pay the homeowner for damages. In cell three, the 
defendant polluter enjoys property rule protection. The polluter may 
continue the activities, and the homeowner receives no relief. Cell 
four involves liability rule protection for the defendant. The polluter 
must cease her polluting activities, but the plaintiff homeowner must 
pay the defendant polluter for the resulting damages. 
The table below illustrates these possibilities, with cases in which 
courts may be deemed to have employed the relevant type of protec-
tion. 
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TABLE 1: PROPERTY RU LES AND LIABILITY RULES 
1. Property Rul e (Plaintiff) 
Deparrment of Health & Menw! 
Hygiene v. Calo:ry Chemical Co. 1" \ 
En sign \". v\iol l.\ 1" " 
3. Property Rule (Defe ndan t) I 
Francisco 1". DeporTment of [ 
Institutions & Agencies 11 ' : Rose v. I 
[ Socony Vucu //Ill Corp. 1' ''' 
2. Liability Rul e (Plaintiff) 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cenz ent 1"' 
4. Liability Rule (Defe ndant) 
Spur lndusrries Inc. 1". Dei/ E. 
Webb Deve!opme11f Co. 11" 
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As we noted in the last Part, the Ca lebresi-Mclamedian four- ce ll 
table has been the launchin g pad for many analyses o f property a nd 
liability rules. In th a t vein , we illustrate the place of pliability rul es 
within the traditio nal four-ce ll table. As the ir name implies, pliability 
rules are amalgamated rules that combine property and liability rule 
protection. Under pliability rule protection , the entitlement holder ini-
tia lly receives one type of rule protection - property or liability -
and then upon the occurrence of a certa in contingency, the nature of 
the protection changes to another kind of rul e protection. Sometimes, 
pliability rules invo lve transfer o f the entitlement itself. 
T he next table adds the poss ibility of pliability rules, illustrated by 
the arrows. As the table demonstrates, pli ability rules involve either a 
simultaneous rule, in which more than one of the rules applies at the 
same time, or, more common ly, a changing rule, in which protection 
begins with one o f the four types of ordinary Calabresi-Me lamedian 
property and liabi li ty rules, and then, upon a specified event, changes 
to another of the four types of rul es. Alth ough there is no limit on the 
number of possible pliability rules, we illustrate in the chart, only th e 
six prototypical pli ability rules that we describe in this Part. 
105. 1 ENYIR. R EP 1660 (Md . C ir. C t. 1970) (enjoining chemica l sme ll s) . 
106. 34 N .W.2cl 549 (M ich. 194R) (enjo ining raisin g a clog in res iden ti a l ne ighborhood). 
107. 257 N .E.2d R70 (N.Y. 1970) (ru ling that avoidance of injunction was conditioned o n 
pa ym e nt of permanent damages to pl a intiffs). 
108. 180 A . 843 (N.J. C h. 1935) (holding that plaintiffs were not e ntitle d to enjoin no ise 
and odors of aclj;1cent san ita ri um) . 
109. 173 A. 62 7 (R. I. llJ34) (finding th at absent negligence. po llu tio n o f pe rcolat ing wa-
te rs was no t e njoin ilble). 
110. 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz . 1972) (e nj o ining the opera tor o f a fe ed lo t from continuing its 
operation. but ordering th at a devel oper rep resenting res id e nts indemnify the tortfeasor for 
the cost of moving or shutting clown). 
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T A BLE 2: PROPERTY RULES , LIABIUTY RULES , AND PLI ~\l31LlTY 
RULES 
1. Property Rule (Plaintiff) 
Title 
Shifting 
Classic Pliabilitv 
3. Property Rule (Defendant) 
2. Liability Rule (Plaintiff) 
4. Liability Rule (Defendant) 
As the table demonstrates, we focus our discussion on six proto-
types of pliability rules that are common in existing law. 
The first set of pliability rules involves property rules that are 
transformed into liability rules - "classic pliability rules" under our 
terminology. T he legal protection of post-freeze-out minority share-
holders provides an example of such classic pliability rule protection. 
The second set comprises the particular variety of pliability rules 
that we call "zero order pliability rules"- property rules that become 
liability rules where the compensation for breach of the rule is zero. 
Octobe r 2002] Pliabilily Rules 31 
A n example of a zero order plia bility rul e is copyright protection , un-
der which the a uthor receives a property right for her life p lus seventy 
years, and thereafter anybody can usc th e copyri gh ted express ion free 
of charge. 
As a third set of prototypical pli abi lity rul es, we turn to the case of 
'·s imultaneous pli ability rul es," in which the same entitleme nt holder 
ho lds one type of rule protection with respect to so me pote ntial users , 
but a different type of rul e protec ti on with respect to other users. For 
example, the fa ir use doctrine in copyright law red uces the usual prop-
er ty rule protection to zero order li ab ility pro tect io n where the use of 
the copy right entit lement constitutes a '·fair use .- ' 111 
The fo ur th set includes " loperty rule s," in whi ch init ia l li ability rule 
protecti on is transformed into property rule protection. The trans!or-
mation of ca ttl e-feed ing righ ts resulting from fe ncing pasture in a 
"fe ncing-out" lega l regime provides an examp le of a loperty rule. 
T he fifth se t of pliability rules we examin e consists of "title shi fting 
pliability rules," i.e., rul es th at transform property rule protection in 
the hands of one entitlement holder into property ru le protection in 
the hands of another entitlemen t holder. Adverse possession provides 
the classic example of this type of pli ability rul e. 
Finally, we examine the case of " multiple stage pli ability rules," in 
which rul e protection is changed more th an once. For example, we ob-
serve that eminent domain can be viewed as property rule protect ion 
fo llowed by liability rule protecti on in the hands of the original owner, 
and then property rule protection in the hands of the subsequent enti-
tlement holder. 
B. Classic Pfiob ility Rules 
Classic pliability r ul es, as we noted, invo lve the tra nsformation of 
an en titlemen t from property rul e to liability rule pro tec tion. In cases 
involving classic pliability rules, property rules provide the baseline 
protection in order to advance effi cient allocat ion of resources. By 
creating in rem rights in reso urces, property rules reduce the cost of 
defending the item against potential takers, a llowing owners to invest 
optimally in the item's use . Where exogeno us transaction costs are 
low, the in rem protection comes at low cost, since the object will still 
gravitate to the highest value user. Moreover, property righ ts them-
se lves lower transaction costs and facilitate exchange by reducing the 
cost of defining ownership and usage rights in obj ects. 
However , class ic pliability rules also take into account the many 
instances in which the defaul t property rule protection becomes ineffi-
cient or unfair. Classic pliability rules, by defining th e tri ggering event 
111. Adm it tedly , in framing the issue in thi s way, we treat users as intrinsica ll y wed ded 
to certa in types of uses, which blurs the important distincti on be twee n uses and users. 
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that a lters protection from prope rty to liability rule. re ta ins the advan -
tages of baseline property rule protection, wh il e creating the flexibili ty 
to adapt to changing circumstances. 
""VVe introduce the category with an exa mination of the most 
straightforward exa mple: the rights of minority share ho lde rs in the af-
termath of merge rs and acquisitions. 
1 
~ . /v!ergers ond Acquisirimzs 
Ord in ar il y. share ho lders in a corporati o n e n joy prope rty rule pro -
tect ion ove r their sha res . Subj ect to reporting a nd a iienab ility restr ic-
tions es tablished by law, shareholders may free ly sell or tra nsfe r th eir 
shares. and shares may not be appropriated by nonowne.r:.; without the 
owner' s co nse nt. 112 However, most types of co rporate dec isions do not 
require un an imo us asse nt. This category includes key dec isions such as 
mergers o r free ze-o ut takeovers that force minority shareholders to 
surre nder their shares in exchange for compensation determined by 
the corpora tion. 1u Generally, in such cases, state law entitles minority 
shareho lders to petition for court review of the adeq uacy of the com-
pensat ion. This right to demand review is te rmed an appra isa l right. 1 1 ~ 
11 2. See WILLIAM L. CA RY & MELVIN ARON E ISENB ERG. CORPORATIONS: CASES 
.Ai\ D MATERIA LS 92 (6 th e el. 1992) (noting th a t " shares of corpora te stock a re free ly tra ns-
ferable .. ). Cary and Eise nbe rg also obse rve that unde r the U.C.C.. a stock ce rtificate is a nc: · 
got iab le in strument. See id. a t 92 n.4 (citing U.C.C. s§ 8- 102, 8-1 05( 1) ). The re fore. .. a trans-
fer to a holder in du e course cu ts off most cla im s against th e transferee ... !d. 
11 3. Co111pore Weinbe rge r v. UOP.lnc .. 457 A.2d 701,713 (Del. 1983) (holding tha t ap-
prai sa l is th e o nl y ava ilable remedy fo r minority share ho lde rs in a c:1sh -ou t me rger. a nd 
no ting that .. [flair pri ce o bvi o usly req uire s consideration o f a ll relevant [acto rs in volving th e 
va lue of a companv .. ). •villi Rabkin v. Philip A . Hunt Che m. Corp .. 498 A .2d 1099. I 106. 
1107-08 (Del. 1985) (hol ding tha t appraisal is not an exclusive remedy whe n the defe ndan t 
e ngaged in fa ithless acts th a t were re asonably related to and have a substan tial impact upo n 
the price o ffe red in a freeze -out merge r). 
114. See J ESS E H. C HOPER ET AL.. CASES AND M ATE RIALS ON CORPO RATIONS 11 67 
(3d eel. 1989) (defi ning ·' disse nte rs· a ppra isal ri gh t' . as th e right of .. [s jha re ho lde rs who di s-
se nt fro m a co rporate me rge r a nd. in most states. share ho lde rs who d isse nt fro m the sale of 
all or subs ta ntially a ll of th e ir corporation 's asse ts ... to require the corpora tion to purchase 
the ir shares at a judicial ly de te rmined price") . 
For a sa mple of sta tutes that provide for dissente rs' appraisal rights. se c CAL. COR I'. 
CODE§§ 17600-17613 (Wes t 1.999) (providing for dissente rs' rights with regard to certa in 
reo rga niza ti o ns or me rge rs o f limited liability co rpo rations) : FLA. ST.·H. A NN . 
s 608.4381 (4)(d) (W es t 1999) (refe rring to offers required in conne ct io n with dissente rs ' 
rights) ; NY. Bus . CORP. L AW§ 1005 (McKinney 1994) (providing for pa yme nts to disse nt-
ing membe rs in the case of certain m e rgers or consolida tions) ; OHI O REV . CODE ANN. 
§ 1705.40 (A nderson 1998) (outlining me mbe rs' entitlem e nt to relief as di sse nting members) . 
Many co rporation s sta tutes lack simil a r protec tions, notwithstanding the wide sp read 
prov isio n of a prrai sal rights for mino rity 0\Vners in corporati o ns. See Joe l Se ligman. 
Reappraising file Appraisal Remedy, 52 G EO . W AS H. L. REV. 829, 831-32 & n.l1 ( 1984) (re -
portin g that a li fift y sta tes a nd the Distric t of Columbia p rovide apprai sa l rights in case of a 
corpora te merge r or consolidation); see also Sa ndra K. Miller, Wlw1 Buy-Ou1 Rig/us, Fiduci-
ary Dwies, and Dissolwion R emedies Should Apply in 1he Case of rli e Min orify 01vn er of u 
Liabi/in· Com pany?, 38 HARV. J. ON L EG IS. 413.416- 17 (2001). For example, some limite d 
liability corpo rations sta tutes do not provide for disse nters' rights in th e case of ce rtain 
I 
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Conside r the case of the class ic tender offer accompanied by a 
freeze-o ut. The target corporation is a publicly he ld corporati o n with . 
let us say. 100,000 outstanding shares. An acquiring corporation de-
sires to purchase and incorporate the business of the target corpora-
tion into its own. To this end , the acquirer issues a tender offer for the 
purchase of 50,001 of the targe t 's shares. Following th e success of the 
te nd e r offer. the acquirer intends to usc the 50,001 shares to cause th e 
target to vo te to me rge itself into the acquire r. U nder the te rms of the 
merger deal. the target will sell al l its assets to the acquirer for cash, 
and then cease to exist as an independent co rporat ion. Since minori ty 
:; harcholde rs in the target will be forced to rece ive cash in exchange 
fo r the ir shares in the dissolving corpora ti o n. th e nature of the ir en ti -
tleme nt will be transformed from prope rty rule protection into li ability 
rule protec tion. If displensed with the amount of compensat ion set by 
the majority (the acquirer's 50,001 shares), the minority sha reholders 
may seck judicial app raisal of the value of their shares in the tmge t. 
E ithe r way, the minority shareholders lack the ability to veto the 
transfer of their asse ts and must make do with a third party determina-
tion of the amount they will receive. 
Minority share ownership in the face of majoritarian corporate 
decisionmaking is therefore a pliability entitlement: in most cases, a 
share is a property interest entitled to property rule protection, but the 
adoption of certain corporate decisions alters the nature of the share-
holde r's interest in his or her shares. The provision in state law re-
quiring majority decisions to engage in a merger, freeze-out takeover 
or the lik e, should therefore be viewed as creating a classic pliability 
rule. 
The use of a pliability rule in this case is justifiabl e on grounds of 
both fa irness and e fficiency. The property rule baseline, by empower-
ing sha reholders to dispose of their shares ns they please , induces in-
vestment in the stock market, and allows individuals to plan ahead. 
Since ordinary share trading on the market is relatively cheap, marke ts 
are liquid , and there is no inheren t reason to assume that non-holding 
investors value shares more highly than existing shareholders, prop-
erty rule protection is th e optimal means for ensuring that shares are 
efficiently allocated. 
However, in scenarios involving transfer of corporate control, 
property rule protection is unduly cumbersome. Obtaining unanimous 
consent is likely to be prohibitively costly. Additionally, strategic 
holdouts may bar such transactions altogether. Under a unanimous 
consen t rule, each shareholder will find it in her interest to holdout in 
order to increase her expected payoff.l 15 Finally, in the absence of stra-
me rgers o r acqui sitions. and fe w corporations statutes provide a n equitable dissolution or 
buy-out remedy in the case of illegality or fraud. !d. at 417. 
115. See Zohar G oshen. Voling (In sincerely) in Corpomre Lo w. 2 THE ORETI CA L 
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tegic behavior, majority decisions are the best mechanism for maxi-
mizing the wealth of the shareholders as a group. Thus, to ensure the 
efficient operation of the market for corporate control, corporate law 
replaces the property rule baseline with a liability rule triggered by 
majority de cis i ems. 
While a pliability rule in this context is superior to both unchang-
ing property and liability rule protection, it still leaves open the possi-
bility of majority abuse in the liability phase. In cases of freeze-out 
takeovers, for cxmnpk, majority shareholders may use their power to 
divest minority shctreholders of their assets to tran~:;fer value from the 
minority to the majority. Majority decisions make minorities vulner-
able to unfair <:sset :;ubstitution, in which the majority uses a merger or 
takeover to substitute one set of assets underlying the share for an-
other, less valuable set. 116 The law thus ensures the shareholders' right 
to adequate wmpensation in the liability stage of the pliability rule by 
means of an appraisal right. 117 
INQUIRIES L. Sl5. S20 (2001) (explaining the holdout problem with the example of a corpo-
ration that asks for its bondholders' consent to an interest rate decrease to ease the corpora-
tion's debt burclt:n- a Jccision requiring the unanimous consent of all the bondholders: 
.. Despite the fact that this decrease in the interest rate may be in the best interests of all the 
bondholders, an individual bondholder may vote strategically against the change. withhold-
ing her consent until she is paid a higher price for her support."). 
116. Modern explanations of the importance of appraisal rights tend to rocus on reduc-
ing the c!istortive effects of two-tier tender offers. See. e.g., Daniel FischeL The Appraisal 
R!'medy in Corporare Law. lY83 Ai\1. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875, 879 (1983) (arguing that ap-
praisal rights :1lleviatc the prisoner's dilemma in the case of a two-tier tenckr offer): Hidcki 
Kanda & Saul Levmore. The 1\ppraisal Re111 edy and the Goals of Corporate Lmv. 32 UCLA 
L. REV. 42lJ, 463-469 (1985) (contemplating the theoretical potential of appraisal rights as a 
general monitoring tool against management which reduces the ex ante costs of the agcncv 
relationship). These e :-.:planations of the importance of appraisal rigl1ts also tt:nd to focus on 
ensuring minoritv shareholders a '·fair share" of value created in the corporate change. See 
Victor Bruclnev & Marvin A. Chirelstein. Fair Shares in Corporate Nfergers unci Tak('(Jvi'rs. 
08 l-IARV. L. REV. 297. 336 ( 1974) (arguing that in the case of a two-tier tender offer, ·'the 
function of a fa irness standard should primarily be one of preventing deception"): Council of 
the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association, The Proposed 
Delaware Takeover Statute: A Report to the Delaware General Assembly 3 ( i 988) (noting 
that a potential bidder is able to ··take over the company without the approval of the board, 
sell the assets, and dividend out the proceeds and have each stockholder receive his fair 
share of its assets"). rather than "asset substitution." For further explanation. see also Peter 
V. Ldsou, The Role ofAppraisal in Corpomte Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1121 (19YS); Paul Ma-
honey & Mark Weinstein. The Appraisal Re111edy and Merger Prerniums, l Aivl. L. & ECON. 
REV. 239 (llJlJ9): Barry M. Wertheimer, Thf' Shareholders' Appraisal Remedv unci Ho w 
Courts Detenninl' Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613 (1998). . 
117. Under the stock market exception , many appraisal statutc:s do not apply to widely 
held public corporations. See. e.g .. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, s 262(b)(1) (1991 ). 
Othe r lega l mechanisms exist to protect minority shareholders, especially in the close 
corporation context. For example, Delaware permits the shareholders of a close corporation 
to include in the certificate of incorporation a provision allowing dissolution at the request of 
any shareholder. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (1991). Similarlv. the Model Business 
Corporation Act empowers courts to order the involuntary dissolution of a corporation if a 
shareholder establishes that (i) tl1e directors arc in a deadlock that cannot be broken by the 
shareholders: (ii) the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, 
or will act in a manner that is ·'illegal. oppressive or fraudulent:'' (iii) the shareholders are 
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2. Essenria/ Fociliiies wzd A nrirrust Donwges 
The essenti al facilities doct rine in ant itrus t law provides another 
example of a class ic pliabilit y rul e. Ori ginating in Un ited States v. 
Terminal Railroad Associmion .11 ' the doctrine renders it illegal for 
owners of .. essenti al faciliti es'· to deny o th e rs access as the res ul t of 
anticompetitive motives or un der conditi ons that reduce competition. 
Essenti al faciliti es are faciliti es that cdnrwt pc,lctica ll y be duplica ted 
and are necessary for competitors· surviva l. ' ,,, The C<lse of Temzinol 
Rai!mod is ill um inating. T here. fin anci e r Jay Ciu uld es tablished a 
group th a t acquired co ntro l ove r a ll the fac iliti es necessary to load or 
unl oad freight or passe ngers. or cruss th e Mississippi River in the area 
of St. Louis. G oukrs group used it s mono po ly pmvcr to impose pre-
mium pricing on users or th e fac iliti es ow ned by his group . T he 
Terminal Roilrood Court found in thi s arrangemen t a violation o r sec-
tions l and 2 of the Sherman Act. Howeve r. rather than strip Gou ld of 
his property by ordering divestiture , the Co urt established that Go uld 
could maintain his monopoly ove r the St. Lo uis nexus - a facility es-
sential to trans-Mississippi traffic in the Mi chvest- so long as pricing 
(and other terms of usage) we re regulatcd. 120 
Th e essenti al facilities doctrine has been ex tended to a wide array 
of assets , including electricity distribution networks,121 telephone 
transmission and switching sys tems,m gas pipelines, 123 and the New 
deadl ocked and hav e bee n unable to elec t clirc:c ttx s fc1 r a t least two co nsecutive a nnual 
mee tin gs: o r (iv) the co rpo rate cbSets cHC being mi sappl ied or ,,·astc: d. See M ODEL Dus. 
CORP. f\ CT ~ 1-+.30(2) ( I 960) (amended I 90-i ): Michae l P. Doolcv & M ichael D. Goldman. 
Som e Comparisons Benveen !h e !vlndel Bus int>ss Corp or111iun A cl und lhr Defmvarr G en rml 
Corporlllion L 111v . 56 Dus. LAw. 737 . 7-17 (200 1). The "oppressio n" g ro und is m ost ofte n 
c it ed in pe titi o ns for disso lution. and so me co urts have recognized a Cll!Se o f ac ti o n for o p-
press ion o utside o f the di ssolution co nt ext. See Robe rt B. Thom pson. The Slwrelw lder., 
Cause of Auion f o r Oppression. 48 Bus. L ". w. 699 ( 1993 ). However. d isso lution proceedings 
rare ly result in th e act ua l dissoluti on of the corporati o n but o ften res ult in a buyo ut o f the 
pe titio ne r's shares. o r. mo re rarel y. th e pet it io ner 's b uyo ut o f the majo rit y's shares . Sec . e.g .. 
Park McG inty. Replacing Hoslile Tak eovers . 1-14 U. P ,'\. L. R.E V. 983.999-1002 ( 1996) (con-
cluding tha t involu nt a ry dissol uti on "e ithe r levels th e te rrain o n wh ich opp ressed mino rity 
shareho lde rs nego tiate o r (q uite r·are lv) fu r·ces liquid a ti o n" ) . 
11R. 224 U.S. 383 (l9 12) . 
J 19. See . e.g .. H echt v. Pro-footba ll. Inc. :170 F. 2cl082 ( D.C. C ir. 1077). 
120. Src genemllv A bbott B. L ipsky. Jr . & J. G regory Sida k. Esse111ial Fucili1ies . 51 
STA N. L. R EV. 11 87 ( 1999) . 
12 l. See Otter T a il Powe r Co. v. U nit e d States. -i1(J U.S . 366 ( 197?< ): C ity of Anah e im v. 
S. Ca l. Edison Co .. 955 F.2cl 1373 (9th Ci r. 1 992) : C it y of Ve rnon v. S. Ca l. Edison Co., 955 
F. 2c! 1361 (9 th Cir. 1992) 
122. See MCI Communi ca ti o ns Co rp. v. A m. ·re i. & Tel. Co .. 70o F. 2cl 108 1 (7 th Ci r. 
1983); Be ll A t!. Corp. v. MFS Communications Co .. 00 1 F. Supp. 835 ( D. De l. 1995). 
123. See City of C ha nute v. Willia ms Natural Gas Co .. 955 F. 2d 641 (JOth Cir. 1992) : 
Illin o is e.r ref. Burri s v. Pan handle E. Pipel in e Co .. 935 F.2d 1-169 (7th Ci r. 1991): Gars!J man 
v. Universal R es. H oldin g. Inc , 824 F.2d 223 (3d Ci r. 1987) . 
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York Stock Exchange. 124 The aim , in all cases, has been to preserve the 
advant<1gcs or unified control of the essenti a l fclcility. o n the one hand , 
and to avoid the ineffici encies or monopoly pricing. o n the o ther. 1c5 
The doctrine requires co urts to mandate access to privately O'Nn e d 
property once it becomes essential for compe tition. Th us. the essentia l 
faci liti es doctrine provides an example of a jud iciall y tri ggered classic 
pl ia bility rule . U pon a judicial finding or an essential facilit y. th e 
owne r's property rule pro tection over he r esse nti a l facilit~· changes 
into li ability rul e pro tec ti o n. She reta ins ownersh ip o f the facil ity but 
mus t grant access to competi tors at a price determined or rev iewed by 
a third party - th e court o r a regulator. 
T he use of a pliability ru le in the instance of esse ntial facililies en -
ab les courts to preserve th e baseline advantages of property rules d is-
cussed earlier - such as enco uraging optimal investm ent and reducing 
tra nsactio n costs - whil e introducing liability rules in th ose cases 
where circumstan ces make s uch rules more adva ntageo us. Specifically, 
th e liability rule stage dimini shes the socia l deadwe ight loss associate d 
with monopol y pricing by granting competitors access to necessary fa-
cil iti es at an approximation of competitive pricing. 
In mandating a liability rule as the second stage of the pliability 
rul e, rather than dividing the property among differe nt firms, the es-
sential facilities doctrine produces another benefit. Keeping the prop-
e rty together under one roof preserves the economies of scale pro-
duced by natural monopolies, while the liability rule avoids the cost of 
m o no polistic pricing. In a n atural monopoly, the cos t of providing a 
se rvice declines with output , making a single provider the optimum 
from a cost perspective. 126 
l :Z 4 Set' Silver v. New York Stock Exch .. 373 U.S. 341 (l%3). 
125 . To effectuate the balance. the essential faciliti es doctrine imposes liability on a 
She rman Act section 2 defendant when the plaintiff proves th e fo llowing e lements: (I) con-
trol of an essential facility by a monopo list: (2) a competito r··s inab ility reasonably or practi -
ca lly to duplicate the essentia l facility: (3) denial of th e use of th e facility to the compe titor: 
and (4) providing the competitor access to the fa cility is feasible . See /vi C /. 708 F. :Zd atll32-
33 (laying out fo ur facto rs) : J ULI AN 0. VON KALI NOWSK I ET AL.. ANTITRUST LAWS AND 
TRADE REGULATI ON§ 25.04(3] n.ll 4 (2d ed. 2001) (listing cases adopting or ci ting with a p-
prova l the /'v/C/ formul ation of the e lements of an esse ntia l faci lities case). Howeve r, th e es-
se ntial facilities doctrine has no t me t wi th uni ve rsa l approva l. See. e.g., Philip E. Areeda, Es-
selllinl F({ ciliries: An Epithe1 In Need of Limiting Principles . 58 Ai\TITRUST L.J. 841 (19YU) 
(a rguing that no Supreme Court case has provided a consistent rationa le for the doctrin e or 
has explored either th e socia l cos ts and benefits or th e adm ini st rative costs of requiring th e 
crea tor of an asset to share it with a rival). 
l2ii. See ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOV r\C IC. ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOrvrr cs IN A NUTSHELL 70 (4 th ed. 1994) ("In what is known as a ·natural mon opoly.' a 
single firm' s average costs decl ine with output. meaning that it is a lways less cos tly for th e 
one firm to produce any leve l of output rather than subdivide production among two o r 
more firms.'') : Christophe r Wyeth Kirkham, Busting tlze Administmtive Tmst: A n Experi-
llll!!I!Uiisr 1\pproach 10 Universal Service Administration in Te/ecomn111nicarions Policy. 9R 
COLU'vl. L. RE V. ()20. 621 n.4 (1998) (describing na tural monopolies as "situa tions in wh ich 
th e ma rginal cost of production or se rvice provision declines with increasin g economies of 
• 
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So far. our discussion has focused on the ex post ei1ect ol the es-
sential fac ilitv doctrine - i. e., th e o utcome that results from the aDDli-- ' ' 
ca tion of the doctrine. It is al so important to note the ,; x ante effect of 
the doctri ne. particularly the ince ntive it creates for se lf regu lation. 
Because owners of facilitie s that may eventually be found ,;:;scnti al 
know tha t they enj oy only pli ability rule, not property rule prot.ecti on, 
they will se lf- reg ula te in order to remain in the property rule :;tagc o f 
the pliability rule. T hey can do so eith er by ensuring that they do not 
accumula te assets in a way that stymi es competition. or by Yoluntarily 
granting access to compet ito rs. 
This last point demonstrates a broad er im plication ot pl i ~1b ility 
anal ys is of antitrust law. T he essential fac ilities doct rin e is net the sole 
antitrust remedy to employ pliability rules; in deed. piia bility u1 k~; m<lY 
be see n as the animating prin ciple behind an titrust law. In <.l p liability 
sca le ac ross the size of th e ent ire marker:· nnd not ing that ·· [ij n such a case. opt im;1 l sucia l 
utility is arguably gaint:cl bv co ncent rating production in a single enter prise .. ): Josep h 
i'.-lonti c ro & Gera ld Robe rtson. S!Iipfiing Conference L egislari(ln in Cwwdu. rile r ·uroJ)('il n 
Economic Comnutniry and ril e Unired Srares: Background, Fm erging Dcve/opn1enrs. Trends 
and a Few ivfrrjo r Issues. 26 TRANSP. L.J. 141, 203 (1'1'19) (explaining -that the cost fun ction of 
n n3tura lmonopolist is subaddi tive nt output because it is more expensive fo r two or more 
fi rms to produce than it is fo r the natu ra l monopolist to produce alone) . 
Nn tural monopolies may ari se in vnriou s contexts. For te lecommuni cations . sec Danie l 
F. Spulber. Deregularing Telecon1municarions. 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25 ( 199.5) (d iscuss ing 
nn tural mon opoly in the context of te lecommunications). Bur see Robert W. Cranda ll & J. 
G regory Sidnk. Comperirion and Regularory Po licies for Inreracrit·e Broadband Ner,,·orks. 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 . 1214 (199.5) (warning th at "[w]hen fo rmu lating policies for inte ractive 
bronclba nd networks .. . regubtors should be cautious abou t assu ming that natural mun op-
oly wi ll necessar ily charac terize such ne tworks" beca use '·[w]hat was once a na turally mo-
nopoli stic mc: thocl for delivering a particul ar kine! of telecommunicat ions se rvice may be 
suppl anted ove r time by n !own-cost method tha t does no t necessa rily have la rge sun k cos ts 
and low increme ntal costs. ' ). For public utilities. see Jim Ros,i. Tlli: Comm on Lo11 · ··Dury ro 
Se rve" ond Prurecrion of Consumers in an A ge of Com peririvc Reroil Public Ut i!ily Resrruc-
ru ring. 51 VAN D. L. RE V. 1233.1237 (1998) (defining a ··public utili ty .. as ·· a la rge \·e rtica lly-
integrated firm th at provides service to all customers within its geographically-clcfinecl se rv-
ice a rea'·). especinlly th e transmission segments of public utili ties. see Christo pher G. Bond. 
Shedding N ew Lighr on rlze Economics of E!ecrric R esrrucruring: / \ re Reruil !'vlurkers fen· 
E!ecrriciry rhe Amwer ro Rising Energy Costs~. 33 CONN. L. REV. 13 11 . 13:23 (200 I) (noting 
tha t "[t]he transmission segmen ts of the tmdition nl public utiliti es (e lect rici ty. phone. and 
gas) are often cited as the best exa mples of na tural monopolies'") . For wa ter wo rks an d ca ble 
te levision, see Lancaste r Cmty. Hosp. v. Ante lope Valley Hosp. Dist. . 940 F.2cl 397. 40 1 n.8 
(9 th Cir. l99l) (e xplaining that "e lectric utilities, wnter works. and cable television are gen-
e rnlly highl y regulated" beca use " these industries are paradignwt ic examples of natural mo-
nopolies" ). For newspape r delivery . see Roge r D. Blair & Joh n E. Lopa tka . The A lbrecht 
Rule afrer Kahn: Dearh Becom es Her . 74 NOTR E D AME L. REV. 123, 152 (19% ) (nu ting that 
·· newspa per deli ve ry has na turnl monopoly characte ristics in very smnll are as .. ). 
On the economics of natural monopoly. see ge nernlly \VILLIA !vl J. BAU~IOL ET AL .. 
CONTESTABLE MAR KETS AN D TI-lE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STR UCTURE i< (rc;v . eel . 1 %8) : 
SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSC HIRH ART, NATURA L fv!Oi\OPO L Y REGULATI ON : 
PR INCIPLES AN D PRACTICE :22 (1988): D ENN IS W. CAR LTO N & .J EFFREY M. PERLOFF. 
MODERN INDUSTRI AL 0RGANIZATlO:'-l 29.5-96 (2d eel. l994); ROGER SHER\ 1,\N. TH E 
REG ULATI ON OF MON OPOLY 80-81 (1989); D ANIEL F. SPULBEK. RE GU U TIOI\ AND 
MA RKETS 3 (1989); JE AN TIROL E, THE TH EORY OF INDUSTRIAL 0RGA 'i !ZATI O:--i 19-20 
(1988); KC:~NETH E. TRAIN, 0PTI~ IA L REGULATION : TH E ECONO'vii C TH EOPY OF 
NATL:Ri\ L iV!O:--iOPOL Y 6-8 (1991). 
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analysis. <ll1t itrust law aims 8t defining the a nticompetitive conditio ns 
th at should tri gger a change of legal pro tect ion from one type ol prop-
erty ru le protec tion to a diffe rent type of p roperty or liability rul e . In 
contras t to th e essential faciliti es doctrine. not all ant itrust remedies 
crea te class ic p li ability rul es . For example . remedies requi ring the 
brea k up u f the a nticompe ti tive corpora ti o n can be see n as enforcin g a 
titl e shifting p li ab ility rul e in which, upon the occurrence of <1 give n 
tri gge ring conditi o n, prope rty rule protec ti o n passes from the h<mds of 
o ne e ntitlement ho lde r (the a nticom pc titi ve corporation) to one o r 
more ot her e nti tle ment ho lde rs. 
3. Pos£-B oomcr Nuisw zce 
Fina ll y. we turn to th e nuisa nce ru le crea ted by Boolller v. Arlruzric 
Cem ent Cu.;:: as yet a noth e r example o f a class ic pliabi lity ru le. In 
Boomer. a g roup of homeowners brought a lawsuit seeking to enjoin 
the nuisance caused by pollution from th e Atlantic Cement pla nt. D e-
vi a tin g from th e es ta blish ed rule of awardin g injunctions in such cases . 
the New York Co urt of A ppeals pe rmitted the plant to continue op-
era tions. provided that A tla ntic Ceme nt pay permanent dam ages to 
the homeowners. The court reasoned th at the Atlantic Cement plant 
was too valuable re lative to the homeown ers ' pollution losses to fol-
low the traditi o nal rule. For Calabresi and Melamed , the Boomer de-
cision represents an instance of liability rule protection. Effec ti ve ly, 
the court prevented th e homeowners from exercising their property 
rul e r ight to exc lude Atlantic Cement's poll ution. Instead, the co urt 
forc ed them to suffer the po llution in exchange for the liability rule 
compe nsa tion decreed by the cour t. 
Whil e Calabresi and Me la med 's s ta tic perspective is valid in de -
scribin g the imm ediate effect of the Boomer decision , its impact from 
the dynamic pe rspective we offer is even more far reaching. In juris-
dictio ns adopting Boomer's reasoning as a rule of law, Boomer created 
a pliabili ty rule. Under th e Boomer plia bility rule , homeowners e nj oy 
property rule protection against all nuisances in s tage one. However, 
once a nuisance-crea ting act ivity becomes sufficiently valuabl e, the 
Boomer rule downgrades the homeown ers' entitlement into li ability 
rule protec tion . The Boom er pliability rule thus aims to preserve 
prope rty rul es in most cases, while adopting liability rule protec tion 
where enj o inin g a nuisance diminish es economic e ffici ency. Impor-
tantly, the re tention of the property rule baseline in this case wo uld 
crea te a hold-out problem, as it would forc e Atlantic Cement to buy 
out the injunctio n from each of plaintiffs -homeown ers . Conversely , 
127. 257N.E.2d870(N.Y 1970) . 
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e limina ting property rule protec tion altoge the r would exccssivelv re-
duce incentives for inves tment in the property. 
C. Zero Order Pliability Rules 
Lik e classic pliability rules. ze ro order pliability rules begin with 
property rul e pro tec tion for the entitleme nt ho lder. However , by con-
trast with classic pliability rules. in the second , liability, s tage ol the 
p li ab ilit y rule , the expec ted li ab ility damages fo r use of the asse t a rc 
zero. Thus. in ze ro order pli ability rul es, property rule protection is 
succeeded by 8 no- li abi lity rul e . Upon the triggeri ng eve nt, the initi cll 
e ntitl ement holder loses the ability to exercise property rule pro tc1> 
tion. such as th e ri ght to exc lud e, over her prope rty. Instead, all com -
ers may use the property fr ee of charge - that is, with zero order 
liability. No twithstanding the ze ro order liability, no third pmty may 
gain a supe rior right to tha t of the original en title ment holde r. The 
zero order pliability rules may therefore be seen as creating a nti-
exclusion , open access, or common property regimes. 
As the examples we bring from copyright and patent make clea r , 
zero order pliability rule protection is ubiquitous in the context of in-
te ll ectual property. There, zero order pliability rul es serve both eco-
nomic efficiency and the interests of fairness. Zero order pliability 
preserves property rul e protection necessary to encourage investment 
in useful inventions, while also using zero order liability to curb the 
deadweight loss created by monopoly power over the creation. Like-
wise , zero order pliability ba lances the claims of justice by the crea tor 
who wants exclusive control over her creation, o n the one hand , and 
the public that cla ims a need to use the creation, o n th e o ther. 
l. Copy right and Patent Protection 
Nowhere is the rol e of property protection in inducing investment 
in reso urces more evident th8n in the context of copyright and patent 
law. Copyright law creates and protects exclusive rights in expressive 
works of authorship. Pa tent law provides protection for innovat ive 
products, processes, and designs. Both bodies of law are rooted in 
utilitarian philosophy, and the principal justificatio n for their existence 
in th e United States is widely known as the "ince ntive theory. " 12x In-
128. See. e.g .. Kenne th Arrow, Ecunonzic We/(are and 1/ze A l/ocmion of Resources .fiH 
!nvenlion. in TH E RATE AND DIR ECTION OF. INVENTIVE A CTIV ITY 609 (1962): Stanky M. 
Besen & Leo J. Ra skind. An fnlroduclion /o !he Law and Economics of Jm ellcclllal Propcnr. 
5 J. ECON. PERS. 3, 5 (1991); Stephen Breyer. '!he Uneasy Case for Copy rig/11: A Slll{h' of 
Copvrigl11s in Books, Plzo10copies and Complller Programs. 84 H ARV . L. REV. 28 !. 29 1-CJ3 
( 1970): Wendy J. Gordon , Fair Use as 1\llarkel Failure, 82 COLUM. L. RE V. l600. 1602- 12 
(1982): Robe rt M. Hun & R o be rt M. Schuchman. The Economic Rmiona/e of Copvrig/11. 56 
AM. ECON. REV. 42 1. 425 ( 1966) (pape rs and proceed ings) : Willi a m !VI. Landes & Richard 
A. Posne r. An Economic Analysis of Copyrig/11 Lmv. 18 J. LEGA L STUD. 325 . 326 (1989) 
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deed , the utili tarian grounding of America n copyright and patent law 
is even manifested in the Constitutional intellec tual property clause , 
which empowers Congress to create exclusive rights in intellec tual 
works in order '·to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
A rts. " 1" 9 
The need for an econ omic incentive in th e field of inte!Iect ual 
property sterns tro m the ··public good·· characteristics of intellectual 
goocls. 1 ~0 Un li ke tangible goods. public goods share two distinctive 
charact eristics: nonr ivztlry of consumption and nonexcludability of 
bcnefits. 1-' 1 A good is nonrival in consumption wh . .;n a unit of that good 
can be consumed by cme person witho ut dimini shing in the s li gh test 
the consumption opportuniti es ava ila ble to others trom th at same 
unit. 1' 2 A good displays nonexcludable benefits when individuals who 
have not paid for the production o f that good cannot be prevented a t a 
reasonable cost from ava iling themselves of its bc ncfits. 133 The non-
exclud ab ility property of public goods gives ri se to two re lated prob-
lems. First , public goods arc likely to be under-produced if left to the 
private market. Second , markets for public goods will not form. 
Since inventions and expressive works arc essentially information 
goods, they too arc suscept ible to the twin problems of under-
production and lack of market exchange. 1 3~ In the absence of legal pro-
[hcreinartcr Landes & Posner. Copyrig/71 Lr111 ']: Stewart E. Sterk. Rheroric and Reulirv in 
Coprrig/71 Lu11· . ')4 i'vl ICH. L REV . 1197. 11 'J7 ( 1 'J'J6): Barrv W. Tyerman. The Economic Ro-
rionulcfor Cop_ITighr Prorcllion )rH !'uhlislll:'d Bonks: A Reply ru fJrofcssor Breyer. 18 UCLA 
L REV. 1100.1100-01 (1'J7 1). 
129. U.S . CONST. a rt. l. ~ 8. EdwarJ Wa1te rschcid points o ut that the intellec tua l prop-
e rty clause ·' is uniqu e in being the only instance wh erein the de legates prescr ibed a specific 
mode of accompli shing the particular autlwrity granted:· c'\'cc Ecl l\'iird C. \Valtersch e id. To 
Prom ole rhe Progress of Scit>n cc 0/1(1 Usejid 1\rrs: The Background ond Origin of rhe lnlcl-
lecr ual Pruperlv Clouse of rhc Unired Sl{l{es Consriuaion. 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L 1. 33 ( 1994 ). 
131J. See. e.g.. Gordon. supm note 128. nt 1610: Landes & Posner. Copyrighr Law. supm 
note 128. a t 326: see also Richard P. Adels tein & Steven I. Pera . The Co111peririon of Tech-
nologies in 1\1/arkers j rJr Ideas: Copvrig/11 und Fair Use in Evolurionarv Perspecrive. 5 [NT'L 
REV. L. & ECON. 209. 218 (19:-\ :i). For a view that inte ll ectual works do not share the di stin-
guishing attribute s o f public goods. sec Tom G. Pa lmer. lnrellecrua/ Properly: A Non-
Posneriun L111v und Economics ;\pproucfl. 12 1-IAl\ILli\E L R EV. 2111. 273-87 (1989). 
131. See . e.g . ROBERT COOTER & TH OMAS lJLE N. LAW AN D ECONOMICS 411-48 (lst 
ed. 1988): RICHARD CO RNES & T ODD SACIDLER. THE THEORY OF EXTER NA LITIES. 
PUBLIC GOODS. AND CLUB GOO DS 6-7 (1986): EDWIN MANSFIELD. PRINCIPLES OF 
MA RCRO ECONOMI CS 400-04 (6t h eel 1989). 
132. See CORNES & SANDLER. supm note 131. a l 160. 
133. Set' id. It shou iJ be noted that the impossibility of exclusion is hardly ever abso lute. 
As a matter o f fact. when exclusion bv contr~1c t is con siclerccl. very few goods. if any. di splay 
nonexcludable benefits in the stri ct se nse o f the term. T hus. it is more accura te to describe 
goods as di splayi ng nonexcluclnbk benefits when it is prohibiti ve ly costl y to bar nonpaye rs 
from enjoying the good. See P<:J trick Croskcry. Jnsriuuional Uriliru riunism and Jnrel!ecrual 
Pmpertv. 68 CHL- KENT L R EV. 63 1. 632 ( l lJ93) . 
134. See. e.g .. fRITZ MACIILUP. J-\ ,'.1 ECONO\IIC RE VIEW OF TH E PATENT SYSTE ivJ. 
St udy No. 1 :i. 85 th Cong .. 2cl Sess . (1 'J58): Kenneth W. Dam. Th e Economic Underpinnings 
of Pmem Law. 23 J. LECAL STUD. 247 (10lJ4): .John S. McGee. /'orenr Exploirmion: Some 
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tection, competitors ot the original inventors and authors would be 
able to copy their inventions or expressive works without incurring the 
initial costs of authorship and research and development. The unau-
thorized reproduction of successful expressive works and inventions 
would drive the market price down to the point where original authors 
and inventors would not be able to recover their initial expenditures. 
Thus, without intellectual property protection, the private returns to 
authors and inventor:; would fall short or the social value of their 
\vorks and inventions, and too fe\v inventions and expressive works 
would be created. 
Worse yet , m~1ny of the invention:.; that would not materialize 
absent intellectu'll propert:v· protecti\ln arc likely to be of great socia! 
value. Socially important inventions arc often dependent not o nly 
upon large expenditures but also upon a high level of risk. Inventors 
often do not know. ex ante, whether their research and development 
will yield the anticipated result. They do not know how the invention 
will fare commercially. Subsequent copiers, however, face no such un-
certainty. Copiers may reproduce- risk-free- only inventions with 
proven commercial success. 1" The same holds true of expressive 
works. For expressive works to make it to market, authors must gen-
erally find a publisher who believes the work is commercially viable. 
But publishing is a risky enterprise. Publishing involves a hit-and-miss 
process in which a small number of successful works subsidize the cost 
of publishing all other works. For publishers, commercially successful 
works are used as a risk spreading mechanism, enabling the publisher 
to bring to market various works that may not cover the publication 
and distribution costs. However, copiers may zero in on the successful 
works. By reproducing only successful works, and selling them at a 
lower price, copiers would deprive publishers of the ability to spread 
risk, and thereby force them out of business. 
Patent and copyright protection solve these problems. By creating 
and enforcing exclusive rights in expressive works and inventions, 
copyright and patent law prevent unauthorized copying and thereby 
guarantee adequate rewards to authors and inventors. The right to ex-
clude permits authors and inventors to engage in voluntary transac-
tions with users and set the price of these transactions. Yet, copyright 
and patent are unique property regimes since they restrict the dura-
tion of the property rights they confer. Copyright protection endures 
for the life of the author plus seventy years; 136 patent protection lasts 
Economic and Legu! Problmzs. 9 .1. L. & ECON. 135 (1966): Richard R. Nelson. The Eco-
nornics of Invention: A Survev of rlu: Lirer(i/ure. 32 .1. Bus. 101 ( 1959): Dan Usher. The Wel-
./{m" Economics of!nvention. 31 ECONO~IIC:A 279 (1964). 
135. See Arrow. SIIJml note l:ZS. at 609. 614-15 (suggesting that the uncertainty as to the 
outcome of the inventive enterprise and the lack or market mechanism for risk shifting. will 
result in underinvcstment in inventive: activity). 
136. 17 U.S.C. ~ 30:Z(a) (1998). In the case of an anonvmous work. a pseudonymous 
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twenty years from the date of filing an application. 1' ' O nce the protec-
tion lapses, th e formerl y p rotected expressive works and inventi ons 
fall into the public domain , a nd anyone can usc. reprod uce, and mar-
ket them freely. Both paten t and copyright are . therefore . examples of 
ma ndatory zero orde r pliability rules. In both cases. the initial prop-
erty rule protection cha nges into a zero ord e r liahility rule protection 
at the e nd or th e sta tuto ril y prescr ibed term . 
T he use of zero order p li<lhility rul es in thi s contex t se rves severa l 
importan t purposes. Patent a nd copyright law e mbody a fundame nta l 
tr<!deoff between ex ante and ex post effici ency . or. put differen tly, a 
tradeoff between production ancl access. E;; ant e . p<:Hr.: nt and copyright 
la w see k to spur adequate produc ti on of informat ion goods: ex post, 
aft e r the inform ation goods h<:tve bee n produced. they seek to ensure 
the wides t possible access to these goods . As the inte llectual property 
cla use clea rly indicates, the purpose of establishing exc lusive rights in 
inte ll ectual goods is not to rewa rd autho rs and in ve n tors per se, but 
rather, to promote the prod uction ancl dissemination of new informa-
tion to the public. 138 The exclusivity con fe rred upon a uthors and inven-
tors promotes the creation of new works and innovation, but it does so 
a t the cost of curtailing the dissemination of the new information 
products to the public. Copyright and pate nt protection essentia lly 
grant monopoly power to autho rs and inventors, ancl thus, like all mo-
nopolies, generates a social ' 'dead-weight" loss. The sa me exclusivi ty 
that induces creativity and inves tmen t also bri ngs about supra-
competitive prices, and leads to the exclusion of certain consumers 
who wo uld have been willing to pay th e competit ive price Y 9 Robert 
Coote r and Thomas Ule n have stated the bas ic d ile mma presented by 
inte ll ectual property is tha t "witho ut a lega l monopo ly not enough in-
formation will be produced, but with legal mo nopoly too little of the 
information will be used." 1 ~u 
The zero order pliability rule mitigates the tensio n between the 
two social goals that in te llectual property law seeks to promote . The 
initi al property rule protection - represented by the limited monop-
oly - underwrites the prod uct ion of informa tion goods. The subse-
q ue nt zero order pliability rule - represented by the eventua l fall of 
exp ressive works and inve ntions into the public domain- gua rantees 
work. or <1 work made for hire . the copy right endures for the shorter of 95 years from the 
year of its first pu b licat ion. or 120 yea rs from the year or it s crea ti on. /d.~ 302(c) . 
137. 35 U.SC. ~ 154(a)(2) ( 1999) . 
!3:0:. See CRAIG J OYCE ET .·\L.. COPYR IGHT LAW 1-70 (5th ecl2000) . 
!39. See. e.g. , Christian Koboldt. fnrelleclllal f'roperry illlll Oprimal Copyrig/11 ProreCiion, 
19 J. CULT. ECON. 131 (1995) (arguing that even optima l copy right protection c<J nn ot lead to 
a first -best allocat ive effic ie ncy soluti o n). 
140. COOTER & ULEN. supra note 13 1. at 135 (in latest edit io n. 3d e el . 2000. s im il ar 
proposition. but not sa me se nt e nce. appea rs on page 128). 
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the public unrestricted access to information goods once the limited 
monopoly expires. The limited duration is supposed to guarantee that 
the goal of copyright and patent protection is positive because in the 
final analysis the goal of copyright and patent is to make more and 
better intellectual products available to every one. 141 
The employment of a zero order pli<:bility rule serves another pol-
icy goa 1: it reduces the cost of su bseq ue n t authorship and innovation. 
1t is important to reali ze that the public domain is not merely the 
sphere of works whose protection has e:-:pired: it is also a source of the 
raw materials for future authorship dlld invention. 1 ~2 \Yorks whose 
protection has expired ensure the continuitv of 2uthorship and innova-
tion as they perpetually replenish the supply of expression and 
knowledge for future authors and inventors to draw on. Furthermore, 
public domain works reduce the cost ur creation and research for fu-
ture authors and inventors. and consequently, the total cost of pro-
ducing intellectual works. 
The zero order pliability rule protection is also attractive on dis-
tributional grounds. Those most likely to be harmed by the monopo-
lies wrought by copyright and especially patent protection are the least 
well-off. Low-income consumers can ill-afford to pay the supra-
competitive prices charged for patented products and copyrighted 
works during the property rule protection period. The shift to a zero 
order liability rule opens up the market to competition and enables 
low-income consumers to enjoy previously over-priced goods. Con-
sider, for example, pharmaceutical drugs. The need to recoup their ini-
tial investment in R&D prompts brand name pharmaceutical compa-
nies to charge supra-competitive prices for patented drugs. The 
principal victims of the monopoly pricing are the indigent 143 and the 
141. It bears emphasis that we do nor suggest that the current protection term is opti-
mal. Nor do we endorse it. Our analysis has nothing to say about the issue. We merely seek 
to explain the use of zero order pliability rules in intellectual property law. 
!42. See. e.g., Jessica Litman. The Public Domain. 39 EI\lORY LJ. 965,968 (1990). 
143. For analysis of the effect of monopoly pricing on poor countries see, for example. 
Bernard Pccoul, Figlzring for Surviml. HARV. INr'L REV. Fall 2001 , at 60 (noting that inter-
national trade agreements and patenting of medicines in other parts of the world intluence 
the global marketing and pricing policies of research-based pharmaceutical companies, 
which in turn impacts the availability and afforcbbility of medicines, including AIDS medi-
cines, in the least-developed countries): Jonathan Mann et al.. South Africa's AIDS Agree-
men!. CNN INT'L: INSIGHT (Apr. 19. 2001). available ar 2001 WL 14386528 (reporting that 
·'[t]he commercial price of the triple therapy treatment to control HIV costs up to $10,000 
[per) year per patient. That dwarfs the per capita income of every African country "; also re-
porting that in response to a "well-organized. high-profile campaign by pressure groups. the 
major drug companies have slashed their prices to the poorest countries. In Zambia, about 
20 percent of the population is infected with HIV. [Recently). Glaxo Smith. Bristol Myers 
Squibb and Merck offered the Zambian government a deal so that anti-retroviral treatment 
would cost two dollars a clay''): Anthony Birrittcri. !urellectuul Properly Protecrion a lvfusr 
.fiH Dmg Firm Success. N.J. Bus., June 2001. at 56 (reporting the April 2001 settlement be-
tween South Africa and thirty-nine drug manufacturers. allowing the country to broaden 
access to medicines for the estimated 4.7 million South Africans with AIDS in exchange for 
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cld e rl y, 1 ~4 who m os t criticall y need the new dr ugs, but lack suffic ie n t 
fund s to afford them. F urth ermore, even those who can purchase the 
drugs overpay for them since the drug companies. owing to their m o-
nopoly powe r appropria te m os t if not a ll , of the con sume r surplus. 
The price of new drugs fa lls drama tica ll y. hO\veve r, o nce the patent 
protectio n expires and gene ric d ru gs e nter the ma rket . Indeed, ac-
cording to some repo rts, two years after the ir introduct io n to the mar-
kcL the price of ge ne ric substitutes is on average 35 -3S'X, o f the pr ice 
of the re levant brand name clru a and th e marke t sh a r :.~ of t he Q.enerics b' ~~ 
ave rages 45 -59%. 1 ~" It bea rs emphas is, tho ugh. that without the ini t ia l 
inducem ent p rovided by the pate nt protect ion . neith e r the origina l 
drugs no r the ge ne ric substitutes wo u ld be p ro duced. Tiw:; . the use of 
pliability rule protect ion in thi s con text ind uces scient ific pl·ogress, e n-
courages co mpe ti t io n amo ng va ri o us dru g manu[ac tu rer::; in the long 
te rm, a nd o ffers signi ficant distr ibutive ad va n tages relat ive to standard 
proper ty rul e pro tectio n. 
2. Genericism in Trodenzork Lmv 
. The genericism do ctrine in trademark law is ye t ano th e r example 
of a zero order pliability rule . Trademark law protects symbolic infor-
matiOn signifying the source of goods and se rvices. 1 ~(\ Unlike patent 
and copyright pro tection that seek to spur creation of inventions a nd 
~lclhere n ce to \VTO p a tent laws) . 
GA;:~· :ohrn M .R Bull , Subsidized Dm gs /(Jt· Seniors Facitrg De/icir .. PITTS BURGH _POST-
. TE. No v. 28. 20lll, a t B8 (drscussrng the tmanc ral d rUrc ult rcs o t Pennsv lvama s pro-
gram to s_u bsicl ize presc ri p ti o n dru gs fo r se nior c itize ns. ca lled Pha rmace ut i~a l Assis ta nce 
~o~tra c t to r the Elde rly . o r ·' PA CE'' ); H owa rd Dea n. Deli Scalpel . Nxr·L J .. Nov. 17. 200 1. 
~~ .)61 : ( rev rcwing G EORGE D. L UNDBERG . SEVER ED TRUST: WHY A\IERICAN MED ICINE 
b 
ASN 1 BEEN F!x. ED (2000)) (describin g the Congress io na l de ba te ove r p rescripti on drug 
enefrts to r tl 1 · . · · .. . 1e e ci e rl y. a nd notmg tha t .. Democra ts a rgue tor a st r::n ght governmen t-
lmancecl Med i · · · b ·· · · · 1 $~~ll0 t .,,. ·· 1 ·1 .. . · c are presc rr p tron drug e ne trt ca rrym g a prr ce tag o t a Jout . .) J J ron, w 11 e 
-~e ,:u ~lrcan s p ress fo r a p rogram in which th e gove rnmen t provi des vo uche rs so th a t pa-
~ents Cd n b uy pri va te ins ura nce .") : Inside !Ire fndusrrv: P/i:er Announces NeiV f'harnwcv 
tSCOtll r! Ca rd (o r Seniors. AiVI. HEALTH LI NE. J a n. 16. 2002. available ur Wcs t la w. l / 16/2002 
f;P~-~E6 ( n oting th e st rength of " po lit ica l pr~ss urc on th e a l"forda b ili ty of med icine for the 
elder,~; ), M o rton Mintz, S1ifl Hard 10 Swa fl o1v. WASI-l. POST. Feb. 11.200 1. a t Bl (re po rting 
~at [w] h a t 's new abo ut presc ripti on d rug pricing is th e at te ntion that it" s be en ge tting in 
l 
ongress. than k s p a rtly to b us load s o f e lde rl y A me ricans going to Canada a nci Mex ico to 
Juy th e ir m e di cines a t sha rply lowe r cos ts'' ) . 
. 145· . See H e nry G rabowski & Jo hn Ve rnon. Longer Parenrs for Increased Generic Colll -
pe!tlw n tn !h e US.: The Waxmon-I-fulch Acl Ajier On e Decade. 10 PHAR~'IACO ECONOM I CS 
110 (Supp . 2 . 1996); Willi a m Haddad. Tes1ing Tim es fo r rlr e U.S. Generic lndusrry . SCR IP 
~lAG ~, _M ay 1992. a t 26. 27 : U .S. [NT"L TRADE COiVIM'N NO. 332-302 . GLOBA l_ 
'--',Oil ll E fl fiVEN ESS OF U.S. A DVANCED TECHNO LOGY MFG . INDUS.: PHARiiiACEUTI CALS 
L)-l 6 (Se p t. 199 1) 
1
176 · 15 U.S. c. § 11 27 ( 1988 & Supp . IV 1992) : see also Ra lphS. Brown J r.. Adn~rrising 
0:.~~~~~/ e Puh fi ~· lll!cre.l l . Legal Pml f'Ci i on of Trade Smr hofs. 57 YAL E L.J . 1165. 11S5 (194S) 
( mlo t ln d ltve JOb o f tra de symbo ls rs conve ntr o na ll y co nsrde re cl to be rde nttfl e<1t ton o f 
so urce : a n cl rt is thi s capacity which co urts trad itio na llv have protec ted .. . ). 
-
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express ive works. trademark protection purports to e nh ance compe ti -
tion among providers of goods and services .w Trademarks promote 
competition in two rel;rtcd wavs. Tradem arks - by themselves and in 
combination with other forms of adverti sing - convey information 
about the quality of prod ucts and services, reducing co nsumers ' sea rch 
costs . 1 ~ .~ T his info rm a lional fu nction of trademarks is especially valu-
able in the context of experience goods, where consumers cannot dis-
cern the attribut e:; o f prod ucts before purchasing thcm. 1 ~·~ and must 
rely on prior experience in c}::ciding am ong competing bra nds. Trade-
marks all m.v consunie rs to associa te product and service at trib utes 
with certain finm. anc! hasc their consump tion decisions on th is asso-
rl···tt·o ··l ;<o l="n·· t\1i -: n' ""' .J'' ( · ·1' l. t'1e· ''\ lj-J nl\i Sl·l .. l·e tr"clcnl'lt·l· nrnl ' ' Ct l. ')1' . _, (l \,. l , ~ '--'I '- • ~') L ..._. ·~~u l._ l1 , I L ~ • t-' -' ~ ~ J. G. ( f\.. 1-) _ ~· ~ C \ L 
spurs firms to maintain and improve the quality of th eir products and 
services.''' The availability of trademark protection protects firm s 
from free-riding by compe ti tors . enabling them to reap the fruit s of 
their investmen t in superior p roducts and services . Furthermore. 
trademark protection provides firms with an incent ive to establish 
brand recognition ancl loya lty. by "educating" consumers about the 
virtues of the ir products. T hus, trademarks constitute an important 
channel of communica tion be tween firms and consumers, with the at-
tendant twin effec ts of motivating the former to improve the quality of 
their products and enabling the latter to differentiate among various 
products on the marke t. 
147. See S. RE P. 0:0. 79-!33l. at 3 (1946) : H.R. RE I'. No. 79-219 . a t 2 ( 1945 ) ("Trad ..: · 
marks defeat mc no po lv bv st imu lating co mpe titi on ... ). 
142. Ser . e.g .. Nicholas Economides . Tradenwrks. in T t-tE NEW P,\LGRAVE DI CTIONARY 
OF ECO!'\O 'vtt CS A:\D TH E LAW 60l. 602 -03 (Peter Ne wman eel.. 1998) (noting that tra de-
marks ··facilitate and enhan ce consumer decisions"): William P. Kratzke. Normuti\' e Ecu· 
nomic A nalysis of Tradema rk Lim. 2 i MEtviPHIS ST. U . L. REV. 199. 214 -1 7 (1991 ) . 
149 . The te rm .. c\pe ri ence goods .. was coined bv Philip Ne lson. !nfo n narion an d Con-
.\tll li er Behavior. 78 .I . POLiTICA L ECO!'\ . 3 11 (1 970): Philip Ne lson. Adt·errising us !nfi> n na-
rion. 82 J. POLITI CAL t::CON. 72Y ( lY74 ). A search good is one whose important a ttri butes 
may be ascc rtaint:cl be fore purchase or use . Beside s sea rch and e\perience goods. a third 
category. usua lly appli ed to serv ices. is "credence." A credence quality cannot be evaluated 
by direct obse rvation or ust: . For exa mpl e . a consume r may purchase automobil e repa ir 
services and never d iscove r. bdore or after the purc hase . whe ther the repa ir was necessa ry. 
See Micha el Darby & Eci i Ka rr1i. Free Com petirion on d rit e Optima/ 1\mounr of Fruut!. t6 J .L. 
& ECON . o7 . 68-69 ( l l)7:;) 
!50. See Mark A . Lcmkv . Tlze M odem Lanham A cr and the D eath of Common Sens1' , 
108 YALE L.J. lo87. 1690 ( ll)l)9) (no tin g that advertising communicates the "experie nce " 
cha rac teristics of goocJ,; direct ly to co nsume rs. whil e "trademarks e nsure that consume rs as-
sociate the cha racteri stics wi th the righ t prod uct' ' whe n ma king purchas ing decisions). 
15 1. Willi am M. Landes & Richard Pos ner. Trarlenwrk Lm v: ; \n Economic Perspnriv1'. 
30 J. L. & ECON. 265 . :26lJ ( !987) [here inaft e r Landes & Pos ner. Tmdenw rk Lmt']. La ndes 
and Posner note that tracl em<lrks have a se lt·-cnforcing qua lity since they denote ··consistent 
quality. and a firm has an incentive to deve lop a trademark only if it is able to maintain con-
sistent qua lity ... iJ :1 t 270 . 
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As a general rule, any expressive term or symbol may be used as a 
trademark as long as it is distinctive and nondcceptive .152 However, 
generic terms may not be used as trademarks.15 ' The doctrine of gen-
ericism has two temporal dimensions: a prospect ive dimension and a 
retrospective dimension. Prospective ly, th e gene ricism doctrine bars 
the appropriation of generic terms such as "WINE" or 
"COMPUTER' as trade marks. Courts ha ve app lied the doctrine pro-
spectively to dcnv trademark protection to terms such as, 
"INJU RY," 1" 4 "386,'' 155 "HONEY BROWN." 15'i '·YOU HAVE 
MAIL ," and '·BUDDY LIST" 1' 7 Th e genericism ductrinc may also be 
152. 15 U.S. C.~ lU52 (e) (l) (1 988): sec also T"u l'esos. fn c. '.Taco Ca bana. fnc., 505 
U .S. 763 . 769 ( 1992) (' ·The ge ne ral rule rega rding cli s tincti, e ne >:" is c k;~r: a n ide ntifying mark 
is d isti nc ti ve and c:1pab\e of being protected if it ei11i er (l ) is inh e rent\\ distinctive or (2) has 
acquired di stinctive ness th ro ugh secondary m e aning.·· ): R obe rt C. De ni cola. Freedo111 10 
Copv. lOS YAL E L.J. J66l. 1673 (1999) ("For word marks. th e u,;e ul bruad ca tego ries de -
termina tive of inh e rent dis tinctiven ess avoids the adm inio;t nll i'.·c cn,;t,; l'l il case -by-case bal-
ancing of the informational advantages and competitive disadvantages o f prote ction. It a lso 
affo rds a degree of pred ictab ilitv. va lu ed bo th in de cisio ns to ad op t a nd decisions to imitate a 
putative trademark."). 
Traditionally. trade mark protec tion sprang into ex iste nce upo n the use of a mark in 
trad e . In 1988. the Lanham Act was ame nde d to c rea te a federa l registry of trademarks. see 
Trademark Law R evision Act o f 1988. Pub. L N o. 100-667. 102 Sta t. 3935, and now busi-
nesses ca n regis te r marks eve n before using the m in trade upon a showing o f a bona fide in -
te nt to use th e m in the future. See Lanh a m Act ~ l (b) . (cocliliecl at !5 U.S. C. s 1051(b) 
( 1994) ): J. THOMAS MCCARTHY. MCCARTHY ON TRr\DUvlM/.K Ac.!D U NFAIR COMPETITIO N 
s 5 (4th eel. 2001) (noti ng that "[b]y fa r the most sweepin g change [effec te d by the 1988 
ame ndme nts] was the inclusion of a n ·intent-to- use · ba sis for a pplicati o ns." which granted 
--United State s firm[s] ... the op tion to apply fo r fe d.:ral regi s tr~lli o n of a mark base d on a 
bona fide intent to use the mark in comme rce"). D escriptive ma rks. such as "Burger." see In 
re Nat'\ Pres to Indus .. Jnc.. 197 U.S.P.Q. ISS (TTAB. 1977) (holding "Burger"' for cooking 
utensils descriptive of purpose of goods) . --PM.-- see B1·is to\- ivlye rs Squibb Co . v. 
McNcii -P.P.C, Inc.. 973 F.2cl \033 (2d. Ci r. 1992) ( holding te rm "PM" descript ive o f an an -
a lgesic/s lee p aiel design e e\ fo r night-time use). and "KING SIZE." see King-Size . In c. v. 
Frank' s King Size Clothes. Inc .. 547 F. Supp. 113:--1 (S.D. Tex. 1982 ) (hold ing the te rm " K!NG 
SIZE" descripti ve of me n's clothes). may o nly be reg is tered if they have a cquired a secon-
dary meaning. See Two Pesos. 505 U.S. at 769 (explaining that ··descriptive marks may ac-
quire the di stinctivene ss which will a llow th e m to be protecte d under th e [La nh a m] Act .. 
Thi s acquire d di sti nctive ness is gene rally calle d ·secondary meaning ' "). 
l53 . Originally. gcnericism was a cou rt-made doctrine. Sr>e. e.g .. Canal Co. v. C lark. 80 
U.S. (13 W aiL) 3 11,323 (1S71): R ESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 735 (l93S). Today. the doctrine 
is codifi ed in the La nha m Act. See 15 U.S.C § 1064(3) (1994). A ge ne ri c term is o ne that 
de notes ·'the nam e o f a kind of goods ... [u]nlik e a trade mark, which identifies the source of 
a product. a ge neric term mere ly identifie s th e ge nus of which the particular product is a 
spec ies. " Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Cont ro l Corp .. 802 F.2cl 934. 936 (7 th C ir. 19S6). 
154. Dranotl-Pe rlstein Assocs. v. Sk lar. 967 F2d S52 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that the 
''injury" po rtion of the mark '·INJURY-I." a telephone numbe r mnemonic. is generic and 
the refore unprotected as a trade mark). 
155 . Inte l Corp. v . Adva nced Micro D evices. Inc. , 756 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Ca l. 1991) 
( ruling tha t Intel's mark '·386"' is ge neric and thu s no t pro te cte d) . 
156. G e nesee Brewing Co. Inc. v. Stroh Bre wing Co .. 124 F. 3c\137 (2cl Cir. 1997) (con-
cluding that th e term "H ONEY BROWN" is ge neric wh e n a ppli ed to ale be e r). 
157. America Online. Inc. v. AT&T Co q>., 64 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E .D. Va. 1999) (holding 
that se rvice marks ··you H AVE MAIL" c: nd "BU DDY LIST' are gene ric rath e r than sug-
ge stive ). 
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appli ed retrospectively to invalidate trade mar ks that were initially dis-
tinctive. but through overuse became ge neric. E xamples of m arks tha t 
initially received protection but we re later nullifi ed on genericism 
grounds include, among others , ·'aspirin .'. 15 ~ .. co la.' ' 15'1 " thermos, " 160 
''corn-fl a kes,' ' 16 1 yo-yo,' '' 6" "trampoline ,' ' '('' "esca lato r , " 1 6~ and " lino-
leum . ·· rr.s The re trospective application of the genericism doctrine ef-
fective ly transforms th e initi a l pro perty ru le pro tecti on acco rded to 
the trademark own er into a ze ro o rder li a l•ility ru le pro tection . Y et , 
the lapse of pro perty rul e protection is no t a uto ma ti c afte r the passage 
of time . as in the case of prope rty a nd p<tle n t. Rat he r , th e property 
rul e stage of the zero orde r plia b ilit y ru k is brought to a close by an 
event whose timing - and even ex iste nce - is unce rtain : the trans-
form a tion o f the meaning ot a term to a ge ne ric one. 
The application of a zero ord er p li a bilit y rule in this contex t has 
several desirable efficiency effects. ;-\!th o ugh trademark protection 
ge ne ra ll y promotes efficiency by fo sterin g com petition , tradem arks 
also ha ve a potential dark side. E xcessivt2l y strong trademarks may 
harm compe tition since they constitute barrie rs to entry. 166 In such 
cases. th e social cost of protecting tradema rks may outweigh the social 
benefit. Consider , for instance, the term ''cola ... If the te rm were a 
protected trademark of the Coca-Cola company, competito rs who 
produced similarly tasting beverages could not use the term "cola " to 
describe their products. Under this regime. compe titors ' marketing ef-
forts wo uld be stitlecl, a nd consume rs would have to pay supra-
compe titive prices for the trade marked prod uct. 167 T he genericism 
15.';. Baye r Co . v. United Drug Co .. 272 F. 505 (S.D .N .Y. 1 LJ2 1 ). 
159. Coca -Co la Co . v. Stand ard Bottling Co .. 138 F.2d 7S8 (l Oth Cir. ILJ43) : Dixi-Cola 
Labs., Inc. v. Coca- Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4 th Cir. 1941 ). 
160. King-Se eley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Ind us .. 32 1 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. l 963) . 
161. See PAUL G OLDSTEIN, COPYRI GHT. PATENT. T RADE\! ,\RK AND R ELATED STATE 
D OCTRINES 243 (4th e el. 1997 ) (reproducing an ad by Xe rox entitle d. " Once a Trademark 
no t always a tradem ark ," that lists examples o f tradema rks that have become ge ne ric.) . 
162. !d . 
163. !d. 
164. !d . 
165. !d . 
166. In the 1930s economists be lieve d that a ll fo rms o f tra de mark pro tec ti o n were 
anticompe titi ve . The mos t nota ble champi on o f this v ie w was Ed wa rd Cha m berlin. wh o a r-
gued tha t the combination o f trade mark pro te c ti o n a nd pe rsuas ive adve rti sing form barriers 
to e ntry. See E DWA RD H. CHAMB ERLIN , TH E T HEO RY OF MONO POLISTI C C OMPETITION 
(1s t eel . 1933). F o r an exce llent re vi ew o f th e de ba te as to the effect of trad em a rk pro tec ti on 
o n competitio n. see Daniel M. McClure, The Lanhrun i \ u / \.fier Fi fiy Years: Tradenwrks and 
Comperirion: The !?ecenl Hiscory, L Aw & CONTE\-IP. P ROBS .. Spring 1996. a t 13. 
167. See John F. Cove rda le , Comme nt , Trademarks and G eneric W ords: A n Ef fecr on 
Competirion Tesr , 51 U. CHJ. L. REV. 868 , 870-71 (1 984) (no ting that when th e re is only one 
word to describe a product, trademark protectio n wo uld equate to monopoly power) . 
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doctrine avoids this unde::iirable result. It empowers coun::; to termi-
nate . in ex treme cases, the property rule protection rna whose 
value to third parties - i.e., competitors and consu lT:,-:r:; - t:xceeds 
their value to their original appropriators. Essentially. the genericism 
doctrine is an ex post mechanism for reallocating generic tcnns to a 
1'1 _:0)1 P f \i'']LJP 1[" 0 ]" 'Lll" p;tblJ'C_ r'0-t1SU!11'~ '-S ' 11111 (' () 'fl'l.(lr' 1 ;i ·-;r ·~ '1 ];'t.-P J(l.) l~t ~ '- Cl ._, ~..JV. _t_ \....- ._ ..._ ~...., _ \.....l. c~ _ t ~- ,_.._ • ._ _  ,- ~~~'- -• ~-' c.~l-'--'--'• 
Hence. the generici:.;m doctrine provides a ncmmark ct rnc:ch<ulism for 
improving allocativc efficiency. 
The ex ante effects of the genericism doctrine are '>en morr.; inter-
esting. Ex ante. the genericism doctrine gi v·:: s ri~-;,.; to h·/U :o ro-
cornpe titive effects: seil-regulation and informat ive · i·;ing. The 
kcv to both ettect:; lies in the usc of a conclitional;cru ; ,;ci c:T ia. bility 
rule to protect trademarks. T radernarks do ne t bccon1c generic by 
mishap: the decisions of trademark owners determin e th<~ marks' fates. 
T rademark owners determine the exposure o f the ir rnark:-; as well as 
which information and image to convey to consumers. Ma rks become 
generic either because there is insufficient competition in the relevant 
product o r service market , or because trc1demark ovvner:; promote 
their brand names too aggressively. T he genericism doctrine curbs the 
incentive of firms to engage in these types of anticompetitivc behavior. 
To avoid the risk of losing protection, firms must ensure that the pub-
lic does not associate the mark with a particular product , rather than a 
particular producer. The safest way to accomplish thi s is to ensure 
some degree of competition in the product. or service markets. in 
which dominant mark owners operate. T he risk of ge nericism causes 
firms to self-regulate by introducing a winner 's curse [() trademarked 
markets. Over-aggressiveness toward existing compe ti'Lors may result 
in the firm 's mark - an asset it has labored hard to promote -
becoming available to all competitors, both exist ing and future. Exer-
cising restraint toward smaller competitors, on the other hand , goes a 
long way towards securing the longevity of the mark. Thus, the use of 
conditional pliability rule protection in this contexl encourages com-
petition in product and service markets. 
The doctrine of gencricism also produces desirable information ef-
fects. In a classic article, Ralph Brown noted the symbiotic relation-
ship between trademarks and advertising. 169 Brown argued that the 
scope of protection afforded to trademarks must be calibrated to the 
degree to which advertising promotes the public interest. Brmvn main-
168. As for the prospective dimension of genericism. Landes and Posner have suggested 
that by barring existing generic terms from becoming trademarks. trademark law provides 
an incentive to "enrich the language, by creating words or phrases that people value for their 
intrinsic pleasingness as well as their information value." They explicitly recognize, however. 
that this benefit is very "small." See Landes & Posner. Tmdenwrk Law, supra note 151, at 
271. 
169. See Brown. supra note 146: see also Symposium. R.olplz Sharp Brol\'11, lnre//ectuu/ 
Pmperry and rhe Public lmeresr. 101'> YALE L.J. 1611 (1999). 
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taincd that trade marks · chief virtue lies in their ability to promote 
compet ition th ro ugh adve rtising. By prompting merchants to adver-
tise. trade mar k protection enhances the informati on available to po-
tential consumers. thus improving consumpti o n decisio ns. 17n Influ-
e nced by the economists of his time, Brown di stingui shed be twee n 
"informative C\dve rtising" and ·'persuasive ad ve rtisin g ... postul a ting 
tha t th e former was benefici a l and th e latter hann fuli 71 Subseque nt 
economic wo rk ca l !eel into quest ion Bro wn ·s ch<Hac te rization of pe r-
suasi ve ad vertis in g, noting that even "pe rsuasive .. ;tch·cni sing may cdso 
produce vari ous efficie ncy enhancing e ffects. Philip Ne lson. fo r in-
stance. po int c:d o ut th a t much of wha t Brown conside red pe rsuasive 
ad ve rtising serves <in irnportant signaling funct iun. which impro ves the 
information ~1va il a ble to consumers. Since busin•.: ·;scs ;·cc<.: ive gre ater 
ret urns o n advert is in g that produces re peat sales. the level or adver-
tising_ for a produc t provides a useful in d ication of consumer sat isfac-
t io n.1 72 frresp ec tive of the ultimate desirability o !" persuasive advertis-
ing. Brown 's basic insight about the direct effec t o f trade mark 
protection on th e marke t for commercial informat ion rema ins va lid. 
D. Sim ultaneous Pliability Rule."> 
Intellectual property also provides an example of a different kind 
of pliability rule: the simultaneous pliability rul e. A s usua l, simultane-
ous pliability rul es invo lve at leas t two different s tages of prope rty or 
liability rule protection, and the fulfillme nt of a predetermined co nc.ii-
tion triggers a shift from o ne type of prote ction to the other. H owever , 
un like th e other pliability rules we have discussed so far , the trigge ring 
condition does not take place a t a discre te m oment in time and the 
types of protection arc not sequential chronologically. Rather, a s ingle 
asse t is simultaneously protected by different kinds o f rules , depend-
ing on the kind of use. V is-a-vis some uses , th e ent itleme nt holder en-
joys the baseline property rule protection. However, certa in kinds of 
uses trigger another kind of protection , such as liability rule protec-
tion. 
Simultaneous pliability rules were clearly recognized by Calabresi 
and Melamed , albeit without being labeled as such. In fact, Calabresi 
170. Brown. supra note 146, a t 1186. 
171. !d. at 11 83 ("' With qua li fications that need not be repea ted. persuasive advertising 
is. for the community as a whole. just a luxurious exercise in talking ourselves into spending 
our incomes ."). Brown's view of persuasive adverti sin g was heav il y influenced by th e work 
of the economist Edward Chamberlin, who argued that the co mbin a ti on of tradem ark pro-
tec tion and pe rsuasive advertising form barriers to entry. See CHAiviBERLI N. supra note 166. 
172. See Philip J. Nelson , The Econ om ic Valu e of Adverrising. in ADVE RTISIN G AND 
SOCIETY 43 (Yale Broze n ed. , 1974). Othe r econo mi sts went even furth e r doubt in g the abi l-
ity of advertising to ge ne rate demand. Ser>. e.g .. J ULIA ;-,; L. Sl\100! . ISS UES IN THE 
ECO I\0 /vii CS O F AD VERTISJI\ G 205-06 (1 970) . 
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and Me lamed noted that ··m ost e ntitl e ments to mos t goo ds arc 
mixed ,·· th e re by adm itting th a t pro tection of entitleme nts can ha rd[y 
ever be described as fa lling un de r one of the pure rul e types. 17 ' O ur 
modes t contributio n he re is to integrate Cala bresi and Melamecfs in -
sight into o ur broade r fram e work o f pliability rules. Fo r this reaso n. 
we limit o ur discussion o f sim ul taneo us plia bility rul es to tvvo exam-
ples. 
W e e mphasize that simultan eo us plia bility rules diffe r from oth e r 
plia bility r ul es we d isc uss in th at they lack a dynamic ele me nt O'.'C: r 
time . As our exampl es illustrate. in simulta neo us pliability rul e:;. Lh~_· 
ry pe ul protec ti on depends o n the type uf usc o r the type o f use r, ~tnd 
docs no r change ove r t ime . 
l. Fo ir Use 
We illustrate simultaneous pli a bility rul es with the example o f the 
fair use doctrine. O rdinarily , as we noted previously , copyrigh te d 
works enjoy property rule pro tection for th e life or the a uthor p lus 
seventy years, fo llowed by a ze ro o rder liability regime. 17~ However, 
even during the pe ri od of prope rty rule protection, copyright law rec-
ognizes a fair use privil ege. 175 An affirmative defense against copyright 
liability, the fair use privilege empowers courts to excuse una uthori zed 
appropria tion of a copyrighted work when doing so advances the pub-
173 . Cala brc:s i & iV!t: la mcd. supru no te 5. a t I osn. 
174. Sec supru Secti u n li. C. l. The dtlc trin c: o f experim e ntal use is yet a nother ex:un plc 
o f a sim ult aneo us pli abili ty rule:. Cou rts hav<.: io ng exe mpted. in pri nciple. purely 
·' ·expe rime nta l use[sj' of a pate nte d in ve nti o n. with no comme rcia l purpose ... fr o m in -
frin ge me nt li a bil ity. See Rebecca S. Ei se nbe rg. l 'arenrs and rhe Progress of Science: Exclusir·e 
R.ighrs and E.1peri111enro/ Use. 56 U . CHI. L. REV . l0l7. 10 19 ( 1989) . Thi s im p li es that pa ten t 
hold e rs do not a lways operate under proper ty rule protec ti on: as again st expe rimental use rs. 
patent o wne rs entitlcmc: nt is protected by a ze ro order p li a bility rule. Base d on the ex pc:r i· 
me ntal use doc trine. ~ 27l (e) o f th e Pate n t Act. which was adde d in 1984 as part of the 
W axma n-H a tch Act, now pe rmi ts ge ne ric drug m anufacture rs to make, use, o r se ll ··a pa t-
en ted inventi o n . .. sole!v for uses re aso n ::~ bl y rela te d to the deve lopm e n t a nd s ub missio n o f 
inform a tio n un de r a f edera l law wh ich regul ates the man ufac ture, use. or sa le o f drugs .·· 35 
U.S.C. ~ 271 (3) (2001 ) . T he impact of th e sect io n was to d ra ma tically expedite the introduc-
tion of ge ne ri c drugs to th e ma rket upon the expiration o f the patent. and the re by cabin th e 
discre ti ona ry effects of pate nt grants. CI G ideon Pa rchomovsky & Pe ter Siegelman. To· 
lmrds w1 ln regrurcd Theon· of !wellecruu l Properr.L 88 VA. L. R EV. (fo rthcoming 2002) (dis-
cuss in g a l!e rn a tive m eas ures fo r red ucing the dis to ni o na ry effects of pa te nts). 
175. 17 U.S.C. s 107 (1994). Se cti o n 107 begins with a no nex hausti ve li s t o f illust rati ve 
uses - such as commen t. criti cism, sch o larship. research. ne ws reportin g, a nd teachin g -
that may qualify as fair. a nd the n enume ra tes four fact ors a co urt should we igh in de cidi ng 
wheth e r a pa rticular use is fa ir . The fa cto rs li s te d a rc : ( I ) th e p urpose of th e usc . including its 
comm e rcial o r noncomm e rcial na ture: (2) the na ture o f the protected wo rk o f the pl a int ifl': 
(3) th e a mo unt a nd im portance o f the pa rts th a t we re reproduced: (4) the impac t of the u;;e 
on the pote ntial marke t for the cop yrigh ted wo rk. !d. 
Current ly, patent law does not recogni ze a fa ir use defense . For a proposa l to change th is 
existing sta te of affairs by introducing a fa ir usc defen se into patent Jaw, see Mauree n A . 
O'Rourke, Towa rd a Docrrine of Fair Use in Parenr La w, 100 COLUM. L. R EV . 1177 (2CJOO) . 
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li e benclit without substantially impairing th e economic value o f th e 
orig inal work .17" Thus. with respect to certa in uses. th e copyri ghted 
\VOrk is placed und e r a zero orde r liability regime . ra th e r t han the or-
dinary pro pe rt y rule regime. 
Th e ' ·fair usc .. pri vil ege se rves seve ral goa ls. Firs t. it provides a 
sa fe ty va lve that m <ty be used to deny copyright p rotec ti o n wh e n th e 
pe ri ls of monopo ly power lo om la rge a nd the nee d fo r c: dd it iona! in-
ce ntive to create i:s s light. tn In this ca pacity, the ' ·f~lir usc .. doc trin e 
const itutes a n effect ive \'C hi c le fo r mitigating a ny a nti co m pct it ivc ef-
fec ts copyright pro tec tion may ca use . Second. th e d oct r ine furni shes 
<l n e ffec ti ve means to r ove rcomin g ma rke t fa ilu res ~ t ssn ci~1L e d with 
h ig h trans acti o n costs o r s trat egic be havior o t· cre~t t ors. 17 ' ln many 
transact io nal settings that involve inte ll ectu a l goods. the cos t of vo lu n-
ta ry e xcha nge is hi gh a nd th e be nefits to both p a rti es in conscqu·.: ntia l. 
In these situati o ns. a finding of fa ir use is like ly to ge nera te a net bcn c-
l"it to one of th e parties without s ignifica ntl y harming th e ot hcr. 17') F ur-
th e rmore . the fa ir usc privil ege reduces the cost of creatin g subsequent 
wo rks. In man y cases, th e party standing to benefit from a fa ir use 
finding is herse lf an a uthor who borrows pree xisting ma te ri a l to crea te 
he r own work . 
Th e incorporatio n of a fair use defe nse turns co pyright law into a 
unique example of pliability rule protection. Essentially , the fa ir use 
pri vilege e ntitles third parties to take the inte llectua l pro pe rl y o f oth-
ers witho ut paying a ny compensa tion to the prope rty owners . 1 ~0 Due 
170 . . ').:t: Ciord o n. sup m nutc 128 . at 160 l. 
177. Sec. e.g. . S terk. supm note 128. a t 121 1. The so-ca lle d ··zap rud cr Fi lm · of the: assas-
s ina ti o n u f J oh n F. Ke nn edy is a case in point. 
178. See. e.g .. Cio rd o n. sup m no te 128, a t 161 3; La ndes & Pos ner. Cu p.1· riglu Lrnv. supm 
no te 128. a t 357-58: Sterk. supra no te 128. a t 1211. 
179. Fo r insta nce . a st ude nt wh o wi shes to qu o te a phrase fro m a co pyrighted book is 
like ly to incur a signi fi cant cos t sho uld she ch oose to secure pe rmissio n from the co pyright 
owne r. A t the same time. quo ting with o ut permiss io n woul d inflic t ~ l neg li g ible ha rm o n the 
copy right o wner. 
180. T he incomple te p riv ilege o f priva te necess ity ava il ab le in cases of inten tio nil l to rt 
offe rs an ana logy to fa ir usc . Pri v<l te necessi ty pe rmits a defe nda nt to com m it an inte nti o na l 
tort to anothe r's rights in p roperty to protec t a highe r-valu e interes t. e ither in prope rty. bod-
ily security. o r life. See RESTATEMENT (SECON D) OF T ORTS s§ 262. 263 & cm t. cl (1965). 
Where the higher-val ue in teres t be lo ngs to a large cl<1ss - for example . whe re the cit v must 
be saved from a fire- the privil ege is on e of publi c nece ssity and the defe ndant is re lieve d 
o f anv d ut y to co m pe nsate the pla intiff. See id. at § 262 & cmt. d . W he re the h igher va lue 
in te res t be longs tu a sm <l ll g ro up o r a n ind ividua l. however, the pr iv il ege is one o f pri v;1 te 
necess ity a nd th e defe nda nt must compe nsa te th e plaintiff. See irl . at § 263(2) & cmt. c. 
Beca use co m pe nsilt ion is owing in th e la tte r case. the p ri vilege is sa id to be .. in co m p lete ... 
In the we ll-kn own case o f Vincent v. L ake Erie Transportation Co .. l 24 N .W. 22 1 (M inn. 
1010) , a shi powne r's ship damage d a clock when the owne r a ttem p ted to m oen th e ship dur-
in g <1 sto rm . The co urt in voked the incom ple te pr ivilege of pri va te necessity to hol d th e 
shipowner liable. In p li ability te rms, the doctrine of p riva te necessity trilnsfu rme cl the dock-
owne r 's tra ditiona l prope rty rule p ro tectio n into a simulta neous p liabili ty rule. Fo r m os t 
uses. t he clockowner retained property ru le p ro tection; b ut und er e xtrao rd inary circum-
stances. the shi powne r was permi tte e! to ta ke the dockowner's prope rty fo r a sum eq ua l to 
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to thi s umque doctrine . co pyright protection is a t once a zero order 
pliability ruie - since the property r ight it bestows is limited in time 
- and a simultaneous pli ability rule -sin ce the protection copyright 
accords ad mits of nonco nse nsua l tak ings . 
2. Pri1 ilegcd Take rs 
i'ld10t he r instance of simul tan eous pl iabilit y protec tion ca n lx 
found in the case of privileged take rs. in which property rule protec-
tion is suspended with respect to some nonconsensual users. T hese 
privileged use rs need only pay fo r thcir use unde r li ability rule s whik 
property rule protec tion remains in i"cnce against the rest of the \Vorld. 
Such a regim e is illust rated by the case of Head v. Amoskcng 
J\,1mwfauuring Co. 1" 1 T he re . th e Supreme Co urt upheld a statute that 
pe rmit ted mill owners to clam waters . depriving ripari an own ers of 
the ir prope rty, if two conditions were sa tisfied: first, th e taking must 
be for a public benefit ; a nd , second, the mill owners had to pay com-
pensation at 150'Yo of marke t value. 
In p li ability te rms , the Supreme Court ruling es tablished a simul-
ta neous pliability rule regime. While the riparian owners enjoyed full 
property rule pro tection vis-a-vis all oth er trespassers , the ir right to 
exclude mill operators was protected by a liability rule. It is 
noteworthy, though. that mill owne rs had to show that the use effect-
ing the taking benefi ted the public. The employment of a simultaneo us 
pliability rule enab led the court to bal ance the right to private prop-
erty against the inte rest of th e m ill owners , and the broader public in 
putting th e land to its highest va lue use. 
The simultaneous pliability rule described in Head differs fro m 
that seen in fair use in an important respect. Whereas fair use employs 
a ze ro order liability rul e , the simultaneo us pliability rule described in 
Heod requirecll50% compensation for r iparian owners not covered by 
property rule protection. The reason for this gap in compensa tion 
schemes can be discerned in the difference between the two types of 
uses permitted by the pliability rules. Users of copyrighted materia ls 
under the fair use provisions do not take exclusive possession of the 
entitlement. Although fair users utilize the copyrighted materials, the 
entitlement holder may continue to engage in commercial transactions 
regarding the copyrighted materials with other users. Fair use is not 
exclusive of the entitlement holder. Furthermore, fair users are only 
the judi cially- cl ete rmi ned da mages. Im portan tly. pri vate necessity is dis tinguisha ble from fair 
use in th at necessi ty req ui res compensation while a fair user need not compensate th e copy-
right holde r. Therefore, building on the typology we have developed, fair use may be te rmed 
a "ze ro simultaneous pl iability rule " whil e p rivate necessity m ay be called a " positive simul-
ta neous pliability rule.' · 
18 1. 113 u.s. 9 ( 11\85) . 
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allowed to take a small part of the entitlement. On the other hand. in 
t he Heod case , the usc pe rmitted by the pliability rule is exclusive. 
Once a m ill owner dams -..va teL the flo oded or water-deprived riparian 
land is a ltered indefinitely - for as long as the cl am is in operation. 
The riparian owner cannot continue to transact with othe r poten ti a l 
users of the land as she did prior to the damming. The condition o f the 
land hc.s been alte red . <mel the pli ability rule takes this into account in 
its compensati on sch eme . 
E. Lopertv R ules 
A nother type of pliability mk is th e lopcrty rule . By contr::t::; i \Vit h 
the pliability rules we have discussed so far. loperty rul es begin with 
li ability rule pro tect ion. which. upon the occurre nce of a trigge r ing 
event, is tran:Jorm cc.l into property rul e protec tion. The goal of lup-
erty protect ion is gene ra ll y to incentivize the entitlement ho lder to 
take some acti o n in order to earn property rule protection. Co nsider 
the famous "fencing out" rule that governed ranging property in th e 
American West in the nine teenth century. T he fencing o ut reg ime re-
versed th e common law rul e th a t prevented cattle from grazing on a 
neighbor's land . Instead. the fencing o ut rul e a llowed cattle to roam 
free ly on others' property until the property was fenced. Thus, land-
owners who wished to enjoy traditiona l property rul e protection over 
their ranches bore th e burden of fencing out neighbors ' cattle. 1 ~2 
Analyzed in pliability terms, the fencing out regime se ts a zero or-
de r liabilit y rul e as the base line for using the land of oth ers. Absent <1 
fence , land was presumably part of an open access regime. and cattle 
grazers could use the land \V itho ut paying compensation. However , 
any landholder could alter the base line protection by erecting a fenc e. 
By erecting the fence , the landholder would trigger a change in protec-
tion from zero order liability to property. Under the new property re-
gime, the landowner could exclude cattle grazers by means of injunc-
tion, and could collect damages in the event of a trespass. 
By imposing the burden of exclusion on the landholder, the fenc-
ing out rule ac hie ved two important goals. First, given the presumed 
mutual interest of all cattle ranchers in allowing cattle to roam freely, 
the fencing out rule eliminated the burden of costly negotiations 
among ranchers. Second, the rule created a mechanism for separating 
those owners for whom property rule protection was efficien t from 
those whose land was better served by an open access regime. Specifi-
182. R OB ERT C. ELLI CKSON. ORDER WITH OUT LAW: H OW NEI GHBORS SETTL E 
DI SPUTES 76 (1 991 ). Fencing out is still the law in Colorado . COLO. REV. STAT. A NN.§ 3.5 -
46-1 02(1) (Bra d ford 21)(Jl) . See generally Te rence J. Centner, R eforming Ourdarl! r! Fmcl' 
Law Pro visions: Good Fences Mak e Good Neighbors Only if Thev are Fair. 12 J. ENV l"L. L. 
& L!TIG. 267 (1997). 
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cally. it induced cattle ranche rs to assess and communica te to oth e rs 
the value of exclusive usc ol th ei r land. 
Addit ionally , a loperty ruk may also be used to inccntivize potc n-
ti<d takers of the entitlement. Co nsider aga in the case of Boomer1 ~' 
Th e Court of Appea ls of New Yo rk cl ecick cl to protect homeowne rs 
affected by a nuisa nce by mea ns o r a li ability rule. At la ntic Ceme nt 
was perm itted to cont inue in fri nging upon homeowners· ~:njoyment of 
the ir property and , in exchange . pay the d<Hnage am ou nt assessed by 
the co urt. The court was moti vn ted in pan by the concern that r eq uir-
in g A tl a ntic Cemen t to deve lop super ior ~~ b ~tt c m e nt technologies on 
such short noti ce would be in equitable:. Thus . the court determined 
tha t the homeown e rs sho uld perma nent ly lo~e their Cull property rul e 
protect io n. A judicia lly craftedloj!erty ruk co uld have better balanced 
the eq uities. Under such a lopc rt y rul e . f\tl a ntic Cement would have 
enj oyed the right to pollute fo r payment o nl y lo r a limited time, say 
five yea rs. Thereafter, prope rty rule protecti on over the homes would 
be re insta ted. This result achieves a better distribution of the burden 
of industrial uses. On the on e hand, homeowners wo uld not need to 
for[eit permanently their prope rty rights. O n the other hand, large in-
dustria l employers, such as At lantic Ceme nt would be g iven several 
years to develop the pollution control measures necessa ry for their 
busin esses to continue without unduly harming neighboring home-
owners. 
F. Title Shifring Pliabiliry Rules 
Having discussed pliability rules that involve trans1t10ns from 
prope rty rules to liability rul es and vice ve rsa, we now turn to titl e 
shifting pliability rules, under which a prese t conditi o n trigge rs th e 
transfer of property rule protec tion from one entitlement holder to 
another. 184 The initial holder receives no compensation. The recipient 
of the entitlement in the second stage, however, enjoys full proper ty 
rule protection. Thus, as we discuss in our examples below, the impor-
tance of title shifting pliability rules lies in their being a nonconsensual 
mechanism of transferring property interests. 185 
18:'\. 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970). 
l S4. As we note in o ur example s in this Section . in s tage 2. th ere may be more th a n o ne 
e ntitle me nt holder. 
185. As we explain later in th is Sec ti o n. in some cases . title shifting pliability rules di s-
play se\'era l advantages ove r the othe r m a jo r noncon se nsual transfer mechanism- li a bility 
rule protection. These advantages stem from the fact that the subsequent entitlement holder 
enjoys prope rty rule protection unde r title shift ing pliabil ity rules. 
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I. Adverse Possession 
Adverse possess ion provid es a stark example of title shifting 
pliability protection. As Dwye r and Mcneil noted. adverse possession 
ts '· [p.J erhaps the most startling mea ns o f acq uiring property 
[ri ghts]." 1s6 Under this doctrine. a st range r can gain titl e to another's 
land by occupying it - "but on ly if th e occupation is indeed wrong-
ful." !SI To succeed on an adverse possession claim. th e occupier must 
show tha t her occupation is host ile to th e owner's interest, actual. 
open and notorio us, exclusive. ancl continuuus fo r th e sta tutorily man -
da tt:d pe riod of time _ ~,,,, The successfu l adverse possessor is not only 
immun e against a sui t for e jection : she acq uires th e ful l panopl y of 
ri~,: ht s associated with o\vnershi pi"! Effec ti ve ly. therefore, adve rse pos-
sess ion is a legal mechanism that sanctions pr ivate tak ings o f property. 
Unde r our proposed typology, ad\'erse possess ion is an exa mple of a 
title shifting pliability rule. Adverse possess ion el imin ates the legal 
protec ti on accorded to the original owner fro m a property rule, and 
instead invests someone else with full property rul e protection over 
the en titlement. As in the case of essenti a l facilities, the reduction in 
l Rfi . JOHN P. DWY ER & PETER S. :VIE'JELL. PROI'F.RTY LAW r\ND POLI CY : A 
CO:VIPARr\ TIYE INSTITUTIONA L PERSPECTIVE 76 ( l lJ91i). In a simi la r vei n. Stoebuck and 
Whitm <J n ca ll adve rse possession '·a strange <1 nd wo nde rfu l sys te m ... WILLi r\M B. STO EI3UCK 
& DALE A. WHITM AN . THE LAW OF PROPERTY R53 (3d ed . 2000): see also Henry W. 
Ballantine. Tir/e by Adverse Possession. 32 Hc\RV. L. REV. 135 . 135 (J91R) (" [T]he doctrine 
[of ad ve rse possession] apparently affords an anomalous instance of maturin g a wrong into a 
ri ght co ntrary to one of the most fund amental a\ioms of th e bw. ·For true it is. that neithe r 
fraud nor might/Can make a title where th e re IVaiHe th ri ght' ·· (quoti ng A ltham's case . 8 
Coke Rep. !53. 77 Engl. repri nt. 707)). 
lf\7. STOEI3UCK & WH IT!vtAN , supm note LS6. at 853. 
188. See, e.g .. DWY ER & MEI\ELL. supmnotc 186. at 77-R2; .1 ee also VanValkenburgh v. 
Lutz. 10fi N.E .2d 28, 29 (N.Y. 1952) (noting that ·'[tjo ~.leq uire title to rea l p roperty by ad-
verse possession not found ed upon a written instrumen t. it must be shown by clear and co n-
vi ncing proof that fo r a t least fifte en yea rs (formerly twe nty years) the re was an ·actual' oc-
cupa tion unde r a claim of title . ."); Howa rd v. Kunto. ~77 P.2d 210, 2 13 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1970) (restating "the oft-quoted rule that: ·[T]o constitu te adve rse possession, there must be 
actu al possession which is uninterrupted. ope n and not orious, hostile and exc lusive , and un -
der a claim of right made in good faith for the statuto ry period' ") . Bur see O 'Keefe v. 
Snyder, 41 6 A.2d 862,870 (N.J. 1980) (noting that '·[t] o es tablish title by adverse possess ion 
to cha tte ls. the rule of law has bee n that the possession must be hostile, actual. visibl e, exc lu -
sive , and continuous"); Chaplin v. Sande rs. 676 P 2d 431. 436 (Wash. 1984) (ove rruling 
1-!mvard v. Kunlo to the extent th a t the case sugges ted a good-faith requi reme nt for adverse 
possession. and specitical\y noting th at an adve rse possesso r's ''subjective bel ief rega rding 
his true interest in the land and his intent to dispossess or not dispossess another is irre le-
vant' '). However, the O'Keefe court also noted that in the case of work s of art. th e '·intro-
duct ion of eq uitable considerations through the discovery rule,' ' id. at 1::72. which ·'prov id es 
that. in an appropria te case, a cause of ac tion will not accrue unti l the injured party discov-
e rs, o r by exe rcise of reasonable diligence should have discove red. fac ts whi ch form the basis 
of a cause of act ion ," id. at 869. "provides a more satisfactorv response than th e doctri ne of 
adverse possession'' !d. at 872 . 
189. See . e.g .. STOEI3UC K & WHIHif\N. suf'ro note !Sri . at 853 ("Title ga ined [through 
adverse possession] is usua lly in fee sim ple abso lute."). 
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protec tion depends on the behavior or the property owner. The shift 
of property rul e protection is not mandatory . but rather, it is triggered 
by the hil urc of the owner to assert possess ion ovcr the property. 1911 
In the context of adverse possession. pliability rul e pro tection is in-
tended to deter cert ain types of inacti on on the part o f property own -
ers . U nde r the analys is of advoca tes of adverse possess ion , the use of a 
title shifting pli ab ility rule in the case of <lc!ve r:;;,~· possess ion promotes 
both efficiency <mel fairness .191 Tradition ally. propon enL:; o[ adverse 
possess ion have asse rted that the risk of los ing the propert y rul e pro-
tec tion en lnn cc?S efficient use of re s ourccs i'~c Advcrs•..: possession , on 
thi s theory . gene rates two complementary ince nti ve d tcc ts: a nega tive 
and a posit i v,~. ']'he negative effect targets prop·.::rty ()\Vncrs: th e posi -
tive <1pp li e~ to po tential occupiers. By pcrwii7:ing nr.: gligcnt and dor-
mant own:.:r ~s who "sleep on th eir rights, .. 19·' adverse possession induces 
property owne rs to handle their property in ~~ soc ia ll y respon sible 
manne r. By reward ing productive occup::ltion of land . the doct rine is 
thought to encourage search and use of neglected property. The com-
bination of penalty and reward effectively ensures that property is put 
190. See . e.g .. Jeffery Evans Stake. The Unmsy Case fur A d verse Possession. 89 GEO. 
L.J. 2419. 2443 (2001) (suggesting th at "adverse possess io n helps d ea l with the probl e m of 
mi ss in g o wners''): see also Monica Kive l Ka lo & Jose ph J. Kalo. I h e Bo11ie 10 Preserve Nonh 
Carolina 's Esnwrinc /V!orshes: Th e !985 Legis/(l{ion, Pri\'1/le Cloi111s lu Esllwrine Marshes, 
D enio/ of Per111irs ru Fill, and 1he Public Tms1. 64 N.C. L. RE V. 565. li06 ( 19R6) ( no ting thZ~t 
"landowne rs nee d not rece ive actual not ice that the ir ri gh ts are in jeo pardy to trigge r the 
running of the statu te o f lim itations . . . [where] possession ... (isJ actua l. e xcl usive. open and 
notori ous . a nd continuous and uninterrup ted"). 
191. See Thomas J. M iceli & C. F. S irmans. /\11 Economic Th eo n · of i \ dve rse Possession. 
15 I :~r' l~ REV . L. & ECON. 161. 161 (1995) (e nume ra ti ng jus tificati o ns fm the "curio us doc-
tri ne ... includin g ( l ) prese rving evide nce , which decavs O\ e r time the rdw in crea sing the dif-
fic ulty of trying ca ses: (2) penalizing owne rs for siuing o n thei r righ ts o r using the ir la nd 
ineffi cient ly: (3) reducing transaction costs and thereby facilit:1ting ma rk e t exc hange thro ugh 
the e limination of old cla ims to property : (4) suppo rting the reliance inte re st that d evelops 
amo ng occupiers). 
192. See Richa rd A . Posner, Sovignv. Holmes. wul thl' Lall' and Economics of Posses-
sion . t\6 VA. L. RE V. 535 . 559 (2000) ("The econo m ic rat io na le of adve rse posse ss io n . con-
ce ived as a method of shifting owne rshi p witho ut bencfi1 o f negotiati On o r a paper transfe r. 
can be made perspicuous by asking whe n property sho uld be deemed aba ndunecl. that is. 
rdurn e d to the common pool of unowne d resource s and so made available for appropriati o n 
th rough se izure by so meone else. The economist' s a nswe 1· is that thi s should happe n when 
it' s li kely to prom o te the e fficient use of va luable resources ." ) . Spra nkling . however, con-
tends th a t the doctrin e may spur overex plo ita tion of wildl a nds. a nd th us p roposes th a t wild 
land sho uld be exempt fro m the doc trine . See John G. S prank ling. A n Environmenra/ Cri-
riqu e of 1\dver:;e Possession. 79 CORN ELL L. REV. 8l6. o-+0 ( 1994) (n o ting that .. [ ujn de r the 
de ve lopme nt model. a dverse possess ion functions to faci litate the economic exploita ti o n of 
lan d " ). 
193. See Sta ke . SlljJ/'11 note 190. at 2434-35 c· Accord ing to Jth c l ·s lee p ing' theory. ad-
verse po ssession acts a s a civ il pe na lty fo r wrongdoe rs. The wrongdoers a re th ose who s lee p 
on th e ir rig hts. and th e ir pe na lty is to lose those rights." ) : so' alsu Ba ll :mtine. supm no te 1 ~6 . 
a t 135 ( .. ·English lawve rs reg::1rd not th e merit ol" th e: possessor. hut th e d e merit of the o ne 
out uf possession.· .. (quoting JAiVI ES BARR AM ES . LECTUT<ES ()~; LEGA L HISTORY 197 
( 191 3))) 
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to sociallv desirable uses either by the title-holder or by the adve rse 
possessor. 1'14 Adverse possession thus constitutes an informaL non-
market mechanism for improving allocation of resources. 
Second, the use of a title shifting pliability rule in this context has 
desirable information forcing effects. Carol FZose likened property to 
··a kind ()[' :c;pcech, with the audience composed of all others who might 
be:: int e rested in claiming the object in qucstion ... 1"' The group of po-
tentia! claimants is not limited to adverse pusscssors. It a lso includes 
buyers. lc:;sees. ancl creditors, who all need to know the identity or the 
rightf:Jl owner in order to transact. Thu:;. ck~ctr titles have two de si r-
abk ,_:tlccts: thcv facilitate trade and redu ce crmrlicts. Frum an inCor-
mCltiun~ll ;x~rspcctive , therefore , aclver:;,~ serve:-; the dual 
functions or .. quieting titles" and tacilit dt ing transactions. '~" t hi~: 
view , <ldverse possession is not intended to l"C\\ard industriousness a ncl 
dete r slacking, but rather, to prompt property owners to cornmunicate 
clearly with th e rest of the worlcl. 197 The use c1f a title shifting pliability 
rule is responsible for this result. By rewarding clear communication, 
and penalizing vagueness, the title shifting pliability rule pre~;erves the 
informational integrity of the property system. thus leading to more 
transacting and less conflict. Obviously, the importance of this func-
tion varies depending on the effectiveness of the jurisdiction's record-
ing system. 
10--t. See. e.g. ROGERT COOTER & THOMAS UI.E'.!. L'\W AI\D ECONO\IICS 156 (1st cd. 
19SSJ (noting that :1dverse possession .. tends to prevent valuable resources from being left 
idle Co r long periods of time by specifying procedure:; for a JHOcluctiv<:: user to take title from 
an unproductive user" ' : the rule thereby ' ·tends to move property to higher-value uses. as 
required lor effici e ncy. by redistributing it to aggressive 0\\ners .. ). Following Holmes's sug-
gestion that a pe rson becomes gradually more attached to land he occupies. sec Oliver 
Wendell Holmes. The Path of !he Low. I 0 HARV. L. RFV. -+57. --+77 (I S07). Richard A. 
Posn e r has argued that adverse possession is in large part about diminishing margina l utility 
of incomt: ... The adverse possessor would experience the deprivation of propertv as a dimi-
nution in his we:1lth: the original owner 1vould experience the restoration of the property as 
an increase in his wealth. If they have the same wealth. then probably their combined utili tv 
will be gre~1tcr if the adverse possessor is allowed to ke e p the property ... RICHARD A. 
POSNER. ECONO MI C ANALYSIS OF LAW 79 (4th eel. 1092). Burse!' Omri Ben Shahen. Till:' 
Erosion ofRigilrs by Pasl13reuch. 1 AM. L. & ECON. Rr:v. 100 . .2.25 (1000). Ben Shahar con-
l<cncls. contrary to the common wisdom. that the risk of loss of title. which he calls "erosion ... 
is likely to prompt owners who neglect their property to .. seck to evict possessors. whereas 
abs<::nt an erosion risk [such property owners] would potcntiallv have allowe d the efficient 
possessor to quietly maintain use." According to Ben Sh:1har the main effect of adverse pos-
session is to ··facilitate the movement of assets away from absentee owners because it makes 
e nfo rceme nt uf absentee ownership more costly." !d. at .225. 
105. Ca rol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Prop ertv. 52 U. CHI. L. R EV . 73. 79 
( i 985) [hereinafter Rose. Origin of Propertv]. For an information-based theory of property. 
sec Thomas \V. Merrill & Henry E. Smith. Optimal Srundnnlizorion in the Llllt" u( Pmparv.· 
Til e Numerus Clausus Principle. 110 YAL"E L.J. I (20UIJ) . 
1%. S ee Merrill. supm note 102. at 1129 (noting that a .. concern which has frequently 
been advanced in the literature on adverse possession is the interest in ·quieting titles· to 
prope rty" ' ): ill. at 1130 (noting that the use of a mechanical cntitkme nt determination rul e in 
the context o f adve rse possession facilitates the development of a market in propertv rights) . 
107. Rose:. Origin of Propenv. supra note 195. at 70-00. 
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Fin ;J ll y, the r isk of losing th e property rule protection deters title-
ho lders fr om a tte mptin g to exto rt quas i-rents from adve rse posses-
sors. ~ ~~ Un der standard property rule protection , and abse nt an cfl'ec-
tive system for conve ying clear inform at ion , property owners co uld 
e licit third parties to im p rove their prope rty by intention a ll y misrep re -
se nting thzn the property has been abandoned. Such stra te g ic be havior 
is a trap to innocent occupants. Believing that they will be entitled to 
the full v;_due of their in ves tmen t , innoce nt adve rse posses::;ors will ex-
pend cons ide rable effort ancl reso urces o n others · property and ulti-
mately will lose their investment altogether when th ~ true owner 
reas:>erls her rights .:···· Th e st rategic mi sreprese ntatio n tl! th e true 
O\vncr d istorts the deci sio n making process of th e adverse possc~;so r by 
crc:tting a n dp pca rance of an economic opportunity tlwt in re a lity 
does not c:\ ist. A dverse pusscss ion miti ga tes, to some C\ tc n t, th e ex 
an te in ce ntive or property owners to engage in such str ategic mis rcp-
rescnt<ltion . and thus. permits "members of the public [ toj rr..:l y upon 
their own reasonable perceptions.''200 H ere, too , the importance of this 
funct ion depends o n th e qualit y of the reco rding system <mel ot he r in-
formation about the sta tus of th e property. 
The use of a title shifting pliability rul e to transfer th e titl e oi the 
property from the original owner to the adverse possessor is also j usti-
fi e cl. at times. o n fairn ess grounds. The fairn ess ration a le maintains 
that after a long period of possession, the reliance inte res t of the ad-
verse possessor should outweigh the formal title of the original owner. 
In doing fa irn ess to the parties, the law must consider th e fact th at the 
adverse possessor has developed a n expec tation to re ta in possession of 
th e prope rty, a nd that th e origin al owner, inte ntio nall y or neg li gentl y, 
fos tered this expec tation. Thus, some degree of moral fau lt attaches to 
the tru e owner for e nco uraging a relatio nship of dependence, wh ich 
she la te r inte nded to cut off? 11 As Justice Holmes fa mo usly stated , 
property ''takes root in your b eing and cannot be torn away without 
IYS. Scr: Me rrilL supm note 102 . at 11 3 1-1132: Mi ce li & Sirm a ns. supra no te IYI , at 161-
!i2. 
I '!Y. This probkm is particular ly acute in cases o f boundary disputes. ln s uch cases. a 
prope rt y owner pe rmits an adjace nt ne ighbo r. who mistake nl y believes s he is ac tua ll y 
bu ilding on he r own la ne!. to e ncroach on the property owner 's land. Aft e r the encroac hment 
occ urred. th e encroached upon owner can exploit he r neigh bor's investmen t to extrac t a 
m uch highe r payme nt fr o m her to set tle th e dispute than she o therwise wo ul d. A s Me rrill 
no te d. in ex tre me cases. the strategica ll y e ncroache d upon owne r ·' may be able to extract not 
on ly the v:du c: of th e la nd but the lull va lue of the addit ion as we ll. '' See Me rrilL supro note 
Ill!. at 11:'\1: i\·liccli & Sirmans. supm note 19 1. at l !i l-62 (noting that ·' wh e n a bo uncLt rv er-
ror occurs .. allowing titl e to pass to th e possessor afte r a ce r tain pe ri od preve nts th e true 
owner !'rom taking ad va ntage o f the possessor 's initi a l e rro r to exto rt qu asi re nts c rea te d by 
his rel iance expend itures") . 
21JU. Rose . Origin of Properry. supm note 195, a t 80. 
2Ul. Se.: Josep h W. Singe r. Th e R eliance In terest in Property . 40 STAN. L. RE V. 611. !i67 
( i Yt\::·i). 
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your resenting th e act a nd trying to dctencl yo urse lf, howe ve r yo u 
came by it.'·cn:> Subseque nt empirical studies have affirmed Holm es·s 
conjccture .c11 ' These stud ies indicate that peopl e deve lop an especially 
s trong attachment to assets in their possess io n. This cognitive phe-
nomenon . \videly known as an "endowment dfec t. '' 2111 further tips the 
sca le in favor of the ad verse possessor. Th e increas ing attachment of 
th e adverse possessor to the property rai ses the subj ec tive va lue she 
assigns \0 th e prope rty, a nd as time goes by he r cla im to th e properly 
grows stronge r relat ive to th e claim of the o ri gina l owne r. The title 
shi fting p liability ru le undergirding ad verse pos:;ess ion provides the 
lega l S)hkt11 with a m echanism to move the p ru pcrty to the adve rse 
posY,cSS(l!. \\hen fairne ss so requi res. It must he note d. however. th <lt 
the requirement that th e adverse possessor possess the property "hos-
tilcl v .. significantly unde rmines the adverse pu:-;se::;so r·s claim to fair-
ne ss . 
G. !'v/ultipfe Stage Pliabiliry Rules 
As we noted earlier, p li ability rul es need not be res tricted to one 
s tage. In theory, pliability rules are unlimited in the number of prop-
erty and liability rules they can aggregate into a single pliability rule. 
Multiple stage pliability rules serve the same functions as their two-
stage cousins, and are necessary to accommodate anticipa ted multipl e 
changes in circumstances or a particularly complicated balance of in-
te rests. 
1. Eminent Domain 
Arguably the most fa mous instance of pliab ility rule protection is 
provided by the law of eminent domain. The power of eminent do-
main authorizes governments to seize private property upon making a 
decision by a process specified in law. By exercising its power of emi-
202 . Hol me s. supm note 194. a t 476-77 . 
203. See Robe rt C. E llickson, Bringing Culture and t-lul/11111 Fmilly to Rmional / \ctors: A 
CritiliiiC of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI. KENT L. RE V. 23 . 39 (1986) (op in ing th a t 
Ho lmes ··is more faithfully inte rpre ted as a nticipating ( in a primi tive way)'' late r deve lo p-
me nts in cogniti ve psychology) . 
204. On the endowment effec t. see generally Danie l K<dllle man e t al.. Erp erim enral 
Tes1s of ril e End01vm enr Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990): Danie l 
Ka hn eman et al.. The Endowm el/l Effect, Loss Aversion, and Sw ill s Quo Bias. 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 193 ( 1991 ): Richard Tha le r, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. 
E CON . BEHA v. & ORG. 39 (1980): see also Owen D. Jones. Tim e SluJied Rarionnlily and the 
LaiV of LaiV's Levem ge: Behavioml Economics Me els Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. 
RE V. 1141. 1154 (2001) (report ing that "people tend to value an object more hi ghly as soon 
as th ey possess it - often twice as high ly - compared to how they va lue the same obj ect if 
they had to purchase it ,"' or, m o re forma lly. " their indiffe rence curves shift in a syste mat ic 
manne r as soon as they acquire a good. increasing th e ascr ibed va lue o f th e e ndowed good 
re la ti ve to al l other goods") . 
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ncnt domain , th e gove rn ment may transform the property rule prutec-
tion into liability rule pro tection, so long as it pays "just compe nsa -
tion," as mandated by the Cons titution205 - unde r current doctrine, 
the marke t value of the prope rty taken. 206 So long as exercised for a 
public purpose a nd accompanied by "just compensation," this power is 
a lmost limitless. This m akes eminent dom ain one of th e m ost im por-
tant pliability rul es. Indeed. it ca n justly be said that, in li ght of the 
ubiquity of ta kings. a ll propr.:r ty e ntitlements should be viewed <tS pro-
tected by pliable pro tecti on . :.t t least vis-3-vis the gove rnment. 
Here, we charac terize takin gs as resulting from a thre e-stage 
pliability rule p ro tectin g (;s:<.ets: prope rty rule pro tection , followed Lw 
li ability rul e protect ion . <tlld then p roperty rule protection aga in . ~"' In 
this characte rizatio n, a gover nme nt decision to exe rcise th e power o f 
e minent doma in - to '·take" - elkcts a transition from property rule 
pro tection in the han ds of the original holder to li ability rul e protec-
ti o n. Before the governm en t's dec ision to take the asset , the pri va te 
property holder e njoys property rule protection, e ve n v i s - ~1- vis t he 
gove rnment. For exampl e, the private property owner has th e ri ght to 
exclude governme nt age nts seeking to pe rform warrantless searches, 
as well as to sue the government to abate nuisances to the ex tent such 
suits are no t barred by sove reign immunity. However, once the gov-
ernment decides to exercise its power of eminent domain , the entitle-
m e nt holde r enjoys only ordinary liability protection - the right to 
"just compensation " in exchange for the asset. After the governme nt 
ta kes the property, howeve r , the asset is once again protected by 
property rul e pro tection , albeit thi s tim e the entitlement ho lder is the 
government. 
205 . U.S. CONST. amend. V ( .. (NJo r shall pr iva te prope rty be take n for public use. wi th-
o ut just compe nsation .''). 
206. See Lcwinsohn-Za rni r. supra note \1, a t 242 (noting that "when land is taken by the 
s tate for public use, compensation is based o n the (objec ti ve) ma rke t va lue of the prope rty. 
regardless of the unique public usc intended by the governme nt" ') . In the context of regu la-
to ry takings. cour ts have t: mploy<cd a .. modifi ed marke t value test," ' which measures th e e x-
ten t to which the regu la ti on at iss ue dimini she d th e property 's market va lu e . See, e.g .. A. f\. 
Profiles, Inc. v. C ity of Fort Lauderda le . 253 F.3d 576.583 n .7 . 584 (11th Cir. 2001) ( ho ldi ng 
that the mod ifi e d m arket va lue tes t was the appropriate measure of damages for a perma-
ne nt regul a tory taking. regardl ess o f whethe r the taking had a valid p ublic purpose). Ca li-
brating compe nsation ha s proven con tentious. See. e.g., William A. Fischel , Tile Ojfei!Ask 
Dispari1y and Jus! Conzpens{[[ion fin Takings: A Conslillllional Choice Perspeclive. 15 INT"L 
REV. L. & ECON . 187 . !93 (19\15) (a rguin g that " latter-day criti cs who ca ll for cnhancccl 
compensation under e minent doma in would upset a so lution to the offer/ask problem tha t 
had a lready bee n struck in sco res of co nstitutiona l conventions" ); Aa ron N. Grue n. Tokiugs, 
Jus! Conzpensllliun. and file Etficienl Use of /_and, Ur/)(ln, and Em,ironmclllal Resources . 33 
URB . L AW. 517.536 (2001) (sugges ting th at .. if th e government pays more than mark e t va lue 
for a property, it may result in un de r-investme nt in beneficial publi c goods th a t the private 
market cannot effici ently provide' '). 
207 . Aclmittccl ly, thi s is no t th e o nly way o f c haracte ri zing ta kings in a pliability analysis . 
See infi·a note 214 and accompanving tex t. 
• 
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T he ev ident enormitv of th e power of e minen t dom a in has led to 
discomfort about its use, re fl ected in the cons titut ional requirements 
of "just compensation ·· and ' 'pub lic use,'' 208 as well as a voluminous lit-
erature abo ut the proper scope of the consti tutional Takings Clause. 209 
Yet , th e power of e m inen t domain has also been see n as indispensable 
in orde r to allo w· gove rnme nt to fulfill its important function of pro-
vidin g p ubli c goods . .:: 1u Thus, emin ent domain serves a different set of 
goa ls than . for example . adverse possession. \Vherc adverse possession 
aims to curb ncgkct of prope rty by the o riginal entitlement ho ld er. 
emi ne nt cl c rnain is not conce rn ed wit h any "wrongdoing· · o f th e ong1-
-------~-··------------------
l !i:-\. i\t k<: st ' ' ' :1 l lliiil·~ i u l gramn1ar. the phrasing of the FiCth Amend men t' s T:1kings 
CI:Jusc iiC tu aJh· sugc:c's ts t!ut .. J'llbli c usc .. is a conditi on precede nt l< l th e· pavm cn t ,['··just 
co m pensation .. i itt he r thil ll t•J the exe rcise of the tak ing power CJ: i\:lOR TO"i J. II OI.ZI\' ITZ. 
Til [ TR A"iSFO R\1.-\TiU:\ t l! ,-\ \1 ER IC>.N L\ W 1780-18!i0. a t 65 ( 1977) (c iti ng a rgume nts of 
nine tee n th C•: nturv lawye rs thai sim ilar p rovisio ns in s tate consti t ut ions di d no t lim it puwc r 
to tak e for priv:!lc usc). Neve rthele ss. th e C l:tuse has not been read tc' e liminate the need ((,r 
JUSt compensation wh ere prope rty is tak e n fo r nonpublic usc. Rath e r. it has been see n as 
embodying the Anglu -,-~mcrica n trad iti o n o f limiting the powe r of emin e nt domain to cases 
where the taking is lo r a pL!blic use. See BRUCE A. A CKERrviAN . PRI VXIE PRCJPEIH Y ;-\~;[) 
TH E CONSTITUT ION 19U n. 5 ( 1977) c·[Tj he m odern unde rs ta nding of ·pub li c usc:· ho lds tha t 
an y s ta te purpose o the rwise const itu tiona l sho uld qua li fy as suffic ient ly ·public ' to j us tify a 
ta king.'') (c ita ti o n om itte d ). ln rece nt yea rs. the '·public use" require me nt has fa llen into 
disuse. see. e.g .. Richard A . Epste in. Nu1ice and Freedom of CunlmCI in rlze L1m· uf Servi-
llules. 55 S. CA L. L. RF.V. U5..i . 1367 n.29 (1982) (obse rv in g that "'the public usc li m ita ti o n 
has little . if any. cons tituti o nal bite today . exce pt in case s invo lving the con dem nation o f ex -
cess Janel"). prom pting protes t from so me schola rs. See, e.g. E PSTEI N. supra no te I 0 I . at I n 1-
8 1: G ideon Kan ne r. Conrlemnarion !Jiighr: Jus/ 1-/mv Jus£ Is Jusr Cmnpensmion ' . 4~ NOTRE 
DA1\·IE L-\ WY ER 765 ( 1973 ): Thomas W. Merri ll. The Economics of Pu blic Use . 72 COR NE LL 
L R EV 6 1 ( lY:\6). 
lOY. Set'. e.g .. E I'STE I;\. sup m note I il l: WILLIAivl A. FISCHEL. R ECiU LATO KY TAK INGS 
(1995): Frank f. Miche lm a n. Properry, Urili!y. and F(/im ess: Commenrs on rh e Erhiwl Foun-
darions of "Jus! Con1pcnwriun .. Lmv. 80 HA RV. L. R EV . 1165 ( 1967): J ose p h L. Sax. Tak ings 
and ;he Police Po ~<·er . 7J, Y,\ LE L.J. 311 (1964). For a hi s torica l ove rview of ta kings. see Wi l-
liam Michael Treanor, The Origin al Ullllers{(lnding of rhe Takings Clause and rhe PoliEical 
Process . 95 C OLU'-''- L REV . 782 ( 1995). M ost of the m ode rn literature focuses on th e que s-
tion of wha t acts o f gove rnment sho uld be co nside re d con stitutional '·tak ings" such tha t just 
com pe nsa tion mu st be paid. Thus. the bulk o f takings scholarship does not directly conce rn 
itse lf with the scope o f the powe r of e minen t dom a in: ra th e r, it addresses the subs id iary 
quest ion o f whe n consti tu tio na l lim itat ions apply. 
2 LO. See E PSTEII". supra note lOL at 4-5 (a rguing that the sta te ca n o nly va lidly exe rc ise 
coercive power to preve nt private agg1·ess ion or to provide public goods) : see also T homas 
W. Me rrill. Rcnr Seeking unci !hi:' Co111pensarion Principle. 80 Nw. U. L REV. 156!. 1569 
(1986) (reviewing RI CHARD A. EPSTE IN. TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TH E POWE R 
OF EMI NENT OOiviAIN ( 1985 )). Me rrill' s review notes Eps te in 's a rgumen t th a t "whe n the 
powe r of e mi ne nt domain is used to supply public goods, the surplus will te nd to be d iviclecl. 
at leas t approximate ly. in proportion to preexis ting sha res of wealth. Those with large pre-
exi st ing sha re s will ob ta in large be nefits fr om public goods : those with small preex is ting 
shares wi ll obtain smal l be nc: rit s ." !d.: cf Ugo Matte i. Efficiency as Eq uirv: !nsighrs fi-olll 
Conzpumrive Law and Econo111 ics. 14 l NT'L R EV . L & ECON. 3. 7 (199-f) (''As far as the 
publ ic usc req ui remen t is co nce rn e d. the econo mic theory of p ubl ic goods provides both a 
justifi ca tio n and a limit. T he j ust ificat io n is tha t the governme nt needs to be able to acqu ire 
the inpu ts th a t arc necessa ry to provide public goods which the marke t can not ea sily pro-
vide. The iim it is set by the co nside rat ion that any priva te use of the powe r o f emin e nt d o-
main will be ineffi cie nt sin ce it produces a result tha t private parties wou ld not be ahle to 
;-each by barga inin g.") ( interna l citati ons omitted). 
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nal ho lder. Rather, emine nt domain is used as a too l tor transfe rrin g 
titl e in property to a presume d higher-va lue use r. Eminent domain 
tak es a n asset from private hands and places it in th e ha nds of a gov-
ernment that nee ds the asset to provide for a public good. The coe r-
cive m echanism is necessary in o rd e r to overcome stra tegic diffic ulti es 
that impede barga ining and preve n t voluntary reass ignme nt of the as -
set to th e governmen t in m arket transactions. 
T he ce ntral barr ie rs to success ful negot ia tions overco me by em i-
nent doma in come un de r the heading of strategic behavior and include 
the closely re la ted problems o f bi lakral mo nopo ly and asy mmetri c in -
l"o rm a ti o n .:11 
In a si tuation of b ilateral mono pol y, the re is but one pote nti al 
buyer and one potentia l seller. [ ac h knows that the tnmsaction canno t 
take place without he r cooper:J.t io n. and each , therefore. attempts to 
ex tract a ll the profit fro m th e tra nsaction. The proble m of bil a tera l 
monopoly can be illustrated with the exampl e of a government dec i-
sion to build a railway through an isolated valley. The re is only o ne 
railway, and therefore only one potential buye r of valley la nd. On the 
other hand , the railroad must purchase all the valley parcels along the 
lay of the track ; even one hold-o ut can ruin the proj ect. Each parcel 
owner is thus a monopolist who may att empt to hold out for a higher 
price that will dive rt the railroad protits to he r own pockets. In such a 
21 1. F o r a comprehensive review of the li terature o n strategic ba rri ers to bilateral nego-
tiati on. see Robe rt Coote r. Th e Cosr uf Couse . ll J. LEGA L. STU D. l. 23 (1YS2) (pointin g o ut 
that di sag re ements a s to how to divid e the contractual surplus may pre vent successful 
Coasean barga ining): Jo hn Ke nnan & Robe rt Wilson. Bargaining ll 'itlz Privwe Information. 
31 J. ECON . LITE RAT URE 45 . 46 ( I YLJ3) (hypothesizing tha t differe nces in priva te info rma-
tion are a prima ry ca use o f ba rgainin g d e lays): Robe rt P. Me rges. Of ProperLy Rules. Coase. 
and !n rellectual ProperLy. 94 CO LU~·I. L. RE V. 2655. 2659 (1994) (obse rving that in the fi e ld 
of inte ll ec tual property the va luation proble m heighten s the possibility of stragetic barga in -
ing): E ric L. Talley. Note , Conrrocr Ren e;:.orimion, ;'v/eclwnisiii Design, and the Liiluidared 
Damages Rule, 46 STAI'!. L. R EV . II 95. 1198. 1219 (1994) (discussing the problem of bil a tera l 
monopoly in contract re negot iati on). 
On asymmetric info rmat io n spec ifica lly. sec Lo ui s Kaplow & Steve n Shavell. D o Liabil-
ity Rules Facilirare Bargaining? A Replr ro ; l yres a/Il l Tallev, 105 Y ALE L.J. 221. 223 -29 
( I 995) (" Whe n each party·s own valuation is not known by the o the r. each party will have 
incentives to misrepresent its valuation in bargaining. ho ping to extract more of the bar-
gaining surplus from th e othe r part y. Parties may the refo re demand too much or offer too 
littl e. with the result th a t efficie nt barga ins may not be reache d. In this case, on e canno t say 
un a mbiguously whe the r prope rty rules o r li a bility rul es wi ll be supe ri or. " ); see also Kare n 
Eggles to n e t a !. , Th e Design and !nrerprerariun of Contracts: Why Co111p lexiry lV/a rrers , 95 
Nw. U. L. REV . 91 , 109 (2000) (defining ·'a symme tric in fo rmation '" as a situation in whi ch 
"'[o]ne party to a contract ... has m o re info rmation about future state s of the world th a n 
doe s the o ther party'" ); c(: William Samuelson. A Commenl on th e Coase Theorem. in 
G AME -T HEORETIC MODELS OF BARC J\ INING 32l. 33 1-35 (Alvin E. Roth e el., 1985) (a rgu-
ing tha t if a n e ntitl em e nt is auc ti one d in a particular way be tween the pa rti es rath e r than 
a ll oca ted thro ugh ba rga inin g, the pro bl e ms associa te d with asymme tri c information a nd 
bargaining can be overcome, but acknowledg ing that hi s propose d aucti ons may be im p rac ti-
cable because they would req uire th e initial e ntitleme nt ho lde r to share the proceeds) . See 
generullv RICHARD A. POSNER. ECONOM IC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56 (4th eel. 1992) ("A good 
econom ic a rgument for em inen t domain ... is that it is necessa ry to prevent monop o ly."'). 
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situation, the ex ante pr ice is unknowable. transaction costs m ay be-
come prohibitive , and the attempt to out-stratc gize the opponent may 
foil the project aitoget hcr. E mine nt domain provides the solution by 
permitting the government to ta ke th e parcels of la nd in the vall ey and 
then open them for use by th e railroad. 
T he problem of asymmetric information is particularly impo rtant 
in this regard. Private e ntities may o ft en overcome the bilateral mo-
nopoly difficulty by using straw age nt s or the like to hide their plans. It 
is far more difficult. iHl\Vevc r. for th e governmen t to hide its pl a ns. 
Parcel owners possess kn owk clge o f th e gove rnme nt plans. whil e the 
government can only gu·-.:ss <ll th e owne rs· ·'true' · se lling price . T hi s 
leads th e parce l own e rs tu cng<1ge in s trat egic be havior and re nt-
seeking, a nd burdens the o pportunil)-' to succe~;; s fully negot ia te a trans-
action . 
The power of e mine nt do m<tin prov ides a solution to these strate -
gic barriers to efficie n t tra nsac ti o ns. On th e o ne ha nd , emine nt do-
main does not disturb the prope rty rul e protection granted in ordinary 
circumstances. Howeve r. wh ere there is a public need that is likely to 
be foiled by stra tegic problems, the government may exercise its 
power of eminent domain , trigge ring a change to liability rule protec-
tion , and a llowing the orderly transfer of the asset. The constitutional 
Takings Clause prevents overutil izat ion of this power by limiting the 
power of eminent domain to those cases where reason able marke t 
transactions are unlik e ly. Indeed , th e requirement of just compensa-
tion makes th e exercise of eminent domain sufficie ntly costly that, in 
many cases , the government prefe rs to negotiate a transfer of the asset 
under ordinary property ru le protection, rather th an force a change to 
the liability stage of the pliability rule. 212 
While we classify takings as part of a three-stage pliability rule , the 
rul e co uld also be classified as a title shifting pliability rule with a 
compensation requirement , or as a classic pliability rule as welL213 For 
instance, due to the just compensa tio n requirement, to the original as-
se t holder, the pliabi lity rule protection affo rded vis-a-vis takings ap-
pears to consist of prope rty rule protection followed by liability rule 
protection.m In th e initial stage, th e asset holder enjoys ordinary 
212. See Willi a m A. Fi sche l. Th e !'u!iiica/ Econo111y of .lust Co111p ensill iun: Lessons .fi-0111 
the Military Draji fo r the Takings Issue . 20 HAR V. J.L. & PUG. P OL.'Y 23. 40 (1996) (obse rv-
ing that " [w]hen it becomes known tha t compensation will be made ... the go vernment e n-
dures· · the transact ion costs of mak in g se ttle ment (or se ttle ment cos ts) . including th e cost of 
negotiating with conde mnecs . participating in an eminent domain tria l (if negotiations fail). 
·'the dea dweight loss o f additiona l taxe s to fina nce the compe nsat ion and the negotiations. 
an d th e losses from moral hazard on the part o f pro pe rty owners who a nticipate that com-
pe nsa tion wi ll be made '") (i nte rn a l citati o n o mitted). 
213. Calabresi a nd Me lam ed co nside r e minent d o main a n example of ' ·mixed pro tec-
tio n.' ' or. under our termin o logy. a sim ulta neous pliability rul e. Ca labresi & Mel a me d. supra 
note 5, at 1093. For th e ren sons di scussed in the text. we prefer a diffe rent cha ra cteri zation. 
214. See Me rrill. supra no te 208. at 64 ("'[r] n the e minent domain a rea . which so o fte n 
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property rule protection . W hen the governm ent rnakes a decision to 
exerc ise its power of eminent domain. the asset- ho lder's pro tection e~ ­
scnt ially becomes one of liability rult: protection in which the asset -
ho lckr cannot prevent others from impingin g upon her exclusive en -
joyme nt of the asse t , but she does h<we the r ight to reasonable com-
pen ::;atio n for such impa irme nts of her rights in the asse t. In thi s sense, 
t he tak ings re gime can be seen as a ch;sic pliab ility rule. though t he 
act that trigge rs the shift be tween the t\vo st<lges o f th e p li abil ity rule 
nrotection- an exercise of e min e n t ck:m ai n -- e ndows the ne w C1SSet 
l 
lwlcler \\itb prope rty rul e protecti o r1 nithe r than merely liability rule 
prot ec tion. Alternatively, in light ot th e t~;ct th'1t the subse quent ·~nti-
tlt::ment holder enjoys prope rty ruk :lcct ion like the origine1l enti-
tlement holder, the law of takings c1n s:1i ci to crcat,.:: a title shifting 
pli ab ility rule. 
We prefe r the characterization of " Ihrcc -stage rule in order to 
hi ghlight how the pliability rule embodied in eminent doma in over-
comes the " reciprocal tak ings·' difficult y enge ndered by lia bility rule 
protection of objects subject to possesso ry disp utes . As we noted ear-
lier ,215 Sh::lVe ll and Kaplow favored property rul es to resolve posses-
sory disputes, lest each taking of an object protected by a liability rul e 
e ngender a reciprocal taking, leading to an endless cycle of takings 
and retakings of the object. The pliability rule employed in eminent 
clomC1in resolves this difficulty by limiting use of the li ability rule pro-
tection to a single taking. O nce the obj ect is take n (in the second stage 
of the pliability rule) , property protection is restored. albeit in the 
ha nds of a presumed higher-value use r. 21 r' 
para lle ls private law doctrine, courts have effectively declared that lia bility rules alone shall 
protec t all private property rights. " ) (inte rnal citation omitted) . 
215. See supm notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
216. A pliability analys is thus has a n important implica ti o n fo r th e debate betwee n 
Kap low/Shavell and Ayres/Balkin , de scribed supra in note 58 . Ayres a nd Balkin reso lved th e 
reciproca l taking difficulty by noting the possibili ty of an a uctio n regime . This can be de-
scribed in o ne of two ways in a pliability ana lys is. One descripti o n wou ld see the Ayres and 
Balkin solution as preserving a sin gle type of rule protectio n - liab ility rule protection -
but requiring that the price paid for the taking be altered in each round in order to retle ct a 
ne w value. On this view. Ayre s and Balkin did not sugges t a p li abili ty rul e and did not rec-
og ni ze that reciprocal takings could be a rrested by iimiting app li cation of a liability rule. 
A second description - and probably the one that would be favored by Ayres and 
Balkin - would view th e suggested auction as a kind o f protection di st inct from o rdina ry 
prope rty an d liability rules. U nde r this descrip tion. Ayre s and Balk in we re sugges tin g a pli· 
a bility rule in which the takin g of an obj ect in a posse ssory di spute wou ld trigge r a change in 
rule pro te c tio n from lia bility to auc tion. Viewed in thi s light. A yres and Balkin 's suggest io n 
is me re ly one of seve ral ways to resolve the reciproca l ta ki ngs pro bl e m by me ans of a 
pliab ilitv rul e. Indeed, any rule th a t limi ted the iia b il itv rule s tage of the pliability rule woul d 
fo il infinite reciproca l ta kings. 
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H . E!emems of Plioh i!iry R ules 
So far, we have de m onstrated the pervasiveness of pliability rules 
in o ur lega l syste m. Before turning to th e normative case fo r pliability 
rules, we summarize some sa li ent features of pliability rules presented 
thus far. 
P li ability rule s invo lve ~ ll least three e le m•.:nts: a firs t s tage rule (e i-
ther property or liabiiity). a tri gge ring e vent causing a s hift between 
stages, and a seco nd s tage ru le . Fo r simpl icity's sa ke, we have focused 
on two-s tage pliability ru ks . a ltho ugh, <lS \Ve demonstrated wi th the 
case of em inen t dom a in. th e re is no theo retical limitation to the num -
be r of stages in a pliubi!ity rule. l\dditi cmally. as we have noted, th e 
stages of the p liabili ty rule need not necessarily be chronologica lly se -
q uen tial. Sometimes, as in the cnse of fa ir use, for exa m ple , the stages 
may coincide chronologically. Neverthe less, in all cases, a triggering 
eve nt or fac t is necessa ry to shift protection from o ne stage to ano ther. 
For example, in the case of fair use, copyright is best seen as protected 
in the firs t stage by a property rule , and in the next stage by a ze ro or-
der liability rule, whe re th e trigger is a type of use that qualifies as a 
'' fa ir use." 
One of the important innova tions of a pliability analysis th e refore 
lies in a study of triggering mech anisms. On either side of the trigger, 
the protection is either by means o f a li ability rul e or a prope rty rule, 
both of which have been the subject of a rich and illuminating schol-
ar ly colloquy. However, as plia bi lity rules have no t been previousl y 
identified, there has been no previous discussion of triggering events. 
As we have seen , triggering m echan isms can be based in the passage 
of time , changed circumstances , m agnit ude or nature of use , or a com-
bination of any of th e three . 
Time-centered triggers specify a preset period of protection in 
stage one at the end of which a different type of protect ion begins. 
The zero order pliability protection used in patent and copyright law 
employs a time-cente red tr igger. 
Triggers based o n changed circumstances are , naturally, less easily 
encapsulated. Thus far, among the changed circumstances that we 
have seen used as triggers are market power , care lessness , a nd the 
emergence of a highe r value use . Excessive marke t power serves as a 
trigger both in the genericism doc trine in trademark law and in the es-
sential facilities doctrine in th e law of antitr ust. Careless behavior on 
the part of the property owner is the tr iggering m echanism in the case 
of adverse possession. Emergence of a higher value use is the trigger 
in the case of eminent domain. C hanged circumstances may a lso be 
combined with the time e lement as demonstrated by th e case of ad-
verse possessiOn. 
Triggers based in the magnitude of the use specify tha t the ordi-
na ry protect io n offered by the base line rule are set aside wit h regards 
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to ce rta in low magnitude uses . Thus far, we have see n such a tr igger 
employed in copyright with re ga rd to fai r use . 
lt is noteworthy that in some instances of pliability pro tection th e 
initi a l entit leme nt ho lde r contro ls the tri gge ring mechanism. whil e in 
o th e rs she does not. Pure time-ce nte red triggers , ror example , are not 
subject to th e control of the e n titleme nt hold e r. Pate nt holders , fo r in-
stance . lack th e ab ili ty to alte r the twen ty yea r period th a t sign a ls the 
shift fro m prope rty to zero order liabilit y pro tec tion. Ot he r tri gge rs, 
however , correlate the shift to the beha vio r o f the initial e ntit lem e nt 
ho lde r. In such cases, the use o f pliabilit y rules gives th e e ntitl e me nt 
ho lde r <!11 ince nti ve to se lf-regu late or ~ t c t in :lccorclance with socia ll y 
cle sirctbl e sta ndards. Fo r example, the ciuctrincs of esse ntial ra ei li ti es 
and ge ne ricism ince ntivize e n tit lement hu!Jers not to acc umulate ex-
cess ive mar ke t power les t the in itial pro pe rty rule pro tect ion be re-
placed with a liability rule . T he doctrine o l adve rse possessio n, on the 
other ha nd, deters careless behavior on th e part of prope rty owners by 
subj ecting careless mvners to the risk of titl e loss . 
IlL THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR P UABIUTY 
Having explained and illustrated the e lements of p li ability rul es, 
we now turn to th e normative case for using pliability rules. First , we 
show that pliability rules achieve different ai ms than property and 
liability rule s, and we show when pliability rules sho uld be used. We 
then turn to some practical lessons to be drawn fro m a p li ability ana ly-
sis. Here, we show both how explicit recognition of the ca tegory of 
pliability rules sugges ts possible modifi cations of exist ing pliability 
rules and how pliability rules can be used in new areas of the law. 
A. When Pliabiliry Rules Sh ould Be Used 
In this Section, we take up the task of identifying those situations 
m w hi ch pliable rules possess a relative advantage over their s tat ic 
cousms. 
From a norm ative perspective, the importance of pliability rules 
lies in that they significantly broaden the range of lega l rul es avail ab le 
to policy makers . We posit that pliability rules a re most advantageo us 
under the following conditions: (1) when po licymakers anticipate sub-
stantially changed circumstances; (2) when competing inte rests must 
be accommodated in a single rule; and (3) when necessa ry to tran-
scend the inherent limitations of prope rty and liability rules. In a ll 
these cases, the use of a pliability rule facilitates planning by the en ti-
tlement ho lder , as well as bargaining be twee n the holder and potenti al 
acqUJrers. 
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1. Chunged Circwns·tances 
The utility of pliability rul es is most obvious in the case of changed 
circumstances. Naturally, changed circumstances may necessitate a 
change in the initial mode of protection in order to adjust th e legal 
rule to the ch a nged reality. Pliability rules. due to their !"lcxibility. arc 
the idcJ I policy tool for this ta sk . Pliability rul es a llow po licymc1kers to 
anticipate changed circumstances and incorporate th e m into a lega l 
rule by identifying th e change as the trigger that shifts protec tion 
modes . Many of the exa mple s or pliability rul es that we haw' c ited so 
fC~r have bee n motiva ted primarily by changed circums tances. For 
c'\ampl c, the essential fac iliti es doctrine. as it s name s uggests. <tims to 
identify those circumstances in which a property has become ·· cs::;e n-
tial'' to competitors , and to usc that change as th e trigger of a plia bi lity 
rule. Neither a uniform property rule protec tion nor li <tbi!ity ruk pro-
tc:ction is capabl e of accommodating th e challenge of change d circum-
stances. Uniform property rule protection prese rves in perpetuity the 
facility owner's right to exclude. As suc h, uniform prope rty rule pro-
tection is incapable of dealing with the emergence of circumstances 
that render such exclusion anticompetitive. Uniform li ability rule pro-
tection , on the other hand. allows for nonconse nsual uses, but docs so 
at the cost of undermining the owner's incentive to develop her prop-
e rty. When circumstances change. the re fore , e ither uniform rule im-
plies some efficiency loss. Pliability rules , by contrast, preserve the ef-
ficiency advantages of both rules. despite the change in the 
circumstances. 
Where the changed circumstances are affected by th e behavior of 
the original entitlement holde r, pliability rules have an added advan-
tage over the pure protection m odes. In such cases, plia bil ity rules may 
be used to ince ntivize entitlement owne rs to avoid certain undesira bl e 
circumstances. For example, in the case of antitrust law, pliability rule 
protection encourages owners to avoid the anticompetitive behavior 
that may lead to the dilution of their property rights. Similarly, the 
pliability rule of genericism in trademark law incentivizes owners of 
strong marks to preserve compe tition in their fi eld of trade, and to dis-
tinguish their products from competing ones, les t they lose their prop-
erty rule protection altogether. The promotion of self-regulati on also 
produces the added benefit of economi zing on regulatory and judicial 
costs. 
2. Conflicting Interests 
It is less easily seen how pliability rul es are beneficial in accommo-
dating competing interests in a single rule since pliability rul es often 
involve seque ntial , rathe r tha n simulta neo us, modes of protect ion . 
Yet, on more careful examination, pliab ility rul es can prove a useful 
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m~~chanism for balancing incompatible interests. For instance. pliabil-
ity ruics may he used to incorporate competing concerns of efficiency 
and justice. Consider patent protection. The time limitation on the 
property rule protection stage in patent l::nv finds grounding. at least in 
part, in concerns of distributive justice. The legal monopoly granted by 
patent protection. while incentivizing inventors ex ank. also subjects 
th e public to supra-competitive pricing of new products. such as medi-
cines. Distributively. then, the first stage of property rule protection 
has the undesirable effect of denying the least well-off access to valu-
able. or even life sewing. commoclities. 217 Yet , the same legal monopoly 
that leads to c:..:clus ion of the poor is also responsible fur the prcKiuc-
tion of the im<:ntion in lhc first place. Additionally. man y view an in-
ventor's ciaim over her invention as a moral one. The usc of a time-
centered zero order pliability rule balances these competing interests. 
3. Inherent Limitmions 
Pliability protection in patent law also provides an example of the 
use of pliability rules to overcome the inherent limitations in uniform 
property rule or liability rule protection. In addition to being subject 
to the tensions between concerns of efficiency, justice and fairness, 
patent law also must cope with the inherent tensions of efficiency 
within uniform property rule protection. By granting the absolute 
power of exclusion, property rules allow owners to invest optimally in 
their property. Property protection also provides the background 
against which voluntary exchange takes place. However, property 
rules may also create inefficiencies. Property rule protection of mo-
nopolies encourages underproduction, supra-competitive pricing and a 
deadweight loss. Patent protection illustrates both these virtues and 
vices. The ex ante anticipation of enjoying a property right is neces-
sary to spur investment in research and development of new products. 
H owever, it comes at the ex post cost of supra-competitive prices. Pat-
ent Jaw 's pliability rule protection mitigates the inefficient elements of 
property rule protection without entirely sacrificing its beneficial as-
217. Distributive justice concerns are paramount in the work of philosopher John 
Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14-15 (1971) (arguing that "social and 
economic inequalities ... are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone. 
and in particular for the least advantaged members of society"): Steve P. Calandrillo, Re-
sponsible Regulnrion: A Sensible Cost-Benejil, Risk Versus Risk Approach 10 Federol Heal!h 
and Safetv Regulurion. 81 B.U. L REV. 957. 983 (2001) (describing the Rawlsian ·'veil of ig-
norance·· by asking '·[f one did not know what her position in society would be- i.e .. one 
might be among the best otl or the absolutely worst off member- what kine! of a society 
would she choose to construct and live in·)"). Calanclrillo also suggests that "[t]he implicit 
presumption [in Rawlsianism] is that because people justifiably care about fairness and eq-
uity. and arc also risk averse. they would choose a society that maximizes the position of the 
worst-otf member.·· and therefore "in the regulatory arena , Rawlsianisrn would ask how a 
proposed policy affected the most disadvantaged person or group, and rwt whether overall 
social we lfare increased in the aggregate ... /d. 
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pects. The initi al property rule protection preserves the incentive to 
inves t in research: and th e subseq uent zero orde r liabili ty rule stage 
cab ins the distorting effects of monopolist ic pricin g. 
Having identifi ed the three primary cases in which normat ive con-
sid e rati ons point toward the adoption of pliability rules. we can now 
suggest two sets of practical results of a pliability analysis. F irst, we 
exa min e the ex ten t to which existing pli abi lity rule s can be modifi ed to 
be tter achieve the ir goa ls. Second , wc uncover s itu<~tions in which 
p li ab ilit y ruks uught to be employed , but have not bee n. 
B. Rn·ising Erisring Pliohilitr Rules 
In thi:-; Se ction. \VC ret urn to some of our earli er exam ples of ex ist -
ing pliability ru les to de termine how their goa ls can be more e tli cie nt ly 
and Llirly ctclvancecl . Spec ifica lly, we discuss adverse possess ion. pa ten t 
protection and genericism . 
1. Adverse Possession 
To review briefly , the pliability rule of adverse possessio n institutes 
property rule protection in both of the two stages of the r ule, with the 
shift triggered by time and evidence of owner carelessness (such as ex-
clusive , open. notorious and hostile possession by a trespasser). T he 
p li ability rule is designed to disco urage underutiliza tio n of the prop-
erty as we ll as reward adverse possessors for bringing the property 
back into ac ti ve use. 
Recognizing that adverse possession embodies a p li ability rule en-
a bles one to design alternative pliability rules that might better 
achieve the doctrine 's aims. As currently structured, the doctrin e of 
adve rse possession is stark. If the adverse possessor satisfies all the 
sta tutory elements, she may take title, free of charge, and with full 
property rule protection. However, if even one of the statutory ele-
ments is missing, even in part , the adverse possessor receives nothing. 
For example, where the statutory period is twenty years, an exclusive, 
open, no torious and hostile possession for nineteen years and eleven 
months entitles the adverse possessor to nothing.m A t its extreme , 
then, the doctrine of adve rse possession merely incentivizes the owner 
to visit the property , and possibly take corrective action, every nine-
teen years or so. This result may strike some of us as neither fair nor 
efficient. 
The rigidity of current adverse possession doctrine stems from the 
fact that it employs a two-stage , time-limited , title shifting pl iabil ity 
2 1il. It is poss ible that the adve rse possessor might have a c la im for damages in unjus t 
e nrichment. o r that the owne r mig ht ha ve a ciaim in tre spass. For the sake o f the di sc uss ion. 
we disregard thc:sc poss ib ilities. 
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rule. To introduce more flexibility into the doctrine, we note the pos-
sibility of adding several new stages to the pliability rule. This can be 
done is various ways. Assume that, optimally, where state law does not 
provide for an adequate recording system, property owners should in-
spect their property at least once every five years. Under this assump-
tion, the legislature can revise the doctrine of adverse possession to 
give no rights to adverse possessors in the first five years of their stay, 
and thereafter to reduce the owner's rights vis-8-vis the adverse pos-
sessor's a certain percentage of the title. For example, the revised ad-
verse possession rul e mC\y st z1te that the successful adverse possessor 
gains twenty-rive percent ul the titl e every five years. The rule might 
further provide that if the advc.:rse possession is interrupted alt e r a cer-
tain percentage Clf the title was acquired by the adverse possessor, she 
will be entitled to purchase the remainder from the original owner. In 
other words , after the first five years of possession, the adverse posses-
sor would receive a call option on the land she possessed, with the ex-
ercise price depending on how much longer the adverse possession 
continues. At the extreme, if the adverse possession continues success-
fully for twenty years, the exercise price would be zero. 
Naturally, the legislature may also create a put option in the suc-
cessful adverse possessor in the liability stage of the proposed pliabil-
ity rule. This would mean that after five years, the adverse possessor 
would not only acquire twenty-five percent of the title to the land but 
also the right to sell this share back to the original owner. Under this 
regime, at the conclusion of twenty years of adverse possession, the 
adverse possessor would have the right to sell back the land to the 
original owner at market price. 
States unsympathetic to adverse possession, such as New Y ork,m 
may also employ a classic pliability rule in this context, but design it in 
a way that would make adverse possession less attractive. For exam-
ple, New York can stipulate that the successful adverse possession 
gains at the end of twenty years, not the title to the land possessed, but 
rather a call option to buy the land at market valueY0 
Finally, it is also possible to adopt a still different classic pliability 
rule that introduces an auction mechanism at the liability stage. Under 
this variant, the adverse possessor receives no property interest what-
soever in the land possessed, but merely a right to receive a monetary 
award for identifying the continuous underutilization by the original 
owner. At the end of the statutory period, the title to the underutilized 
land would be auctioned off to the highest bidder, with the proceeds 
219. See. e.g., Joseph v. Whitcombe. 279 A.2d 122. 126 (2001) ("New York law has long 
disfavored the acquisition of title by adverse possession.") (citations omitted). 
220. Alternatively. the states more sympathetic to adverse possession could give the ad-
verse possessor a put option, thereby requiring the owner to buy the land back at market 
value. 
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divided between the original owner and the adverse possessor. The 
advantage of this system is that it transfers the land to the highest 
value user as determined by the auction. 
2. Pntents 
As we explained, patent protection represents an example of a 
zero order pliability rule. Critics of the patent system have long argued 
that a superior way to encourage innovation would be to substitute a 
system of compulsory licensing for the limited property rule protection 
accorded to patentees. Under a system of compulsorv licensing , a 
regulator would set the price for use ot new inventions, and the pat-
entee would have no pmver to deviate from that price. Tel compensate 
the patentee Cor the loss in revenues, the protection term could be 
longer than that currently provided for by L:m.ccl If set correctly, the 
compulsory license would adequately reward patentees for investing 
in research and development without creating a social deadweight 
loss. This proposed system of compulsory licenses represents a patent 
system that is based on liability rule protection. Thus, to date , this cen-
tral debate in patent law has proceeded in terms of pure property rule 
versus pure liability rule arguments. 
Our discussion of pliability rules introduces a third option that may 
be superior to the competing ones. Specifically, we propose a classic 
pliability rule that combines initial property rule protection and posi-
tive liability protection. Under the new rule , patentees would be ac-
corded property rule protection for a certain period of time, and then 
the invention would become subject to a compulsory license for an-
other period. For example, Congress can enact a rule under which 
patentees will enjoy property rule protection for ten years, and then 
liability rule protection for another twenty years. During the latter pe-
riod, the invention would be available for a price determined by the 
PTO, or some arbitration tribunal. 
Relative to the current patent system, the proposed pliability rule 
would reduce the deadweight loss associated with patent protection by 
cutting the exclusivity period in half; at the same time, the prolonged 
liability rule period would preserve the incentive to engage in innova-
tion. Relative to a pure system of compulsory licensing, the proposed 
pliability rule diminishes the risk to which inventors are exposed. A 
fundamental problem with compulsory licenses is that it is extremely 
difficult to set the license rates accurately. The license rate, in order 
not to undermine the incentive to innovate, must reflect not only the 
221. See Pankaj Tandon. Oprimal Parenrs wirh Compulsory Licensing. 90 J. POL. ECON. 
470 (1982) (contending that the optimal patent would have an indefinite life. for both proc-
ess and product innovations , but even if the patent term is left at seventeen years, compul-
sory licensing may lead to substantial welfare improvements). 
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expec ted profits of the patentee on the current innova ti o n. but ulsu 
the expenditures incurred by th e patentees in research projects that 
fail ed to yie ld a patentable res ult. Given that there is no market price 
for new inventions, it is very difficult to se t compulsory lice nse ra tes 
accura tely. Granted , the pliability rule \Ve propose incorporates com-
pu lso ry li censing in the liab ilit y rule stage. However. it exposes p2t-
cnk es to a smaller ri sk of unde rcompe nsa tion by granting them te n 
vears of property ru le protection. 
The proposed class ic pliabilit y rule has an add it io nal advan tc:gc 
cner i1.s p ure liab ili ty cousin . Ass ume that th e liability rule cq ui v~:l ent 
of o ur pro posed pliabil ity ru le is fo rt y yea rs o r liabilit y rule protectio n. 
In th·.:nry . the lon ge r protection per iod can make up lo r rh,; fa c t th a t 
l''!kntces recei ve no property rule protect ion. In pract ice. howev;: r. 
th e t~ddit i o nal te n years ma y prove worthless . This is so bcccwse newe r 
a nd supe rior inve ntions may re nder existing ones va lue less . In add i-
tion. d isco unting or future va lues imposes an inhe re nt limitati o n on 
how much patent protection may be exte nded. In othe r wo rds. th e in-
centive effect of th e ea rly yea rs of protectio n is much stro nge r than 
that of late years. 
3. Genericism 
As we discusse d, the gcne ricism doctrine in trademark law is 
predicated on a ze ro order pliability rul e . If consume rs identi fy a 
dominan t mark not with a particular company, but rath e r with the un-
ch::rlying product. the prope rty rule protection of the mark holder 
lapses and the mark falls into the public domain. That is, once a rnark 
is pronounced ge ne ric, competito rs of the mark holder can use it free 
of charge . 
We suggest tha t a classic pliability rule can improve upon existing 
genericism doctrine. Specifically, Congress could repl ace the current 
rule wi th one that grants compe titors the ri ght to use dominant m arks 
in exchange for payment. 222 The PTO could then dev ise a me nu of 
prices for the use of dominant marks, with the amount to be paid de -
pending on the dominance of the mark: the more dominant the mark , 
the smaller the payment. Alternatively, once a mark becomes domi-
nant , Congress could require the mark's owner to pay its competito rs 
to reta in the right to deny them access to the mark. E ithe r way, the 
use of a classic p li ability rule with a menu of prices would result in a 
more refined regime than that currently in place. Such a refined sys -
tem wo uld better enhance competition, and is potentia ll y fairer to a ll 
the part ies involved. 
222 . T he dominance of th e mark ma y be measured hv th e mark owner's m<1rket sha re in 
th,_: re lcl'ant p roduct o1· se rvice mark et. A lterna tivel y. th e: dominance o f the mark ma v be a 
fun ction o f the streng th of cons um ers· association of the mark with its associated product (as 
opposed to tht: ir association o f the mark with the product's manufacturer). 
I 
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C. fnrroducing N nv Pliability Rules 
Pliability rul es need not be limited to the circumstances in which 
they are already currently employed. In this Section, we discuss tvvo 
instances of field s of lmv tha t co uld benefit from the introduction of 
pliability rules. O ur fi rs t exa mple grapples wi th the probl em of the 
anti-commons - the proble m of the di vision of propert y int o too -
small units. Our other examp k g•:: ne ralizes the anti-co mmons anal ysis 
and examines the possibility uf exporting some of the princi p ie:; of 
eminent do main into th e pr ivate ~ec tor- in o ther wo rds, the creation 
o f a private takin gs pmver. 
1. ;Lui-Comm ons 
Th e famili ar comm ons pro ble m dea ls with too many owners m 
common of a single resource. !n his "Tragedy of the C ommo ns,'" 22 ; 
Garrett H ardin pos ited tha t uve rexploit a ti o n of the resource wo ul d 
result. H ardin illustra ted th e phenomenon with the example of a rural 
pasture commonl y owned by a community o f shepherds. H e pos ited 
that the shepherds would allow the ir he rds to overgraze the pas ture 
since each shepherd only bea rs a small fraction of the marginal cos t o f 
each use while enjoying the fuli marginal benefit. The result is the 
tragedy of the commons: property held in common will be overex-
ploited.m Hardin's o ft-cited conclusion was that freedom in a com-
mons "bring[s] on universal ruin.· ·~1" The traditional solution to com-
mons problems is privatization. leading on e owner to internalize the 
full marginal cost of each use . 
l'viichael Heller noted that a converse problem- which he labeled 
the anti-commons proble m - could result if the resource were divided 
into too-small pieces of property, each owned by different owne rs. c :~> 
In an anti-commons , property interests in a certain asse t are dispersed 
among multiple holders , each of whom has an effective ve to over an y 
given use of the property. Because each property owner has veto 
power over all compe ting uses, individual owners can behave stra tegi-
223. Ga rret Hardin. The Tragedy of rlre Comm ons . 162 SCIEN CE 1243 (1Y68). 
224. Bw see Caro l M. Rose . The Com edv of rhe Com muns: Cus1om, Colllmerce. and ln-
lr erently Public Propenv. 53 U. C HI. L. REV. 711.723 (l<J8G) [he reinafte r Rose . Comr:d_1 of 
rlre Commons] ("" [C]ustonw ry doctrines sugges t that co mme rce might be thought a 'comedy 
of the comm ons· not onl y because it may infinitely expand our weal th. but al so. at k as t in 
part. beca use it has bee n th ought to enhance the sociabilit y of the membe rs of an oth erwise 
atomi zed society"') . 
225. Hardin. supra note 223 . ;n 12-li). H;1 vi ng sai d th a t ·· [f]reedom to breed will bri ng 
ruin to all"" Hardin goes on to propose that ··[ t] hc o nly way we e m preserve and nur tu re 
other and more precious freedo ms is by n' li nq uishing the ft·eedom to bret:cl ." !d. 
22() . Mi chael A. He ile r. Tire Trugr:dv of rlz e An1icommons: Prop erly in rile Trunsirirm 
.fi"om i\1/urx 10 Mw!ws. 111 l·l."'. RV. L. REV. 62 ! ( 1998) . 
74 
cally with respect to their prope rty or may fa il to cooperate with o ther 
use rs clue to high transaction cos ts. H ell e r has obse rved that, clue to 
thi s characteristic of prope rty rule pro tec tion. asse ts in an anti-
commo ns commons regime wi ll fall prey to uncle rutiliza tion."27 The 
so lu tior; to an anti-commons diffic ulty is th us aggrega ti o n of prope rty 
righ ts into fewe r ha nds. 
One of the most promine nt examples of an anti-commons is pro-
vided by the land regi me in Native Ame ri c~ 111 reservations. In a well-
inte ntioned but misg uided attempt to rrotcct co mmunal Native 
America n la nds in the late nine teenth cen tu ry . Co ngress provided for 
the a ll ocation o f rese rva ti on lands among N<t tivc A m erican ho use-
ho lds. vvit h provisos severel y limi ting ali e na! in~ of th e parcels. "2" Over 
the years. as the lands became ever mo re d ivided amo ng he irs, the 
parcels became increas ingly frac tionated . to th e point where some 
la nd inte rests produced a lease incom e u[ as littl e as one cent per 
month. and much of the land lay fallow. In L983. Congress passed the 
Ind ian Land Consolidation Act, which escheated small portions of 
highly fractionated pa rcels to th e tribe upon dea th of the owner. How-
eve r, in Hodel v. lrving,229 the Supreme Co urt ruled that the escheat 
worked an unconstitutional uncompensa ted taking. A s a result many 
Native American lands remain in an anti-commons. 
A similar problem arises with respect to many other properties 
typical ly passed on to heirs as owners in common. After several cycles 
of intes tate succession , the prope rty is lik e ly to have numerous owners 
who have little communicat ion with one another and divergent inte r-
ests. Indeed, citing Robert Brown ·s ana lysis, H eller and H anoch 
Daga n recently suggested th at such an anti-commons regime was re-
sponsib le for the underutiliza tion of African American-owned rural 
land, a nd , ultim ate ly, the diss ipation of Afr ican-Ame rican participa-
tion in the agricultural economy Y0 
A pliability analysis introd uces additional tool s to resolve anti-
commons difficulties. A properly tailored pliability rule could avoid 
anti-commons problems by altering protection from property rules to 
liability rules whe n the value of the prope rty interest becomes suffi-
227. !d. a t 624. 626 (noting th at " [wjhen th e re a rc too many owne rs holdin g ri ghts of 
exclusion. the reso urce is prone to unde ruse - a rragedy ofrhc amicommons .. and proposing 
tha t '·[p ]ri va tizing a commons and bundling a n antico mm o ns ca n solve the tragedies of mis-
use by better ali gning indi vidual incen ti ves with socia l we lfa re ' '). H e lle r does note tha t an 
anti -commons regim e is idea l where no nuse is the most highly valued " use" o[ the property. 
22::::. See Genera l A llo tment A ct of 1887. ch. 11 9. 24 Sta t. 388: see also Act of Ma r. 2, 
1889. ch. 405. 25 Stat. 888 (a uthorizing the division o f th e Great Reservat ion of th e Sioux 
Nat io n into separa te rese rvations a nd the a ll otme nt of speci fi c tracts of rese rva tion la nd to 
individu a l Jndians. conditioned on the conse nt of three -fo urths of the adult male Sioux). 
229. 4B 1 U.S. 704 (1987) : see also You pee v. Babb itt. 519 U .S. 234 (1997) . 
230. See Hanoch Dagan & Michae l A. Heller , Th e Uherol Commons. 110 Y ALE L.J . 
549.551 & n.3 (2001). 
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ciently small. For exam ple . in th e Indian Lan d Consolidation Act, in-
stead of providing for a n uncompensated eschea t, Congress could 
have changed the nature of the interests in Nat ive A merican Lands 
into a pliability rule in which owners enjoyed property rule protection 
o nly as long as the va lue of the interest was sufficie ntly large , or the 
numbe r of owners in an undivided whole suff icie n tly small. E the 
va lue or number of ovv ne rs crossed a specified thresho ld , howe ve r. the 
owner would enj oy on ly liabil ity rule p rotection in he r land vis-a-v is 
other tr iba l members o r vis-): -vis the tri be . If, in the hands of the ne\v 
owner, the aggregate of land int e res ts we re to heco me suffic iently 
va lu able or were again conc,.:nt rate cl in a su fiic ie ntly small numbe r o f 
hands , the interest could o nce more '.:njoy property rule protection. 
More generally. th e usc of <t pliability rule co uld help reso lve th,:; 
diffic ulties proclucccl by success ive intestate successions and th e re-
sulting multiplicit y of un coord inated he irs. In such cases , policym akcrs 
could adop t a mecha ni sm of inte r- group pli ability protection, a llowing. 
for example, heirs of intes tate succession holding a too -sma ll perce nt-
age to be subject to lia bility protection for the ir small holdings. Such 
liability protection, howeve r, would only app ly vis-a-vis other heirs. 
W ith regards to non-heirs, the owners would enj oy full property rule 
protection. To the extent that anti-commons problems were responsi-
ble for the decline of African-American farm in g communities, a 
pliability regime could ha ve been a valuable tool in helping to pre-
serve minority rural la nd owne rship. 
Inter-group pliability regimes wo uld enjoy two significant advan-
tages over the Congressional schemes of th e last two decades. First, 
since the transition to pliability rules would s till enta il full compe nsa -
tion for takings , it wo ul d no t fa ll a foul of the Takings Clause. Second , 
because different potenti a l owners could compete for the land until it 
arrived in hands with suffi cient other land holdings, without the neces-
sity for potentially costly negotiation, the pliability regime would pro-
vide a more efficie nt m a rke t mechanism for aggregat ing the property 
holdings. 231 
2. Eminent Domain and Pri va(e Takings 
Pliability rule protection as a solution for anti -commons uncleru-
tilization can be seen as part of a broader category of pliability rule 
applications in the realm of private takings. A taking, in a pliabili ty 
analysis, transforms property rule into liability rule protection, and 
23 1. Given the immovabi lity o f the Ja nel holdings, th e legisla ti on wo uld have to provid e: 
a mecha nism by which perso ns could se ize the land subje ct to the li ability protection phase 
o f the plia bility rule. O ne possibility would be by se rving no tice upon a court and the pe rson 
fro m who m the land is be ing se ized . In cases of m ult ip le mino r ho lde rs tryi ng to se ize the 
sa me prope rty. or cyclica l tak ings a nd re ta kings of the same prope rty. the court could ini tia te 
a closed a uction. 
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th e n back into prope rty rule protection in new hands - those of th e 
government. However , a public taking is no t inev itable . Condemna-
ti o n could pave the way for the interes t ending up in priva te hands in 
th e third . property rule phase of th e pliabili ty rule. This would be a 
private, rather than public taking. 
No twithst a nding the constitutional requir~.::ment th at the govern-
ment e\e rcisc its power of e mine nt doma in for a ··pu blic use:-:~'2 ofte n. 
the takin g resu lts in the transfer an object lrom unc se t of private 
hands to anoth e r. For example, in th e fa n11ws case of Po!erm vn 
Neiglih orlzood Council v. Ciry ofDerroir.2'; the city o f Detroit se ized a 
number o f rrivate lo ts in order to trans fe r th e m Lu Genera l Motors for 
building <1 ne w fac tory. Vis-a-vis the government. ever)' origin a l owner 
of a private lot in Poletown e njoyed thc pliab ility rule protect io n 
shaped by th e law of eminent domain. This pliabilit y rule protec ti o n 
was not a ltered by the fact that the ultimate destination of the prop-
erty was<:. different se t of private hands. Indeed. imagin e that Ge ne ra l 
Motors could itself trigger the process for a taking by eminent domain 
by petitioning for city council approval for a private taking. In such a 
case, th e original owner would enjoy the same pliability rul e protec-
ti on as in the case of a public takin g, so long as the pliability rule's 
trigger for altering rule protection remained the same. 
Whil e priva te takings might produce th e same incentive effects on 
the original owners as public takings, private takings offe r two poten-
ti a lly significant advantages . First, by e limina tin g an unnecessary ac-
to r, private takings reduce surplus bureaucracy and decrease the cost 
of coordination. If the Poletown case had involved a private taking, 
General Motors could proceed on its own once it had received ap-
proval to exercise a private taking . Instead of coord inating with a gov-
ernment agency to undertake the project, General Motors could ncgo-
tiate and interact directly with the land owners in Pole town. 
Importantly, as in the case of the public taking, owners dissatisfied 
with their compensation could seek judici<1l review. Thus, the lack of 
direct involvement of a government agency would no t alter the rights 
available to the lane! owners. 
Second, private takings lead the parties to a more accurate ac-
counting of the costs of their actions , leading to fewer inefficient tak-
ings. Were Pole town a private takings case , General Motors would 
pay the required just compensation directly to th e land owne rs, re-
quiring it to internalize the full cost of the taking. By contrast , in the 
context of a public taking, the Po letown case permits General Motors 
to underestima te th e cost of the takings while possibly requiring the 
232. Bur see supm note 208 . 
233. 304N.W.2d 455(Mich. l98 1) 
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government to overestimate the cost.''! Indeed. the takings compensa-
tion costs for the Poletown project greatly exceeded original estimates, 
leading to a depletion of public funds of in excess of $200 million.=35 
Private takings could be widely permitted. given the ubiquity of 
the strategic problems justifying public takings.=''' The strategic prob-
lems afflicting government acquisitions can be seen in such private 
contexts as railroad ancl utilit: l<md purchases. lncleccl. it is for pre-
cisely this reason that private t:tkings were cl wide ly used tool in the 
nineteenth century for railroa(L. =;' 
An important caveat must be ~tdcled here. So long as the trigger 
c:mployecJ by the pliability rul>.:: ie ll1<lii1S the ~ame. the nature of the 
p liability r u le protection depend-; I1{)l at all on the actor who ends up 
with the final entitlement. Thus. a pliability analysis demonstr<lles 
that, in one sense, private takings are no less defensible than public 
takings. However, when the pliability rule ·s trigger depends on the 
discretion of a particular party. the identity of the party exercising that 
discretion naturally affects the incentive effects of the pliability rule. 
In our example of a private taking in the Poletovvn case, we vested dis-
cretion in the same actor as the real Poletown case did - the city 
council. Thus, we did not have to take account of the altered incentive 
effectsY8 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have developed the concept of pliability rules 
and demonstrated its centrality to a full understanding of the entitle-
ment theory sparked by Calebresi and Melamed's classic article. We 
have also shown the pervasiveness of pliability rules in existing legal 
structures, and demonstrated how pliability analysis can transform 
property and intellectual property law. 
Any study of a subject requires an understanding of its animating 
principles. The law is no exception. In light of the widespread use of 
234. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky. Gi ving.,·. 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001); 
Merrill. supru note 20i-:. 
235. Editorial, Proleclllze Tuxpavers. DETROIT NEWS. Oct. 19. 1999 at AlO; Tina Lam, 
Dispule Could Cause Price u( Land f!;r Swdium' 1o Rise. DE.f ROIT FREE PRESS. May 17. 
1999. at lB. 
236. See. e.g .. EPSTEIN, supm note 101. at 169-l:-\l (arguing in favor of private takings 
for public usc): Lawrence Berger. The Puhlic Usc Rcquircmenl in Eminenl Dolllain. 57 OR. 
L REV. 203.236-37.243 (1978) (proposing that th e public use requirement in private takings 
-for e:-:ample. where landowners need to acquire access to their real property - should be 
allowed only if fifty percent excess compensation is pa id). 
237. Sec FischeL supra note 209. at 80-S9 (1995) (discussing historical evidence of pri-
vate takings by railroads in the nineteenth century) . 
23S. A fuller analysis of the ince:ntive effects created by discretionary triggering events 
in pliability rules lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
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pl iability rules in our legal syste m. it behooves the academy to update 
its theories to fit a comp lex legal reality. Given the ability of pliabi lit y 
rules to accornmodate divergent social concerns . it is not surprising 
that they are already widely used, forcing the acZtclemy to plZly catch -
up. A ttention to pliability rules is thus necessary to a lign theory and 
reality. ?viorc ove r. such academic ana lysis of pliabili ty ru les can gene r-
ate supe rior possibilities for decis ionmakers, as we illustrated in the 
fin al Part o f this Article. 
Our expositi on has provided a taste of the possibiliti es created by 
pli abil ity a na lysis . rat her than exha usted the m. The pr ism of pliability 
highlights t rend s and fea tures of the law that an . .: no t eas ily seen oth -
erwise . Listing a ll the examples lies beyond the ken of this Artic le . 
But. to illustrate some possib le directions for futur e d isc ussions. we 
close by brieLly touching upon a field of law that we have not yet men-
tioned - bank ruptcy. 
To be sure. the place of bankruptcy rights in Calcbres i a nd 
Melamed's traditiona l framework is not easily determined , rend ering 
it somewhat difficult to define precisely the various stages of the 
pliability rules crea ted by bankruptcy. 239 But there is littl e doubt that 
the bankruptcy framewo rk follows the broad outlines of pliability 
rul es: one type of protection is altered by a trigger (the filing of the pe-
tition) and replaced by another type of protection. Bankruptcy law es-
tablishes that a certain event- the proper filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion - alters the rights of a ll persons with regard to the p ropert y of 
the debtor. A new set of rules applies to all the debtor 's and creditors ' 
enti tlements while the petition is in bankruptcy court, and after the 
proceeding is completed, the debtor is considered a new person, e nti-
tled to a "fresh start.., 
However. the importance of bankruptcy for pliability a nalysis lies 
not in its providing ye t another instance of the usc of pli abi lity rules in 
legal practice; rather, the example of bankruptcy points to the impact 
of pliability rules on commercial practice, and the importance of un-
derstanding pliability rules as a category distinct from property or 
li abi lity rules. Aware that a potential bankruptcy will trigger a change 
in protections, parties to commercial transactions shape their ex an tc 
expectations. The possibility that a bankruptcy petition will alter the 
rights of owners and creditors has led to business practices such as 
credit ratings, risk-based interest premiums and guara ntees. It has also 
spawned such lega l fields as secured transactions, which seek to shape 
the rights of parties in the post-petition state of the debtor. All these 
239. See Shu bha Gh osh. Th e i'vlorphing of Properly Rules and Liabilitv Rules: 1\n !m el· 
lectua/ Proper!v Optimist Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy . 8 fORDH AiVI INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L J. 99 (1997); see also David Frisch , Th e Implicit '" Takin gs " Jurisprudence 
of Arricle 9 of the Uni_l(mn Cotwn ercial Code, 64 FORDHAM L R LV. ll (1 995) (examining 
prope rty rights in the conte xt of secured transactions); cf Merrill & Smit h. supra not e 94 
(arg uing against prope rty a nalys is of in personam rights). 
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in stitutions are based upon th e parties· aware ness that the legal rights 
they e njoy will not necessarily extend infinit e ly into th e future . Yet. 
th e part ies also know th at if a bankr uptcy petition trigge rs a 
rearrangement o f their rights, they wi ll not fin d th e mselves in 
unknown territory. The post-pe tition rules of bankruptcy are re lative ly 
clear a nd can be planned for. 
Thus. bankruptcy provides an importa nt guide on how th e legal 
academy should use pliability a nalysis. In exa minin g any given kga i 
enti tkme nt. we must reject th e temptati on t() engage in a s tatic <ma ly-
sis that freezes th e entitlement a t th e present time. Ins tea d. we mus t 
adopt <t dynamic perspective tha t incorp<m:tes the change that the en -
titlem e nt is clue to undergo. Like th e commt:rci a l actors aware of 
bankruptcy. we too can proj ect change and create st ru c tures - like 
secur ities and pl edges in the context of bankruptcy - that take into 
account the abi lity to change built into th e ri ghts created by l aw. 2~' 1 
The three decades tha t have elapsed since Cabbresi and 
Me lamed 's landmark article have demonstrated its durability and use -
fuln ess. To retain its vitality, however. Calabrcsi and Melam ed 's 
model must be adapted to the dynamism of legal rules. Static prope rty 
and li ab ility rules have become basic stap les of lega l research. It is 
time for their dynamic cousins - pliability rules- to jo in them. 
2-10. Before concluding. we note that ou r Artick - like many base d on The Cmhedra/ 
- has focused o n prope rty a nd liability as the two basic building blocks identi fied by 
Ca labresi a nd Me lamed. Ot he r combinations are. o f course, possible. Conside r child labor. 
Until a ce rtain age. a child·s labor is ina lie nable : afte r th at age . a pe rson may se ll her labor at 
any ag ree d upon price, wi thin the bounds se t by labor la ws. Thus. chi ld labo r laws create a 
type of ' ·pli ability rule" th a t involves a transition from in a li e nability to pro perty ru le pro tec-
ti on . 
